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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the past impact United Nations Command (UNC) has had on 
South Korean security. With South Korea’s security environment facing significant 
changes today, including the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) and the 
push to establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, the UNC is under debate over 
whether it has to remain in the peninsula. This thesis seeks to analyze the impact of the 
UNC on South Korea’s security on a comprehensive security concept to give insight into 
the debate. This thesis analyzes the UNC’s influence on South Korea’s security 
before and after the creation of the CFC in 1978, when the UNC’s role was changed. 
This thesis insists that the UNC has had different effects on the comprehensive 
security of South Korea. Prior to 1978, the UNC had a positive impact on South 
Korea’s military and economic security but had a somewhat negative impact on 
political and diplomatic security. Since 1978, the UNC has had a limited positive 
impact on South Korea’s military security and has played a positive role in 
diplomatic security. Based on these findings, this thesis proposes that South Korea 
should have diplomatic initiative to resolve Korean Peninsula issues. This thesis also 
suggests that before establishing a peace regime, there should be no room for concessions 
in denuclearization negotiations with North Korea. Finally, this thesis suggests that the 
UNC should remain as an extension of its past positive role. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis examines what impact the United Nations Command (UNC) has had on 
South Korean security in the past. With South Korea’s security environment facing 
significant changes today, the UNC is under debate over whether it has to remain. 
However, although there are conflicting opinions on the issue, the analysis of the UNC’s 
impact on South Korea’s security is either peripheral or lacking. In this context, this thesis 
analyzes the impact of the UNC on South Korea’s security on a comprehensive security 
concept. This thesis also analyzes the UNC’s influence on South Korea’s security before 
and after of the creation of the CFC in 1978, when the role of the UNC changed. 
This thesis insists that the UNC has had various effects on the comprehensive 
security of South Korea. Prior to 1978, the UNC had a positive impact on South Korea’s 
military and economic security as well as a somewhat negative impact on political and 
diplomatic security. At that time, the UNC provided South Korea with deterrence against 
North Korea, and based on this, the UNC guaranteed South Korea to be able to lead the 
economic growth. In the process, however, the UNC partially restricted Seoul’s foreign 
policy and failed to curb Seoul’s involvement in a series of events in which democracy 
regressed. Since 1978, the UNC has had a limited positive impact on South Korea’s 
military security and has played a positive role in diplomatic security. The role of the UNC, 
which has been reduced since 1978, has not been enough to force North Korea to restrain 
itself. However, the UNC has supported South Korea’s deterrence against North Korea by 
institutionally guaranteeing the execution of its mission of providing troops in case of 
emergency. On the diplomatic security, the UNC has been able to enhance South Korea’s 
diplomatic security by influencing North Korea’s diplomatic isolation. 
Based on these arguments, this thesis recognizes that the Korean Peninsula issue is 
an international issue and proposes that South Korea has diplomatic initiative to resolve it. 
It also suggests that before establishing a peace regime, there should be no room for 
concessions in denuclearization negotiations with the North Korea. Finally, this thesis 
suggests that the UNC should remain as an extension of its past positive role so that it can 
be meaningful to South Korean security in the future. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines what impact the United Nations Command (UNC) has had on 
South Korean security in the past. 
When the Korean War broke out, the United Nations (UN) established the UNC to 
implement collective security aimed at peace in the international community.1 On July 14, 
1950, The President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea (ROK), facing North Korea’s 
massive invasion, handed over Operational Control (OPCON) of ROK forces to the 
commander of the UNC, General MacArthur. The commander of the UNC exercised 
OPCON over ROK forces and multinational forces belonging to the UNC, which 
conducted the Korean War. On July 27, 1953, with the signing of the Armistice Agreement 
(AA), the Korean War was suspended, but military threats from North Korea still existed. 
In response, the UNC played an important role in South Korean security by providing 
strong deterrence against North Korea. 
With the establishment of the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) in 
1978, the role of the UNC was reduced somewhat. The commander of the UNC handed 
over OPCON to the CFC, which maintained a reduced role in supervising violations of the 
AA, maintaining dialogue channels with North Korea, and providing multinational forces 
with the UNC’s legal authority to operate in South Korea in case of emergency.2 
In 1994, peacetime OPCON of ROK forces was returned to South Korean 
government, and wartime OPCON of ROK forces is also in the process of being 
transferred. With considerable changes continuing in the security environment on the 
Korean Peninsula, calls are being made for the establishment of a peaceful regime on the 
Korean Peninsula. In order to meet these demands, the Moon administration now is 
 
1 Hanbyeol Son, “The Korean Peninsula Peace Regime and Alternatives for the Role of the UNC: 
Maintaining, Enlarging, Transferring, Switching, and Dismantling,” The Korean Conference for 
International Politics (July 2019): 3–6. 
2 Ibid., 3–6. 
2 
pursuing a peace policy which pursues peace based on mutual respect between the two 
Koreas, cooperates with the international community in an open way, and institutionalizes 
these efforts to ensure the sustainability of this policy.3 
This peace policy implies expectations for the declaration of the end of the Korean 
War, which naturally leads to public opinion favoring the dismantlement of the UNC. On 
the other hand, other opinions insist on the importance of the UNC’s continuing existence, 
laying out alternative future roles based on the past role of the UNC and the practical 
benefits it currently provides. The UNC revitalization program, which has been under way 
since 2014 with the aim of expanding the role of UNC, is also in line with these claims. As 
a result, debates over the future of the UNC have arisen. 
It is natural that judgments about the past value of the UNC should precede debate 
over its future role. Thus, this thesis seeks to explore answers to the more foundational 
question: What has been the role of the United Nations Command in affecting South 
Korean security in the past? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
As the debates over the future of the UNC build, the importance of the judgment 
about the current value of the UNC is increasing, as various scholarly efforts show. Above 
all, judgment of current value should be a logical basis for debates about the UNC’s future 
role. Scholarly efforts to judge the value of the UNC can try to find the answer in history. 
Based on the continuity of history that connects the past, the present and the future, a 
reflection on history could provide a insights for the future. In this context, scholarly 
assessment of the value of UNC in the past can provide a valuable foundation for today’s 
debates. 
While the importance and interest of historical research on UNC’s value are 
increasing, many efforts remain one-dimensional, focusing only on the military dimension. 
These assessments provide an explanation of how the UNC defeated North Korean attacks 
 
3 ROK Ministry of Unification, Unification White Paper 2018 (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 2018): 
12–13. 
3 
during the Korean War. They also respond to how South Korea has been able to maintain 
peace without a recurrence of war despite the continued threat from North Korea since the 
Korean War. However, these views offer different arguments about how the role of the 
UNC was reduced by the creation of the CFC, which provides room for another debate. In 
other words, these academic efforts have not risen above the superficial level. 
This thesis also has academic significance in that it could provide insight into the 
past, present and future security environments on the Korean Peninsula. First, this research 
could provide a window of understanding of North Korea’s offensive moves. Since the 
Korean War, South Korea has achieved military development based on the UNC’s 
deterrence against North Korea, but North Korea has been seen as a relatively declining 
military power in the past half century.4 North Korea still has a quantitatively dominant 
conventional military power edge, but it is degraded in quality, and the country continues 
to focus on developing asymmetrical methods such as weapons of mass destruction and 
nuclear weapons. 5  North Korea’s offensive behavior has aroused antipathy from the 
international community, and its diplomatic isolation has been aggravated through 
continued sanctions by the international community, including the UN.6 In other words, 
North Korea’s offensive moves and diplomatic isolation have formed a vicious circle, 
reflecting Pyeongyang’s perception of its own security. The UNC, which has played a role 
in providing deterrence against North Korea and managing the AA on the Korean 
Peninsula, must play a role in Pyeongyang’s considerations. In this sense, study of the UNC 
role could provide insight into North Korean attitudes and behavior. 
As a second insight into Korean Peninsula security environments, this research is 
also helpful in understanding the current and future U.S. global strategy, especially its 
Asian strategy. Since the UNC is geographically located in South Korea and the U.S. 
proactively operates the UNC, the UNC could be one way to implement the U.S. security 
 
4 John H. Cushman, “The Military Balance in Korea,” Asian Affairs 6, no. 6 (1979): 359–369, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/30171864. 
5 “2020 Military Strength Ranking,” Global Firepower, Accessed March 7, 2020, 
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp. 
6 Jina Kim, “UN Sanctions as an Instrument of Coercive Diplomacy against North Korea,” Korean 
Journal of Defense Analysis 26, no. 3 (October 2014): 315–332. 
4 
strategy.7 The facts that the CFC commander has held the position of UNC commander 
and run the UNC revitalization program support this. In this context, this research could 
help to understand how the U.S. utilizes the UNC’s values and resources in implementing 
its security strategy. Furthermore, this research could help to gauge the U.S. strategic 
intention and process of judgment to utilize the UNC, and provide a prism in understanding 
the future geopolitical rivalry between the great powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The existing literature that deals with the UNC itself is largely divided into three 
categories. First, there is literature dealing with the alternative roles of the UNC in the 
changing security environment on the Korean Peninsula, such as the transfer of wartime 
OPCON, change in the nature of the U.S.-ROK alliance, and the establishment of a 
peaceful regime on the Korean Peninsula. Second, the experts cover the legal status and 
issues concerning the alternative roles of the UNC in the changing security environment. 
Third, scholars attempt to assess the historical role of the UNC itself in South Korean 
security. This third topic is the intended focus of this thesis. 
Historical research on the UNC’s value to South Korea tends to be shallow because 
it is treated as a subsidiary topic of other questions. There are attempts to suggest alternative 
roles of the UNC as a preemptive response to disputes over the UNC.8 These efforts define 
the meaning of the UNC’s existence, and suggest roles in keeping with the changing 
context of the times. Also, they present an assessment of the ongoing program for 
revitalization of the UNC. However, these views are built on the judgement that the role of 
the UNC has been positive without careful analysis. Ironically, they overlook the 
 
7 In-hyo Seol, “United Nations Command in Korean Peninsula: The Past and the Present,” Institute of 
Military History, no. 108 (September 2018): 1–35, http://www.dbpia.co.kr/journal/
articleDetail?nodeId=NODE07531499. 
8 Hanbyeol Son, “The Korean Peninsula Peace Regime and Alternatives for the Role of the UNC: 
Maintaining, Enlarging, Transferring, Switching, and Dismantling,” The Korean Conference for 
International Politics (July 2019); Wongon Park, “The United Nations Command in Korea: Past, Present, 
and Future,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 21, no.4 (December 2009); Kyudok Hong, “The 
Continuing Role of the United Nations in the Future of Korean Security,” in Recalibrating the U.S.-
Republic of Korea Alliance, ed. Donald W. Boose, Balbina Y. Hwang, Patrick Morgan, and Andrew 
Scobell (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003). 
5 
assessment of past UNC roles, and subsequently faces logical limitations by excluding the 
importance of fully evaluating the historical role. 
These problems also occur frequently in scholarly efforts to review potential issues 
about the future role of the UNC.9 The UNC was created through a resolution by the U.N. 
Security Council, but there is a dispute over its legal status if a peace treaty is signed on 
the Korean Peninsula and the Armistice Agreement ends. The debate concerns whether or 
not the basis of the UNC’s existence would disappear at that point. But each of these 
viewpoints stems from differences in interpretation of the UNC in its historical context. As 
such, assessment of the UNC’s value requires historical evaluation, but such efforts have 
been lacking. In this context, this thesis research will provide an historical evaluation to fill 
these gaps in prior scholarly work. 
Existing studies evaluating the role of the UNC itself can be further categorized 
into three types of arguments: that the UNC has undermined peace in South Korea, that it 
has passively contributed to peace, or that it has actively contributed to peace. The claim 
that the UNC undermined peace in South Korea mainly deals with the judgment of who 
provides the primary source of conflict between the UNC and North Korea. The studies 
concluding that the UNC has either passively or actively contributed to peace vary 
according to evaluation criteria. Some focus on the UNC’s role only in terms of deterrence 
of war, while others expand the scope to consider its role to manage crises and contribute 
to the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
1. The UNC’s Negative Contribution to South Korean Security 
There is a view that the UNC, which played a major role in South Korea’s security 
after the Korean War, had a negative impact on South Korean security. Steven Lee points 
 
9 Chad R. Nishizuka, “Demystifying the U.S.–ROK Command and Control Structure: How “OPCON 
Transfer” Can Advance the Unity of Effort on the Korean Peninsula,” The Korean Journal of Defense 
Analysis 30, no. 4 (December 2018); Steven Lee, “The Korean Armistice and the End of Peace: The US-
UN Coalition and the Dynamics of War-Making in Korea, 1953–76,” Journal of Korean Studies 18, no.2 
(2013); Sang-hyuk Lee, “Authority for Issuing the ROE of the ROK Armed Forces: Focused on the Scope 
of the ROE Issuing Authority of the UNC and the CFC,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 33, no. 4 
(2017). 
6 
to the UNC as the beginning of conflict and confrontation on the Korean Peninsula.10 This 
study sees the nature of the UNC itself as a one-sidedly led organization by the U.S., and 
the alliance with states in the UNC is a side that sympathizes with the U.S. strategic 
diplomatic actions in a way of collusion or silence. This view explains that the U.S., which 
used offensive diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula in accordance with its own interests, 
has been linked with supporters in the UNC and has caused North Korea’s offensive 
behavior. As an example, it presents the U.S. tactical nuclear deployment on the Korean 
Peninsula in the 1950s. In addition, he contends that the role of the UNC in South Korea’s 
military and economic growth also contributed to the strengthening of North Korea’s 
dictatorship and to a potential arms race. 
There is also a claim that the existence of the UNC has had a negative impact on 
the South Korean military. First, Chad R. Nishizuka considers the meaning and impact of 
the UNC since the establishment of the CFC. He argues that there are overlapping roles 
between the CFC and the UNC in South Korean security policy, and that the presence of 
the UNC, in particular, undermines the efficiency of South Korean military operations by 
complicating the command and control procedures for military operations to be carried out 
on the Korean Peninsula.11 Sang-hyuk Lee points to South Korea’s weak ability to carry 
out military operations by paying attention to disordered rules of engagement (ROE) from 
the complex relations between the UNC, the CFC and the South Korean Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.12 These views that the existence of the UNC has had negative impact on South 
Korean security are a logical basis for the argument for the dismantlement of the UNC. 
 
10 Steven Lee, “The Korean Armistice and the End of Peace: The US-UN Coalition and the Dynamics 
of War-Making in Korea, 1953–76,” Journal of Korean Studies 18, no.2 (2013): 183–224. 
11 Chad R. Nishizuka, “Demystifying the U.S.–ROK Command and Control Structure: How “OPCON 
Transfer” Can Advance the Unity of Effort on the Korean Peninsula,” The Korean Journal of Defense 
Analysis 30, no. 4 (December 2018): 455–457. 
12 Sang-hyuk Lee, “Authority for Issuing the ROE of the ROK Armed Forces: Focused on the Scope 
of the ROE Issuing Authority of the UNC and the CFC,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 33, no. 4 
(2017): 100–102. 
7 
2. The UNC’s Passive Contribution to South Korean Security 
Some articles argue that the UNC has made a passive contribution to South Korean 
peace, limiting the evaluation of the UNC’s role of deterring war. Kyudok Hong divides 
the role of the UNC into three major categories and evaluates the role of the UNC 
somewhat skeptically based on these.13 First, considering enforcement, he explains that 
efforts to maintain non-military characteristics within the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) have 
been made to some extent, but have been often violated by North Korea, making it difficult 
to ensure its success. Second, considering verification, he notes that North Korea’s refusal 
to cooperate from the outset means that verification has repeatedly failed, overshadowing 
its role. Third, considering communication, he analyzes that it was inefficient at first due 
to the hostility of North Korea, but that the UNC has remained somewhat of a dialogue 
channel over time. For these reasons, he makes skeptical claims about the UNC’s role in 
maintaining peace. 
Wongon Park also evaluates the value of the UNC based on the mission and role of 
the UNC, and consequently argues that the role of the UNC itself was passive.14 It gives a 
positive assessment of the inter-Korean war deterrence not mentioned in Kyudok Hong’s 
claim, and also of potential deterrence through the provision of a rear base for the UNC 
located in Japan. But in the same vein as Kyudok Hong’s claim, he raises the UNC’s lack 
of a role in maintaining dialogue channels with North Korea and implementing the AA, 
and insists the UNC’s contribution to peace has been only passive. 
3. The UNC’s Active Contribution to South Korean Security 
Some authors insist the UNC has made an active contribution to South Korean 
security. First, Seong Ho Jhe reappraises AA’s value, and argues that the role of the UNC, 
 
13 Kyudok Hong, “The Continuing Role of the United Nations in the Future of Korean Security,” in 
Recalibrating the U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliance, ed. Donald W. Boose, Balbina Y. Hwang, Patrick 
Morgan, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 69–88. 
14 Wongon Park, “The United Nations Command in Korea: past, present, and future,” The Korean 
Journal of Defense Analysis 21, no.4 (December 2009): 485–499. 
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which is inseparable from the AA, was positive.15 In particular, he presents four major 
functions of the AA and adds more weight to the explanation that the function of preventing 
a recurrence of war or armed conflict has prevented North Korea’s massive military strike 
on the Korean Peninsula. According to his argument, as globalization progresses, 
preemptive strike planning is a target of condemnation from the international community, 
and countries’ efforts to avoid accusations of having such intentions have naturally curbed 
large-scale military conflicts on the Korean Peninsula. It also suggests that 36 of the 63 
clauses of the AA are still adhered to, and given the realistic circumstances and the context 
of the times, this result means that the AA is positively functional. 
A different school of thought claims an active contribution of the UNC through the 
relationship between the U.S.-ROK alliance and the UNC, which is the core of South 
Korea’s defense policy. Hanbyeol Son argues that the UNC has played a role as a key 
vehicle for the U.S.-ROK alliance to function.16 He explains that the UNC still defended 
South Korea after the signing of the AA and that the UNC allowed the U.S. military 
stationed in South Korea to have strategic flexibility after the establishment of CFC. 
Ironically, he claims that the UNC gave rise to the CFC, and its military institutionalization 
between the U.S.-ROK, as the U.S. reduced its military commitment to South Korea. 
According to his assertion, the UNC has become a major justification of the establishment 
of the CFC in the context of the U.S. concerns over its declining influence on South Korea 
and South Korea’s increasing perception of its own autonomy and sovereignty. As a result, 
he insists on the active contribution of the UNC through its role as a key mechanism that 
has made the U.S.-ROK alliance function more powerfully. 
Hwee Rhak Park, on the other hand, analyzes the potential effect of the dissolution 
of the CFC on the UNC, and emphasizes the advantages of a complex system between the 
 
15 Seong Ho Jhe, “Role of the Armistice Agreement under Korean Security Environment and Future 
Peace Management Regime,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 29, no. 2 (July 2013): 10–45. 
16 Hanbyeol Son, “The Korean Peninsula Peace Regime and Alternatives for the Role of the UNC: 
Maintaining, Enlarging, Transferring, Switching, and Dismantling,” The Korean Conference for 
International Politics (July 2019): 1–23. 
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UNC and the CFC.17 In particular, he argues that the option to choose between the UNC 
and the CFC as the lead entity responding to any crisis situation on the Korean Peninsula 
provides more flexibility to meet the needs of the strategic situation. He also asserts that 
South Korea exerts a higher level of influence in the UN thanks to the U.S.-ROK alliance, 
thereby securing Korea’s international presence. As such, the combined system of the UNC 
and the CFC itself plays an active role in South Korean security. 
4. Appraisal of Existing Literature 
Existing studies dealing with the alternative roles of the UNC serve as a key basis 
for the insistence on maintaining the UNC. However, these studies, above all, do not 
provide a thorough assessment of the UNC’s role. Without systematic analysis, these 
existing studies tend to assume that the UNC has played a positive role in the security 
environment on the Korean Peninsula. Due to this problem, these studies are logically 
vulnerable. In particular, these assessments could overestimate the value of the UNC and 
raise fundamental questions about whether it really played a positive role in the security 
environment on the Korean Peninsula. A more complete historical evaluation could further 
deepen the debate over the existence of the UNC. 
Studies dealing with the assessment of the UNC’s role typically only deal with the 
military aspect of maintaining peace, a serious limitation. In particular, the issue 
surrounding the security of the Korean Peninsula today cannot be judged simply by the 
existence of military conflicts and wars. The Republic of Korea and North Korea are 
repeating the process of conflict and reconciliation, and in particular, North Korea is taking 
an offensive stance in this interaction.18 There are various analyses that North Korea’s 
offensive intentions are aimed at strengthening solidarity within North Korea, breaking 
through the international community’s economic sanctions, and breaking away from 
 
17 Hwee Rhak Park, “The Impact of Dismantlement of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command on 
the United Nations Command: Policy Suggestions for the Republic of Korea,” New Asia Journal 19, no. 3 
(2012): 76–98, http://scholar.dkyobobook.co.kr/searchDetail.laf?barcode=4010023498113. 
18 “The First Meeting of the Leaders of the Two Koreas between the Military Demarcation Line,” 
Yonhap News, April 27, 2018, https://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?oid=001&aid=0010051811.; “North 
Korea Explodes Kaesong Liaison Office, Blue House “Strong Regret,”“ Yonhap News, June 16, 2020, 
https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20200616134554504?input=1195m. 
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diplomatic isolation. 19  These diverse explanations prove that security on the Korean 
Peninsula can never be viewed only as a military matter. 
This thesis attempts a systematic analysis of the role of the UNC in the past based 
on an expanded security concept that goes beyond military considerations alone. Through 
this analysis, this thesis seeks to have a macroscopic view of the value of the UNC in the 
past and supplement the limitations of existing research which have remained more limited. 
In particular, this thesis attempts to find a link between the role of the UNC in the political, 
diplomatic and economic aspects of South Korean security. These attempts are not intended 
to examine the merits and demerits of the UNC in the past, but to objectively examine the 
actual value of the UNC shown by concrete indicators of its utilization. Depending on the 
results of the analysis, this thesis may either supplement or lead to arguments refuting the 
logical limitations of existing studies dealing with the alternative roles of the UNC. Above 
all, this thesis could provide the basis for judging the policy implications of the UNC, 
regardless of the analysis results. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis begins at the threshold of existing literature in which the UNC’s role 
evaluation remains fragmentary. As globalization progresses, interdependence among 
states in the international community today is increasing, and the scope of roles played by 
states is also expanding. Simple survival of states is losing its place as the single goal. 
Considering this point, evaluating the role of the UNC only in the military aspect of 
maintaining peace does not reflect the reality and characteristics of the international 
community. Also, to some extent, this has always been true. Providing narrow military 
security for South Korea has never been the UNC’s only function. Therefore, this thesis 
seeks to reevaluate the role of the UNC based on an expanded security concept including 
 
19 Tae Hyun Kim, “A Coercive Strategy of KJU(Kim Jong Un) Regime,” The Korean Journal of 
Defense Analysis 31, no. 4 (2016); Hae Soo Yang, “A Study on the Transformation to the Provocation 
Intention of North Korea According to the Behavior of Provocation,” Review of Korean Military Studies 7, 
no. 1 (July 2018); Sung-Yoon Chung, “North Koreas Hwa-Chun Double-Sided Strategy: Characteristics 
and a Prospect,” The Journal of Strategic Studies (March 2012); Jongkwa Jeong and Dongman Shin, 
“Analysis of Kim Jung Un Regime’s Stick-and-Carrot Tactics and Our Confrontation Strategy,” Military 
Studies 139 (2015). 
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economic, diplomatic and sovereignty dimensions. The following hypotheses provide 
focus to the inquiries into each of these dimensions. 
(1) Hypothesis #1 
If the UNC has suppressed North Korea’s military attacks on the Korean Peninsula 
after the Korean War, it can be judged that the UNC has had a positive impact on South 
Korean security. This is in line with the theory of deterrence, which guarantees security by 
pre-suppressing a threatened armed attack.20 The fact that the Korean War stopped with 
the AA did not guarantee a complete resolution of the military tension, which means that 
there is an inherent possibility of a recurrence of military armed conflict at any time. 
Therefore, deterrence against North Korea can be an important criterion in assessing the 
role of the UNC. Above all, however, a clear definition of North Korean military attacks 
being deterred is required, it is required to judge how North Korea’s perception of the UNC 
figures into its intentions. From this perspective, this thesis evaluates the correlation 
between North Korea’s military provocations and the role of the UNC, improving on past 
assessments even within the narrow military idea of security. 
(2) Hypothesis #2 
If the UNC has favorably influenced Korea’s economic development, the UNC has 
had a positive impact on South Korean security. After the Korean War, South Korea 
suffered from considerable damage, and its economic level made it one of the world’s 
poorest countries.21 South Korea needed post-war economic recovery for its physical 
survival. Also, South Korea needed economic growth to gain an upper hand over North 
Korea as the regime competition between South Korea and North Korea intensified after 
the war. However, military threats from North Korea still existed, and South Korea was in 
a situation where economic growth and deterrence against North Korea had to be achieved 
 
20 Van Jackson, “Beyond Tailoring: North Korea and the Promise of Managed Deterrence,” 
Contemporary Security Policy 33, no. 2 (June 2012): 296–301. 
21 Joonseok Yang, “Why Did the Post-Korean War the Korean Reconstruction Program Between the 
R.O.K. and the U.S. Fall Apart?” The Korean Journal of International Studies 59, no. 1 (March 2019): 50–
54. 
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at the same time. Obviously, South Korea had limited national resources to achieve these 
two goals. In this context, South Korea’s economic development could advance more 
quickly if North Korea’s provocations could be contained by other resources. Based on the 
fact that the essential purpose of the UNC is to provide South Korea with military security, 
an analysis of the correlation between Korea’s economic growth and the UNC’s role could 
present the criteria for determining the UNC’s influence on the economic dimension of 
South Korean security. 
(3) Hypothesis #3 
If the UNC has promoted South Korean diplomatic buildup, it could be judged that 
the UNC has had a positive impact on South Korean security. The UNC is a military 
extension of the UN created under the value of collective security, and so is an organization 
that reflects this aspect of diplomatic relations among states. South Korea, reborn as a 
modern independent country based on democracy after the colonial period, was the patron 
of the UNC during the Korean War, and this relationship has been maintained even after 
the Korean War. In this context, this thesis examines the special relationship between South 
Korean diplomatic power and the role of the UNC, and judges the UNC’s influence on the 
security of South Korea by looking at whether South Korean international influence has 
expanded based on the UNC. 
(4) Hypothesis #4 
If the UNC has guaranteed the autonomy of South Korea’s policymaking, the UNC 
has had a positive impact on South Korean security. During the Korean War, the UNC 
commanded the Korean War with OPCON, and after the Korean War, the UNC retained 
the OPCON until the CFC was established. The possession of OPCON does not in itself 
mean direct intervention in the nation’s sovereignty, but considering the meaning of 
operational control, the potential impact on the formation of security-related policies 
cannot be ignored. In this regard, the UNC was inseparable from security-related 
policymaking of South Korea, which was emerging in the implementation of the new 
political system. Therefore, it is possible to judge the UNC’s influence on South Korean 
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security by considering the UNC’s role in security-related policymaking and the 
development of the political governance capacity of the South Korean government. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis analyzes the impact of UNC on South Korean security. In developing 
the argument, this thesis defines the concept of security first. With the international 
community’s multi-layered and complex transformation, the concept of “security” can no 
longer focus solely on military elements. In other words, it extends the concept of security 
beyond military elements to economic, diplomatic and political.22 This thesis analyzes the 
role of UNC based on this broader concept of security. 
The deterrence of military security elements is evaluated through the case of North 
Korea’s provocation against South Korea when South Korean military strength was clearly 
inferior to North Korean military strength. In particular, the evaluation of North Korea’s 
provocations is not based solely on the number of such provocations, but also on the type 
and nature of provocations. This thesis evaluates the primary influence of deterrence 
through the fundamental blockage of the provocations, and evaluates the secondary 
influence of deterrence based on the nature of the provocations. 
The economic element of security is assessed in terms of reducing security costs of 
the South Korean government at a time when South Korea’s conventional military power 
was clearly inferior to North Korea’s conventional military power. Through a comparative 
analysis of the differences between the conventional military capabilities of South Korea 
and North Korea at that time, this thesis emphasizes the need for South Korea’s 
considerable security costs. This thesis looks at the correlation between Korea’s security 
costs and the UNC’s role in providing security through measures of defense spending of 
the South Korean government. In addition, this thesis assesses the discounting effect of 
South Korean defense cost through comparing South Korea’s and North Korea’s economic 
growth indexes. 
 
22 Satish Chandra and Rahul Bhonsle, “National Security: Concept, Measurement and Management,” 
Strategic Analysis 39, no. 4 (2015): 337–341, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2015.1047217. 
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The diplomatic element of security is evaluated through South Korea’s openness 
and activities within the UN.23 Even though the Cold War confrontation had dominated 
the international community since the Korean War, the fact that the UN included both the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union, which are the main players of the confrontation, reflects that 
the UN expressed an international universality beyond the Cold War confrontation and 
provided the foundation for states’ use of diplomatic power. For this reason, South Korea’s 
openness and activities with other states in the UN could be a measure of diplomatic power 
beyond the context of the times. Here, openness can be measured through the status of 
diplomatic relations and bilateral exchanges between states, and activities can be assessed 
through compliance with the value of the UN and specific activities. Also, this thesis 
compares the diplomatic situation between South Korea and North Korea from the Soviet-
Chinese conflict to the detente between the U.S. and China that provided significant 
changes in the international community, and after South Korea and North Korea joined the 
United Nations at the same time. 
The political factor of security is assessed through South Korea’s autonomy in 
making security-related policy decisions at a time when the UNC had OPCON of ROK 
forces. Based on historical records, this thesis examines the mutual relation of South Korea 
government and the UNC in the process of making security-related policies in South Korea 
at that time. In particular, taking into account the nature of the UNC led by the U.S., this 
thesis causally analyzes the dynamics of South Korea’s security-related policymaking 
process, and evaluates South Korea’s initiative in political governance. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis consists of four chapters. This first chapter has introduced the core 
question, and described how the research will both contribute to existing knowledge and 
improve current debates over the UNC’s future. Chapter Ⅱ tracks the role of the UNC 
during the period from the Korean War armistice to the establishment of the UNC, 
evaluating its contribution to South Korean security in terms of the four dimensions 
 
23 Craig Hayden, The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts (MD: Lexington 
Books, 2011), 6–24. 
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previously discussed. Chapter Ⅲ analyzes the role of the UNC, along with the change in 
the role of the UNC after the CFC, evaluating the UNC’s contribution to South Korean 
security in terms of the same four dimensions. Finally, Chapter Ⅳ summarizes the findings 
of the analysis, discusses policy implications, and presents the need for further research in 
the face of a changing security environment. 
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II. THE IMPACT OF THE UNC BEFORE THE CREATION OF 
THE CFC 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyzes the impact of the UNC on South Korean security during the 
period from the signing of the Korean War Armistice Agreement in 1953 to the establishment 
of the CFC in 1978. The UNC took over Operation Command of South Korean forces from 
South Korea, and commanded South Korean troops as well as UNC troops in the Korean War. 
Since then, the terms of Operational Command was changed to Operational Control during 
the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the ROK and the U.S. and Agreed Minute 
Relating to Continued Cooperation in Economic d Military Matters, and the UNC had 
continued to retain the OPCON of the South Korean military. This meant the UNC had direct 
responsibility for South Korean security. The formation of the CFC in 1978 led to the transfer 
of OPCON over South Korean troops from the UNC to the CFC. 
This chapter analyzes the role of the UNC in the period before the establishment of 
the CFC, a time when the UNC was directly involved in South Korean security. To this end, 
the chapter first considers the historical background and initial role of the UNC and the 
characteristics of the UNC at that time. Then, South Korean security is divided into military 
and economic elements and political and diplomatic elements, and the impact of the UNC on 
each aspect is analyzed. 
B. THE UNC BEFORE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CFC 
1. The Historical Background of the UNC 
After Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule, the Korean Peninsula was 
divided into the democratic and communist camps. This ideological division on the Korean 
Peninsula soon led to confrontation and conflict, which expanded to the Korean War on June 
25, 1950 through North Korea’s illegal Invasion. North Korea launched an all-out offensive 
to communize the entire Korean Peninsula, and the South Korean military was unable to stop 
the attack. It was not long after World War II ended that a massive bloody conflict broke out 
again. The UN quickly passed UN Security Council resolutions to restore stability on the 
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Korean Peninsula and prevent the spread to World War III from this illegal invasion from 
North Korea. As a result, the UNC was created. 
The UNC defended South Korea in the Korean War as a multinational unified 
command based on UN Security Council resolutions. The UNC was created through a series 
of resolutions, such as UN resolution 82, 83 and 84. Shortly after the outbreak of the Korean 
War, the UN passed resolution 82 condemning North Korea’s invasion and demanding its 
withdrawal. The resolution 82 pointed out that North Korea’s Invasion was a peace-
destructive act, and called on North Korean military to immediately halt hostilities and 
withdraw to the north of the 38th parallel. At the same time, UN member states requested that 
all efforts be made to implement the resolution and that aid to North Korea be suspended.24 
Despite resolution 82, the North’s attack continued. In response, the UN Security 
Council passed resolution 83 on June 27 to recommend UN member states provide assistance 
in repelling North Korean troops, judging that Pyongyang has no intention of stopping 
hostilities. Through this, UN member states including the U.S., Britain, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, and France decided to participate and prepared for the dispatch of troops. As 
such, resolution 83 provided a legal basis for the United Nations’ intervention in the Korean 
War.25 
The UN passed resolution 84 on July 7 calling for the creation of an integrated 
command to welcome the participation of UN member states and to provide effective support. 
The resolution allowed the U.S. to appoint and lead the commander of the integrated 
command, and recommended that all warring states that would provide military power and 
other assistance follow its order. In addition, the integrated command was authorized to use 
the UN flag in its operations, and the United States was stipulated that it should report to the 
 
24 United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 82: Complaint of aggression upon 
the Republic of Korea (New York: United Nations Security Council, 1950), Resolutions adopted by the 
Security Council in 1950 | United Nations Security Council. 
25 United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 83: Complaint of aggression upon 
the Republic of Korea (New York: United Nations Security Council, 1950), Resolutions adopted by the 
Security Council in 1950 | United Nations Security Council. 
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UN on its activities.26 As a result of this series, the UNC was established in Tokyo on July 
24 to command 16 UN member states and South Korean troops. The UNC consists of 16 
combat troops from the United States, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, 
France, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Africa, 
Thailand, Turkey and the United Kingdom, and five other countries providing medical 
assistance, including Denmark, India, Italy, Norway and Sweden.27 
U.S. President Harry S. Truman, who was given the initiative of the UNC, designated 
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff as an agency for the UNC to lead the U.N. forces in the Korean 
War. In response, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed General Douglas MacArthur, the 
commander of the U.S. Far East Army, as the commander of the UNC, who later took direct 
command of the operations of the U.N. forces on the Korean Peninsula. First, General 
Douglas MacArthur integrated his organization into the UNC and assigned the Eighth Army 
Command, a member of the Far East Command, to take charge of the Operational Command 
of the U.S. ground forces in Korea and move the command to Daegu, South Korea. The Eighth 
Army was integrated into the ground operations of the UNC, and soon the Far East Naval and 
Air Force Command were also integrated into the naval and air operations of the UNC.28 
On July 14, 1950, President Rhee Syngman handed over the Operational Command 
of South Korean troops to the commander of the UNC in the form of exchanging official 
documents between the two countries. General Douglas MacArthur then transferred the 
Operational Command of South Korean ground troops to the commander of the Eighth Army, 
and the Operational Command of South Korean each commander Force to Far East Navy and 
Air Force.29 This led to the unification of all units fighting against North Korean troops in the 
 
26 United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 84: Complaint of aggression upon 
the Republic of Korea (New York: United Nations Security Council, 1950), Resolutions adopted by the 
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27 “Members of the UNC in the Korean War,” ROK Ministry of National Defense, Accessed May 5, 
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28 Myeongchul Lee, An Analysis of the Impact of the Change in Security Environment on the Role of 
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Korean War, and the UNC took the initiative in the defense of South Korea in the Korean 
War. 
2. The Role of the UNC 
Since its establishment, the UNC had played a role in the defense of South Korea, the 
management of the Armistice Agreement, and as a power supplier to accommodate and 
provide troops from 16 UN member states in case of emergency. First, during the Korean 
War, the UNC defended South Korea based on the Operational Command transferred from 
South Korean President Rhee Syngman. When the Korean War broke out, South Korea 
judged that it lacked the strength to defend itself and defeat North Korea on its own. In 
response, President Rhee chose to transfer the Operational Command of South Korean troops 
as a strategy to reverse the unfavorable situation through the unification of military command 
and efficient execution of operations. On July 14, 1950, President Rhee sent a letter to the 
commander of the UNC through U.S. Ambassador to South Korea John J. Muccio proposing 
to transfer the Operational Command of South Korean troops to General Douglas MacArthur, 
the commander of the UNC. In response, General Douglas MacArthur accepted the proposal 
for the transfer of Operational Command by sending a reply to President Rhee through U.S. 
Ambassador to South Korea, saying, the UNC had been delegated the Operational Command 
of South Korea’s Army, Navy and Air Force while the current hostilities continue. Later, on 
July 25, General MacArthur’s reply was delivered to the UN Secretary-General and submitted 
to the Security Council, making the transfer of Operational Command official.30 
The UNC played a leading role in the signing of the armistice as well as in South 
Korea’s defense during the Korean War. During the Korean War, the UNC carried out 
operations north of the 38th parallel after the success of the Operation Chromite which the 
U.N. forces landed in Incheon, South Korea. However, when the Chinese military intervened 
in the Korean War in earnest on October 19, 1950, operations on the northern part of the 
Korean Peninsula became difficult. Thus, the United States, which played a leading role in 
the UNC, decided on May 17, 1951 to adopt NSC 48/5 to end the war in Korea with 
 
30 Institute for Military History, The History of Military Relations Between ROK and the U.S. 1871–
2002 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2002), 470–472. 
21 
negotiations.31 Accordingly, the UNC led the Armistice Agreement negotiations starting with 
the first plenary session on July 10, 1951. As a result, the Korean War entered a truce on July 
27, 1953 when the commander of the UNC signed the Armistice Agreement with the Chinese 
and North Korean commanders on behalf of the free camp, including South Korea.32 
After the Korean War armistice, the UNC retained Operational Command of South 
Korean military and continued to take charge of the defense of South Korea in case of 
emergency. First of all, the current hostilities, when the Operational Command was 
transferred, disappeared visibly under the armistice agreement. Therefore, the command 
relationship between the UNC and the South Korean military needed to be reestablished. In 
response, the South Korean and U.S. governments took tentative steps to ensure that the UNC, 
which is a signatory to the Armistice Agreement, could continue to control the Korean 
military until the day the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty took effect. From here, the term 
of Operational Command has changed to the term of Operational Control.33 On November 
17, 1954, South Korea and the U.S. signed Agreed Minute Relating to Continued Cooperation 
in Economic and Military Matters, an annex to ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, and 
paragraph 2 of the minutes stated while the UNC is responsible for the defense of South 
Korea, South Korean troops shall be kept under OPCON of the UNC. As a result, the UNC 
continually came into possession of OPCON of the South Korean military even after the 
Armistice Agreement, and continued to take responsibility for the defense of South Korea.34 
After the signing of the Armistice Agreement, the UNC assumed the role of managing 
the Armistice Agreement. The UNC had been tasked with monitoring and investigating 
violations of the Armistice Agreement and leading the settlement and coordination of security 
issues through negotiations with the communist side, including North Korea. The UNC was 
supposed to conduct the investigation and negotiation process for violations of the Armistice 
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Agreement through Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and Neutral Nations Supervisory 
Commission (NNSC). MAC and NNSC were equally supposed to carry out surveillance and 
investigation missions for violations of the Armistice Agreement.35 
In addition, the UNC had been tasked with providing troops of UN member states to 
the Korean Peninsula in case of emergency after the signing of the Armistice Agreement. At 
the time of the signing of the Armistice Agreement, the 16 countries that participated in the 
Korean War resolved in the Joint Policy Declaration Concerning to Korea Armistice, the so 
called Washington Declaration, that they would send military forces in the event of a 
recurrence of war, and the UNC was responsible for ensuring the implementation of this 
commitment.36 To that end, the UNC has maintained its rear base in Japan. Under the Status 
of Force Agreement (SOFA) between the UNC and Japan on February 19, 1954, the rear base 
of the UNC guarantees the role of providing troops to be deployed to the Korean Peninsula 
by accommodating the forces and providing support for their service. As such, the UNC was 
in charge of the defense of South Korea, the management of the Armistice Agreement, and 
the supply of troops of UNC in case of emergency until the establishment of the CFC. 
3. U.S. Initiative with the UNC 
The UNC was a U.S.-led organization since its establishment. After the outbreak of 
the Korean War, the Soviet Union had declared a boycott of the Security Council to protest 
the granting of one of the UN Security Council permanent members to Taiwan. Also, 
communist countries at the time broke away from the process of creating the UNC. In the end, 
discussions on the establishment of the UNC took place with only partial participation, and 
the U.S., which at the time felt responsible as the architect of the international order, naturally 
led decision-making and action in this process.37 
 
35 Hyunkwon Joe, “United Nations Command Armistice Roles on the Korean Peninsula: Is December 
2015 the End?,” (master’s thesis, The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2013), 15–19. 
36 Kwang Hyun Chang, “A Study on The Revitalization of UNC based on The Transfer of Wartime 
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The U.S. initiative within the UNC had been further strengthened through the chain 
of command of the UNC. In fact, there was a disagreement between the U.S. and the U.N. 
Secretary-General at the time in forming the chain of command of the UNC. Specifically, 
their views were divided over whether to establish the Committee on Cooperation of 
Assistance for Korea. The Secretary-General insisted on the establishment of such a special 
committee, while the U.S. Department of Defense opposed it.38 The U.S. reason for opposing 
the establishment of the committee at that time was to rule out the possibility of the 
committee’s involvement in local military operations.39 There was a concern from the United 
States that the U.S. military in the Far East, if established, could carry out the war on the 
intention of the Secretary-General, regardless of Washington’s policy. As a result, when the 
Security Council passed a resolution on the formation of the United Nations Command on 
July 7, 1950, as intended by the United States, the contents concerning the establishment of 
the committee were deleted.40 In other words, a framework for the chain of command was 
formed, requiring the commander of the UNC to prepare an operational report, obtain 
approval from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and submit it to the Security Council via the 
Pentagon and the State Department. This chain of command provided a practical basis for 
U.S. interests to be reflected in the UNC. 
C. ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE UNC ON MILITARY AND 
ECONOMIC SECURITY IN SOUTH KOREA 
In order to assess the UNC’s role in South Korean security, the basis and assumptions 
for judgment are needed first. This section considers the security stability in the military 
dimension and the impact on South Korea’s economic development in the economic 
dimension as the criteria for determining the impact of the UNC on South Korean security in 
the period before the CFC was established. On the security stability of military elements, this 
section examines the effectiveness of deterrence against North Korea by analyzing how North 
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Korea’s military attacks developed during the period. Direct and indirect influence on 
economic development is recognized by analyzing whether the UNC facilitated provision of 
economic aid to South Korea and how South Korea operated national resources. 
1. Assumption of Analysis 
a. Possibility of North Korea’s Military Threats and Deterrence Against North 
Korea 
The key to deterrence is to prevent the other party from taking certain actions. The 
concept of deterrence has been discussed by many scholars. Among them, Glen H. Snyder 
defines deterrence as deterring the other party from military action by making them anticipate 
more losses and risks than expected benefits of taking military action.41 Kenneth N. Waltz 
explains that deterrence prevents the other party from doing something by threatening the 
other party.42 That is, in general, deterrence refers to the conscious judgment and behavior 
that causes the other party to abandon its own behavior through the value judgment between 
the loss and the profit involved in doing something. 
Deterrence against North Korea has been an important concept in military relations 
between South Korea and North Korea since the Korean War. North Korea started the Korean 
War with a massive invasion and has continued to threaten South Korean security even after 
the Korean War ended in a truce. In military relations between South Korea and North Korea, 
North Korea has always been on the offensive, and South Korea has pursued effective 
prevention and response from a defensive standpoint. In other words, deterrence against North 
Korea has been a key mechanism in South Korea’s security policy. Based on this, it could be 
seen that whether South Korea’s deterrence against North Korea has been effectively 
exercised is in line with the stability of South Korean security. 
The analysis assumes that South Korea’s deterrence against North Korea had been 
effectively exercised if North Korea did not launch a military attack on South Korea. 
 
41 Glen H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1961), 3. 
42 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” in The Use of Force: Military Power 
and International Politics, 8th ed. Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2015), 85–97. 
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However, the mere absence of military attacks does not explain all of the deterrence 
capabilities against North Korea. Above all, North Korea’s capability and willingness for 
military attack should be considered first. If there is no military threat capability, North Korea 
would expect its losses in judging the value of profits and losses resulting from military 
attacks, making it less likely to launch military attacks. On the contrary, even if they are 
capable of military threats, it would be difficult to take actual action without the will to do so 
as well. In this context, judging the effectiveness of deterrence against North Korea could be 
more logical by considering the likelihood of military actions from North Korea. Therefore, 
this analysis considers that South Korea’s deterrence against North Korea was effectively 
exercised if North Korea did not carry out a military attack despite having high military 
capability and will to do so. 
b. Economic Aid and Economic Development 
The Korean War caused enormous economic damage to South Korea. The Economic 
Almanac, issued by the Bank of Korea in 1955, suggests that the Korean economy suffered a 
total of 412.3 billion hwan, which was current Korean currency, in damages due to the Korean 
War. 43  This was an economic damage equivalent to about $3 billion as of the time, 
corresponding to the level at which Korea’s per capita GNP fell from $87.02 just before the 
Korean War to $64.12 shortly after the Korean War.44 Considering that economic power is 
also important for the physical survival of the nation, the economic damage in Korea after the 
Korean War could have led to a breakdown of South Korea’s social stability. In other words, 
after the Korean War, South Korea needed not only to respond to North Korea’s military 
threats, but also to repair and develop economic damage at the same time. 
Attention is being paid to whether the UNC had a direct and indirect impact on South 
Korea’s economic development at that time. In analyzing these roles, it is necessary to expand 
the perspective on the role of the UNC. If only attention is paid to the background and nature 
of the UNC’s founding, the role of the UNC would inevitably be focused on military factors, 
 
43 Towoong Jung, “The influence of the Korean War,” Military History 40 (June 2000): 214. 
44 Jang Churl Shin, “A Study on the Korea Economy after the Liberation and Propel of the Economic 
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which naturally puts a considerable distance between South Korea’s economic development 
and the UNC. However, research for this thesis does not overlook the influence of the United 
Nations, which is the basis of the founding of the UNC, and the secondary impact of the 
UNC’s military role. In other words, from an economic point of view, it is necessary to 
consider the direct impact of the United Nations and the indirect impact of the UNC on South 
Korean economic development. 
There had been some challenging situations in the process of establishing the UNC, 
but ultimately considering that the UNC was founded on the ideal value of the United Nations 
for peace in the international community, it could be seen that the UNC’s role was an 
extension of the role of the UN. Therefore, it is assumed that direct United Nations’ economic 
aid to the South Korean government is a form of contribution from the UNC to Korean 
economic development. 
If South Korea’s national resources had been diverted to its economic development 
based on the UNC’s military role, this is also a form of the UNC’s contribution to South 
Korea’s economic development. This viewpoint is partly in line with resource dependence 
theory starting from the underlying assumption that a country’s resources are limited. 
Resource dependence theory is a theory that all organizations rely on external resources for 
their survival, and in the process, an organization can allocate and adjust resources and power 
within and outside the organization based on strategic choices in order to actively respond to 
a given environment. Here, this theory believes that the permanent survival of the organization 
is guaranteed only when the dependence of resources is ultimately lowered. In this analysis, 
only the premise assumption of the theory is utilized.45 The evaluation of the UNC’s indirect 
contribution to South Korea’s economic development utilizes the partial assumption of 
resource dependence theory that the resources needed for the organization’s survival are 
limited and that strategic coordination and selection are made. 
 
45 Kihyun Ryu and Jisu Jeong, “Designing Method of the Korean Military Organization Structure in 
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2. Reference Point of Analysis 
Before analyzing the UNC’s role in South Korean security, a reference point of 
analysis is needed. Because the dependent variable of South Korean security also embodies 
the effect of promotion or reduction, the criteria and the basis for determining this is needed. 
As the analysis assumptions show, the preconditioned consideration for the correlation 
between South Korean security and the role of the UNC was the existential threat of North 
Korea. In other words, the role of the UNC should be discussed from the possibility of military 
threats in a military point of view, from the economic status in an economic point of view. 
Therefore, the possibility of military threats from North Korea at the time and the comparison 
of the level of economic power between South Korea and North Korea are presented as the 
basis for analysis. This could provide a framework for understanding South Korean security 
level and its changes at the time. 
a. The Possibility of Military Threats From North Korea 
In judging the possibility of military threats from North Korea, a conceptual definition 
of military power and an understanding of military force assessment are needed. First of all, 
military power refers to the ability and capacity to carry out military operations as part of the 
direct and substantive national power to ensure the security of the country.46 Military power 
means both war performance and combat capability, including intangible as well as tangible 
factors. These forces are generally composed of force personnel, weapons systems, logistics, 
military strategies, command and control, military science and technology, mobilization 
capabilities, and reserve forces.47 Military power is used to resolve international conflicts in 
support of national interests and involves some or all of six effects, including deterrence, 
acquisition, neutralization, rejection, annihilation and capture, in the course of confrontation 
between countries, including war.48 
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The assessment of military power is by no means easy to do, as it quantifies and 
analyzes complex factors. This is because the evaluation of military power varies depending 
on the object and method of judgment based on the conceptual definition of military power. 
This assessment of military power is largely divided into static and dynamic evaluations. The 
static assessment here refers to evaluating the mutual military power with only the capabilities 
of several fixed military components, and the dynamic assessment refers to evaluating the 
mutual military power by deriving combat results that take into account the interaction of 
several components in a specific battlefield situation. The static evaluation is simple and 
concise in the model, such as comparing the quantity of possession by distinguishing military 
forces or reflecting limited amounts of weapons systems and troops’ strength. However, there 
is a limit to accurate military assessment when excluding other intangible factors. On the other 
hand, dynamic evaluation also faces limitations in accuracy in the quantification process of 
intangible elements, and the process is also quite complex.49 
The current analysis looks at the possibility of North Korea’s military threat to South 
Korea from the Korean War to the establishment of the CFC in 1978. In order to more 
objectively judge the possibility of military threats, it is necessary to supplement the 
previously raised limitations on military power’s assessment. Therefore, this analysis starts 
from this limitation and judges military threats based on the method of calculating military 
expenditure. Military expenses reflect the sum of human, physical, and organizational 
components in terms of component costs and are most directly invested to build military 
power. Unless the ability to operate military expenditures among countries varies greatly, 
countries would use the costs to ensure the most reasonable defense posture in a given 
environment. In this regard, the method of calculating military expenditure may be surer than 
other methods of judging military force, and may enable objective analysis of the possibility 
of military threat.50 
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However, there is a problem that could be raised in applying the method of calculating 
military expenditure. In fact, this method may not reflect the context of the times by excluding 
the variables of U.S. and foreign institutions from South Korea’s military expenditure and 
economic strength. Rather, this could present clearer criteria for judgment in this thesis, which 
seeks to find out the role of the UNC in South Korean security by enabling a pure comparison 
of military expenditures of South Korea and North Korea at the time. 
In addition, there is a limit that the analysis of the period cannot be presented due to 
difficulties in accessing data on North Korea’s military capabilities in the 1950s immediately 
after the Korean War. Based on the judgment of the U.S. side, including the commander of 
the Eighth Army and White House aides, that South Korea’s military power was relatively 
superior until the early 1960s, this thesis focuses attention on military threats from North 
Korea since the 1960s.51 
This thesis utilizes the method of calculating military expenditure and the possibility 
of military threat presented by Jung-woo Lee. According to Lee’s method of calculating 
expenditure in national defense, the ability to pose military threats can be seen as a 
simultaneous consideration of military spending and economic power supporting the ability 
to carry out war. In other words, by multiplying military spending and economic power, one 
can gauge the potential of the military threat of the time. In Table 1, columns A and B provide 
annual ratios of North Korean and South Korean military spending and economic power, 
respectively; Column D provides the multiplied product of these figures. 
Using Lee’s method, an estimate of military threats from North Korea is developed 
from North Korea’s military threat capabilities and its willingness to use military force. The 
willingness to use military force is the ratio of military spending to the economic power, which 
is based on what policy priorities the country has for the military sector. Column C in Table 
1 provides this annual calculation for North Korea. North Korea’s military threat each year 
can be quantified by the multiplication of North Korea’s military threat capabilities and 
willingness to operate military forces, provided in Column E of Table 1. Column F provides 
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Lee’s index of military threat probability for each year in proportion to the baseline figure of 
100 for 1968, the highest year.52 




































1961 1.31 0.62 13.08% 0.81 10.6 34.0 
1962 1.31 0.61 15.00% 0.80 12.0 38.5 
1963 1.38 0.59 13.75% 0.81 11.2 36.0 
1964 2.27 0.62 13.89% 1.41 19.6 63.0 
1965 2.36 0.63 13.68% 1.50 20.5 65.8 
1966 1.73 0.54 13.00% 0.94 12.2 39.1 
1967 2.61 0.53 20.43% 1.40 28.5 91.7 
1968 2.65 0.48 24.40% 1.28 31.1 100.0 
1969 2.18 0.39 23.46% 0.86 20.1 64.7 
1970 1.81 0.40 18.13% 0.72 13.0 41.7 
1971 2.11 0.37 21.71% 0.78 16.9 54.3 
1972 2.18 0.39 22.86% 0.86 19.6 62.9 
1973 2.72 0.39 24.04% 1.05 25.2 80.9 
1974 2.28 0.31 23.56% 0.72 16.8 54.2 
1975 1.70 0.31 25.08% 0.53 13.2 42.6 
1976 1.30 0.27 24.42% 0.35 8.5 27.3 
1977 1.06 0.23 24.07% 0.25 5.9 19.1 
1978 0.98 0.20 23.71% 0.20 4.7 15.1 
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According to the calculations in Table 1, for the period from 1961 to 1978, when 
the CFC was established, North Korea’s military threat capability was considerable in 
1964, 1965, 1967, 1968 and 1973. The quantified figures for these years are higher than 1. 
In addition, the possibility of military threats from North Korea in these years also showed 
relatively high figures. They are equal to or higher than the quantified figure of 20. In 
particular, the figure for possible military threats among them is the highest in 1968. Figure 
1 conveys Jung-woo Lee’s graphical representation of North Korea’s military threat 
probability. 
 
Figure 1. Military Threats from North Korea (1961-1978)54 
The graph presents shows that the possibility of military threats from the mid-1960s 
to the early 1970s was high overall. A closer look shows that there was a relatively high 
possibility of military threats in 1964, 1965, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1972, 1973 and 1974. 
Therefore, based on this representation of the changing degree of North Korea’s military 
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threat in this period, this thesis analyzes the effectiveness of deterrence against North Korea 
by looking at the examples of military attacks from North Korea in those years. 
b. Comparison of Economic Power between South Korea and North Korea 
and Trend of Change 
There is a disconnect between South Korea and North Korea in comparing and 
analyzing their economic power during the 1953–1978 period. This is because there was a 
limit to the verification of data for North Korea’s economic indicators at that time. 
Therefore, it is necessary to divide the period and analyze it on the basis of different data. 
Nevertheless, these comparisons and analyses are still significant. Regardless of the 
comparison and analysis of economic power between South Korea and North Korea, the 
UN data on direct economic aid to South Korea is relatively accurate. Also, the indirect 
impact of the UNC’s economic development is more closely related to growth rates than 
to the size of the economies of South and North Korea itself. 
Economic figures for South Korea and North Korea in the 1950s identify economic 
growth rates for each specific period through secondary sources. South Korea’s economic 
indicators in the 1960s are checked based on the Bank of Korea’s National Income 
Yearbook, and North Korea’s economic indicators utilize estimates generated by South 
Korea’s National Intelligence Service based on statistical data released by North Koreans 
at that time. From 1970 to 1978, the economic indicators of South Korea and North Korea 
utilize the UN’s National Accounts Statistics data. Although there is a break in data from 
a certain period of time, the overall economic growth rate of South Korea and North Korea 
can be checked. 
Comparing and analyzing the economic power of South and North Korea based on 
limited data are as follows. First, right after the Korean War, South Korea relied entirely 
on international economic aid, including support from the United Nations and the United 
States, and emphasized economic recovery and growth, focusing on secondary 
industries.55 The average annual growth rate of the South Korean economy reached 4.9 
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percent from 1953 to 1960.56 At the same time, North Korea carried out a three-year 
development plan (1954-56) and the first five-year economic development plan (1957-61) 
and could achieve remarkable success in the primary and heavy industries.57 From 1956 
to 1960, North Korea’s economic growth rate was 13.7%, which was higher than that of 
South Korea.58 Regardless of the absolute economic indicators of South Korea and North 
Korea at the time, it can be seen that North Korea had a relative advantage in economic 
growth. Through this, South Korea would feel threatened in social stability at the beginning 
of the post-war system competition. 
In the 1960s, South Korea and North Korea focused more on economic growth 
under the name of modernization and socialist industrialization, respectively, and achieved 
high growth. South Korea’s GNP surpassed $7.5 billion in 1970, 3.8 times the figure of $2 
billion in 1960.59 In the case of North Korea, the seven-year economic development plan 
(1961-67) suffered a three-year extension but achieved economic growth of about 2.5 times 
in the 10 years from 1960 to 1970.60 In the 1960s, not only did the overall size of South 
Korea’s economy exceed North Korea’s, but also South Korea’s economic growth rate was 
ahead of North Korea. 
South Korea’s economic growth gained momentum in the 1970s. South Korea’s 
GNP shows a sharp rise of $53 billion in 1978 from $10 billion in 1971. North Korea’s 
economic growth, on the other hand, shows considerable inferiority in comparison with 
South Korea, although it has still not lost momentum. North Korea’s GNP grew from $6 
billion in 1971 to $10 billion in 1978.61 This shows that the economic gap between South 
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Korea and North Korea has emerged in earnest since the 1970s. The economic indicators 
of South and North Korea can be found in Table 2. 
Table 2. Economic Indicators of South Korea and North Korea62 
Year 
GNP (U.S. million dollars) 
Year 
GNI (U.S. million dollars) 
South Korea North Korea South Korea North Korea 
1960 2,002 1,264 1970 9,395 5,536 
1961 2,122 1,372 1971 10,221 6,112 
1962 2,266 1,485 1972 11,145 6,747 
1963 2,641 1,616 1973 14,212 7,449 
1964 2,812 1,818 1974 20,054 8,224 
1965 3,005 1,983 1975 22,080 9,079 
1966 3,648 2,067 1976 30,408 9,452 
1967 4,233 2,328 1977 39,130 9,839 
1968 5,057 2,584 1978 53,164 10,243 
1969 6,405 2,649    
 
3. Analysis for Military and Economic Factors 
a. The Effectiveness of the UNC’s Deterrence Against North Korea 
This section analyzes the UNC’s impact on South Korea’s military security before 
the creation of the CFC. Since the Korean War armistice, South Korea has always faced 
military threats from North Korea. For South Korea, preventing such threats from 
becoming a reality was an important issue of military security. Prior to the establishment 
of the CFC, the UNC had OPCON of South Korean troops, providing South Korea with 
deterrence against North Korea. In other words, the role of the UNC and South Korea’s 
military security at the time were directly related through deterrence against North Korea. 
Therefore, this section analyzes the impact of the UNC by gauging whether the deterrence 
against North Korea had been effectively exercised. 
 
62 Adapted from Bank of Korea, National Income Yearbook (Seoul: Bank of Korea, 1972); ROK 
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The deterrence against North Korea is in line with North Korea’s military 
provocations in that it blocks Pyongyang’s military threats against South Korea in advance, 
and such military provocations are an essential criterion of judgment for its deterrence against 
North Korea. Since the end of the Korean War, North Korea has shown some differences in 
its level, but it has not stopped making military provocations against South Korea in the form 
of infiltration and local provocations. In particular, the level of North Korea’s military 
provocations against South Korea from 1961 to 78 is provided in Table 3. 
Table 3. The Status of North Korea’s Provocation Against South Korea by 
Year.63 
Year 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
Number 86 58 63 47 60 91 184 141 144 
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Number 86 49 20 20 23 28 8 9 13 
 
As Table 3 shows, military provocations by North Korea were constantly occurring 
every year. In addition, it can be seen that provocations were carried out in earnest in the 
1960s. The earlier analysis suggested that North Korea’s military threat would not become 
a reality if deterrence against North Korea worked effectively. In this regard, if the number 
of simple military provocations by North Korea is considered, this section would come to 
the conclusion that the deterrence against North Korea by the UNC was ineffective, and 
ultimately the UNC’s influence on South Korea’s military security was insufficient. Also, 
the analysis results could be reached that the deterrence has been little exercised in 1967, 
1968, and 1969 in which the number of military attacks is overwhelmingly high, with 184, 
141 and 144 times, respectively. 
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However, one cannot help but wonder whether the number of times that reflects all 
types of military provocations by North Korea corresponds to the standard of judgment of 
deterrence that this thesis wants to pay attention to. First of all, the conceptual definition 
of military provocation reflects the specific subject’s intention for the act, as it means any 
harmful act that the enemy imposes on our people, property or territory to carry out a 
particular mission.64 The previous North Korean military provocation covers direct acts 
ranging from indirect acts such as infiltration to bombing and attempting to assassinate 
VIP. In other words, considering the two facts together, North Korea’s indirect provocation 
was made to avoid being the subject of deterrence in advance with the intention of 
concealing the main agents of the act. Therefore, it may be illogical to judge the 
effectiveness of deterrence against North Korea based on only the number of provocations. 
The preceding data offers some support to this judgment. If provocations are only 
a function of North Korea’s military threat ability, then the numbers of provocations each 
year should correlate with its degree of threat each year. But, as Table 4 shows, there is 
little correlation: 
















1961 86 10.6 8.11 
1962 58 12.0 4.83 
1963 63 11.2 5.63 
1964 47 19.6 2.40 
1965 60 20.5 2.93 
1966 91 12.2 7.46 
1967 184 28.5 6.46 
 


















1968 141 31.1 4.53 
1969 144 20.1 7.16 
1970 86 13.0 6.62 
1971 49 16.9 2.90 
1972 20 19.6 1.02 
1973 20 25.2 0.79 
1974 23 16.8 1.37 
1975 28 13.2 2.12 
1976 8 8.5 0.94 
1977 9 5.9 1.53 
1978 13 4.7 2.77 
 
The analysis here instead pays attention to the main cases of provocations that had 
been ostensibly revealed in examples of North Korea’s military provocations against South 
Korea. Still, major North Korean provocations had occurred almost every year. In the 
1950s, political terrorist acts such as spy and aircraft abduction were more prevalent than 
direct military attacks, but after the 1960s, more direct military provocations such as 
attempted assassination of the president, raids on the Demilitarized Zone and skirmishes 
began to appear at the forefront. In particular, the effectiveness of deterrence against North 
Korea had decreased in the late 1960s. Among 1964, 1965, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1972, 1973, 
and 1974, the most notable North Korean military provocations were the Blue House raid, 
the USS Pueblo abduction, and the infiltration of armed communist guerrillas into Uljin 
and Samcheok, South Korea in 1968. Even though the target of the USS Pueblo abductions 
is not South Korea but the U.S., this is also a major provocation that cannot be overlooked, 
considering that the U.S. is the leading agent of deterrence against North Korea provided 
by the UNC. In addition to 1968, there were still major military provocations by North 
Korea. There had been high-level provocations, including the shooting of a South Korean 
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Air Force F-86 fighter jet and a U.S. L-16 reconnaissance plane that were patrolling the 
Demilitarized Zone in 1964 and 1965 respectively, the skirmish in the Demilitarized Zone 
in 1967, the kidnapping of a Korean Air aircraft in 1969 and the attempted assassination 
of President Park Chung-hee in 1974. Based on these results, this thesis cannot still expect 
optimistic results on the effectiveness of deterrence against North Korea.65 In other words, 
the firm deterrence against North Korean provocations on the Korean Peninsula at that time 
could not be exercised. 
However, this cannot stop judging the effectiveness of deterrence against North 
Korea. This is because the possibility of North Korea’s military threat inherent in the 
analysis assumptions calls for the conceptual expansion of the North’s military 
provocations. In other words, it should also be considered whether the deterrence provided 
to South Korea by the UNC has curbed more serious actions than the provocations 
summarized in Table 3, up to the level of the outbreak of an all-out war on the Korean 
Peninsula. In fact, judgments about this could be made relatively easily. Based on historical 
facts, it is easy to see that military tensions between South Korea and North Korea have 
risen since the Korean War armistice, but no full-scale war has taken place. Indeed, the fact 
that the many provocations in this period did not lead to wider war suggests that deterrence 
of higher level conflict was still just as effective even in times of the highest North Korean 
threat. However, it should not be overlooked that these judgments could lose logic as 
criticism based on the result. 
The aforementioned points indicated that the concept of military provocation 
reflected the intent of the subject. Sun-bo Moon also argues that military provocations do 
not constitute sufficient conditions to form the concept of such provocations simply by 
attacking the enemy, and that military provocations should be understood in a political 
sense. In other words, Moon explains, military provocations should include strategic 
thinking that can primarily constitute conditions that trigger the other’s actions and turn 
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the other’s response into a situation that seeks to take advantage of it.66 As his claim can 
be described as a strategic problem-causing act, all North Korea’s military provocations 
were implicit in their respective strategic intentions. It is necessary to reconsider North 
Korea’s strategic intentions behind the major cases of the provocations, in order to 
determine the effectiveness of deterrence against North Korea by examining in detail 
whether North Korea had a strategic intention to wage an all-out war on the Korean 
Peninsula behind the provocation cases. 
This section takes a close look at the case of North Korea’s major provocations, which 
are beyond the local level. It will look at the Blue House raid and the infiltration into Uljin 
and Samcheok in 1968, and the assassination of President Park in 1974. 
On Jan. 21, 1968, 31 members of North Korea’s the 124th unit infiltrated Seoul to 
attack the presidential office. Their mission was to attack the Blue House and assassinate 
government officials, including President Park Chung-hee. Five targets—the Blue House, the 
U.S. Embassy, the Army headquarters, Seodaemun Prison and Seobingo Spy Detention 
Center - were initial targeted, but were reduced to a single goal of the Blue House a week 
before the attack. Armed personnel managed to infiltrate Seoul at night across the border. The 
guerrillas first contacted woodcutters in Paju, South Korea, but continued to infiltrate the area. 
However, upon the report of the woodcutter, the Korean military and police entered an 
emergency status, and as soon as the guerrillas were discovered, the exchange of fire began. 
This later evolved into a huge mop-up operation by the Korean military, which led to pursuit 
and siege. As a result, the Blue House raid ended with 28 of the guerrillas killed, two missing 
and one captured alive.67 
From Oct. 30 to Nov. 2, 1968, the 120 guerrillas from North Korea’s 124th unit were 
organized into eight groups of 15 people and infiltrated into Uljin and Samcheok. Armed 
communist guerrillas were divided into two, two, and four groups, respectively, to conduct 
the first, second, and third infiltration. Their aim was to create an atmosphere of fear in South 
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Korean society through ruthless terrorist and destructive activities as part of the violent 
revolution. The vessel of the third group was detected by the radar of the South Korean Navy 
ship at first at 8 p.m. on Nov. 2. Later, at 6 a.m. on Nov. 3, their infiltration was officially 
confirmed by a report from the Uljin area residents. Accordingly, South Korea deployed 
military, police and reserve forces to carry out the counterespionage operation, and continued 
the operation until December 28 for about two months until the end of the operation by killing 
113 guerrillas and capturing seven others alive.68 
The two major provocations in 1968 were the result of North Korea’s active armed 
struggle against South Korea. Looking at the situation on the Korean Peninsula at that time, 
President Park’s administration, which emerged in the early 1960s, continued to strengthen 
its anti-communist policy, and in the late 1960s, its national power was growing due to rapid 
economic development. Following military buildup economic development policy, which 
was decided in 1962, North Korea established a strategy to communize South Korea and unify 
Korea. This was intended to overthrow the South Korean government by violence, establish 
the communist regime, and then unify the Korean Peninsula. Later, North Korea recognized 
the effectiveness of the guerrilla warfare carried out in the Vietnam War and decided to launch 
guerrilla warfare activities against South Korea.69 This can be confirmed by Kim Il-sung’s 
speech at the October 1966 Workers’ Party Congress that North Korea advance the 
revolutionary period through the proper combination of economic and political, legal and 
illegalities, and violence and nonviolent struggles.70 In this context, it could be seen that the 
Blue House raid was caused by North Korea’s attempt to explore the operational environment 
and create conditions before North Korea’s active guerrilla warfare for the unification of the 
Korean Peninsula. It could be seen that the Uljin and Samcheok area infiltration, which was 
repeated provocation following the failure of the Blue House raid, also occurred as an 
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extension of guerrilla activities for the unification. In particular, this infiltration was intended 
to promote the distribution and fatigue of combat power by using tactics to simultaneously 
field the former and rear areas of South Korea. As a result, it can be judged that North Korea’s 
provocations in 1968, which took the form of an active armed struggle, were part of North 
Korea’s preparations for war under the name of revolution. 
On August 15, 1974, Moon Se-kwang, a Korean-Japanese, attempted to attack 
President Park Chung-hee, who was giving a speech at the National Theater of South Korea 
to commemorate the Liberation Day. The shooter, Moon Se-kwang, was immediately stopped 
by a bodyguard at the scene, but in the process, the president’s wife, Yook Young-soo, was 
killed. Moon Se-kwang, who was later arrested, was found to have been recruited by North 
Korea.71 This was a relatively direct and distinct form of provocation compared to those in 
the 1960s. The 1970s was a time of change in the balance between South Korea and North 
Korea. Due to the rapid economic growth of South Korea in the 1960s, the balance between 
South Korea and North Korea in the 1970s was sharply tilted toward South Korea. In 
response, North Korea wanted to implement a policy to confuse South Korea, which had been 
developing in various fields such as politics, economy, and society, and in this context, a direct 
attempted assassination of the president took place. As a result, it could be judged that North 
Korea’s provocations in the 1970s were mainly aimed at causing confusion in South Korean 
society rather than the intention of supporting war on the Korean Peninsula. 
If one looks at whether North Korea’s strategic intentions for an all-out war were 
included behind North Korea’s provocations, some facts from the 1960s are relevant. In the 
1960s, when North Korea’s relative competitiveness against South Korea continued to some 
extent, North Korea sought to promote unification by using violent mechanisms. However, 
the gap between South Korea and North Korea in the 1970s shifted North Korea’s intention 
from preparations for war to increasing social turmoil. In the end, the deterrence against North 
Korea was not entirely effective during the time of the similar balance between South Korea 
and North Korea, but after the asymmetry in the balance, the effectiveness of the deterrence 
had increased. Thus, it could be concluded that the UNC had had a positive overall impact on 
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South Korea’s military security, but at different levels depending on the situation on the 
Korean Peninsula. 
Above all, this represents that the deterrence is not a constant but a variable that 
changes with the times and circumstances. The fact that the range of changes in the 
effectiveness of deterrence against North Korea is affected by the balance between Seoul and 
Pyongyang suggests that Seoul’s security calls for a comprehensive concept of economic 
superiority as well as military elements of deterrence. In this context, this thesis’s efforts to 
look at the role of the UNC in various aspects of South Korean security are significant, and 
move on to an analysis of the UNC’s role in South Korean economic development. 
b. UNC’s Impact on South Korean Economic Development 
This section analyzes the direct and indirect impact of the UNC on South Korean 
economic development. Basically, the UNC, which was established during the Korean War, 
was a military organization in charge of military functions. However, considering that the 
UNC is a symbolic organization established to express the ideal value of the UN, the role of 
the UN in South Korea is also understandable as an extension of the UNC’s role. In this 
context, this section looks at direct U.N. economic aid to South Korea after the Korean War 
as a direct influence of the UNC. The fact that U.N. aid was donated to South Korea through 
the UNC at the time supports this argument.72 As the next indirect impact, this section studies 
whether the UNC’s military role had affected South Korea’s economic development. It 
analyzes if the symbolic existence and practical functions of the UNC could make South 
Korea expand its options for economic development. 
During the Korean War, the South Korean economy suffered a period of extreme 
turmoil due to a vacuum in economic policy and the destruction of industrial and production 
facilities. After the Korean War, South Korea needed a post-war economic recovery process 
first for physical survival. At that time, however, the South Korean economy was suffering 
from a vicious cycle of poverty, a universal obstacle to economic reconstruction and 
development in underdeveloped countries. At the time when South Korea lacked its own 
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capital, external capital was needed more than anything else, and under these circumstances, 
South Korea became highly dependent on foreign aid from sources such as the United Nations 
and the United States. In the 1950s, foreign aid capital was injected free of charge, which 
played a vital role in South Korea’s economic reconstruction.73 
The UN Korea Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) was established in accordance with 
Resolution 410 of the United Nations General Assembly on December 1, 1950, and full-
fledged economic aid began to flow to South Korea. First, the U.N. economic aid provided to 
South Korea was through the U.N. Civil Relief Program in Korea (CRIK). CRIK aid provided 
approximately $450 billion from 1951 to 1956 and UNKRA aid provided about $120 billion 
from 1953 to 1960. The specific amounts of economic aid by the United Nations after the 
Korean War are shown in Table 5. This UN aid was donated to South Korea through the UNC, 
intending to contribute to South Korea’s economic recovery. 
Table 5. Economic Aid by the United Nations (U.S. thousand dollars)74 
 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
CRIK 158,787 50,191 8,711 331 - - - - 
UNKRA 29,580 21,297 22,181 22,370 14,103 7,747 2,471 244 
 
In addition to direct economic aid to Korea, the UNKRA wanted to establish South 
Korea’s economic development plan. In 1952, the UNKRA commissioned the Robert Nathan 
Association of the United States for this plan. In March 1953, the Robert Nathan Association 
reported a survey of the overall South Korean economy and a long-term revival plan. The 
long-term rehabilitation plan was a five-year plan from 1953 to 1957, and it was prepared by 
collecting a large amount of data related to the economic reconstruction plan. However, the 
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plan was not implemented because it contained unrealistic and unreasonable plans, projecting 
that the South Korean economy could achieve economic independence in 1958.75 
In addition to U.N. economic aid to the South Korean economy at that time, the 
United States also provided economic aid directly. Considering the leading role of the U.S. 
in the background of the establishment of the UNC at that time and the position of the U.S. 
within the U.N., direct economic aid from the U.N. could be interpreted as part of U.S. 
economic aid. In fact, U.N. aid is based on contributions from member countries. However, 
most of the U.N. aid supplied to South Korea was provided entirely by the U.S.76 In this 
regard, Table 6 shows the financial support by the United States prior to 1978, which 
includes the percentage of that aid provided through CRIK and UNKRA through 1960 
(using the data from Table 5). 
Table 6. Economic Aid by the United States (U.S. million dollars)77 
Year 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 
Aid 194.2 153.9 236.7 326.7 382.9 321.3 222.2 245.4 199.2 
Percent 
via UN 97.0% 46.5% 13.1% 6.9% 3.7% 2.4% 1.1% 0.1% N/A 
Loan - - - - - - - - 35.0 
Year 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1977 
Aid 232.3 216.4 149.3 131.4 103.3 97.0 105.9 107.3 97.0 
Loan 6.0 43.0 30.0 39.0 172.0 218.0 364.0 509.0 234.7 
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U.S. aid to South Korea began as part of its emergency relief policy for occupied 
areas, and during the Korean War, aid had the characteristic of this relief aid. However, 
from the end of the Korean War to the end of 1961, U.S. aid evolved into a form of military 
aid and economic aid for postwar reconstruction.78 As Table 6 shows, in tandem with this 
evolution, the U.S. quickly shifted to providing aid directly, rather than through the U.N. 
agencies. Table 6 also shows that U.S. economic aid increased rapidly after the Korean 
War, reaching its highest level in 1957, and then after that declined. This is due to the 
change of the U.S. foreign aid policy in 1957. Due to this change, foreign capital began to 
flow into the form of paid loans in 1959, and in 1966, the amount of loans began to exceed 
the amount of aid. After that, foreign capital had been changed into a form financed mainly 
by loans. Aid has been suspended since 1980. 
Economic aid by the U.S. was far more than direct U.N. aid, leading the overall 
recovery and revival of South Korea after the war. While the UNC was responsible for 
South Korea’s military security with OPCON over the South Korean military, the fact that 
the U.S. was the leading body of the UNC and that the USFK accounted for the majority 
of the UNC’s forces indicates that the presence of the UNC was one sufficient condition to 
enable U.S. aid to South Korea. In this regard, even though aid directly from CRIK and 
UNKRA was short-lived, direct U.S. aid to South Korea was also within the scope of the 
UNC’s influence on Korea’s economic development. 
After the war, South Korea’s sluggish economy was able to achieve stability and 
growth with U.N. and U.S. economic aid. On the other hand, foreign economic aid had also 
distorted the industrial structure of South Korean economy. In the 1950s, most of the aid 
was made free of charge, so the South Korean economy had a weak economic structure 
that could not escape from its foreign-dependent constitution, with the aid itself being 
unilaterally determined by aid states.79 Under these circumstances, as the U.S. aid policy 
shifted from free aid to loans from 1959, South Korea faced the challenge of transforming 
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its foreign-dependent economy into a self-reliant economic system. As the loans that 
gradually replaced the free aid had to be repaid one day, the South Korean government 
needed a measure to secure a stable source of foreign currency to repay the paid-in loans. 
In this context, South Korea’s pursuit of export-driven economic policies in the 1960s and 
1970s is understandable. 
After the post-war restoration period, South Korea implemented a full-fledged 
export-driven economic development plan in 1962. These economic development plans 
were implemented on a total of three occasions as a five-year plan and achieved 
considerable results. The military government, which took power in early 1960, had set a 
basic goal of revamping the existing U.S.-centered, import-dependent aid economy in 
pushing forward with the first five-year economic development plan. To this end, the 
government actively pursued the substitution of imports to establish the foundation for a 
self-reliant economy and adopted policies for expanding export-oriented products. The 
second five-year plan, which began in 1967, laid the basic goal of modernizing the 
industrial structure and further promoting the establishment of a self-reliant economy. 
Therefore, the export driven policy, which achieved economic growth by leading exports, 
was strongly implemented. The third five-year plan began in 1972 and laid the basic goals 
for the innovative development of the rural economy, the epochal increase in exports, and 
the construction of heavy and chemical industries. This was intended to strengthen 
international competitiveness by the so-called Second Import Substation, which attempts 
to replace imported raw materials in South Korea by fostering heavy and chemical 
industries while maintaining the existing export-driven growth strategy.80 In other words, 
during the period, the South Korean economy was embodied in a development plan with 
the stage of fostering import replacement industries—the establishment of an export 
industrial structure—and export-driven growth. 
South Korea’s economic development, which began in the 1960s, was premised on 
national interest and investment in material resources. At the same time, however, South 
Korea had to respond to the real threat of North Korea. North Korea achieved remarkable 
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success in the primary and heavy industries by pushing for a three-year development plan 
(1954-56) and the first five-year economic development plan (1957-61) for postwar 
restoration and economic development. North Korea even achieved the goal of the first 
five-year economic development plan a year earlier, and later began the seven-year 
economic development plan (1961-67), injecting more than 20% of the GNP into the 
military buildup. As a result, until the mid-1960s, North Korea maintained a defense budget 
of more than 2.5 times that of South Korea, and its military strength remained superior to 
that of South Korea. As such, North Korea threatened South Korea’s physical survival at 
that time.81 Therefore, at that time, South Korea was in a dilemma of not being able to 
meet all national resource requirements for national defense and economic development. 
Facing this threat from North Korea, the South Korean government had pushed 
ahead with its policy direction of economic growth, with social stability first and the 
construction of defense forces later, based on the U.S. government’s commitment to solid 
support for South Korea’s defense and the UNC’s deterrence. At that time, South Korea’s 
defense spending stood at 20–30 percent, which was not small compared to other countries’ 
defense spending. But this level was still lower than North Korea’s defense spending; as 
shown in Table 1, from 1961–1976, North Korea’s military expenditures ranged between 
130%-265% of South Korea’s, even though North Korea’s economic power was slowing 
declining relative to South Korea, causing its threat probability to increase. Given the 
growing threat from North Korea, South Korea needed UNC and U.S. deterrence against 
North Korea. As a result of this support, the South Korean government was able to allocate 
funds first for economic development and social development while the UNC and the 
presence of USFK deterred North Korea’s military threats. Table 7 shows the classification 
of the South Korean government’s finances in that period. 
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Table 7. Allocation of the South Korean Government’s Finances (South 


































1957 36.19 11.29 31.2 9.43 26.1 4.28 13.3 4.62 12.8 6.03 16.7 
1958 40.76 12.78 31.4 10.58 26.0 7.14 17.5 3.76 9.2 6.50 16.0 
1959 41.54 13.97 33.6 9.31 22.4 9.93 23.9 5.04 12.1 3.29 7.9 
1960 42.70 14.76 34.6 7.49 17.5 11.14 26.7 6.01 14.1 3.30 7.1 
1961 59.00 16.66 28.2 18.67 31.6 13.18 22.3 7.27 12.3 3.22 5.5 
1962 82.75 20.52 24.8 31.83 38.5 17.79 21.5 8.45 10.2 4.16 5.0 
1963 79.89 20.48 25.64 26.62 33.21 19.30 24.16 10.39 13.01 3.10 3.98 
1964 81.99 24.93 30.41 23.05 28.11 20.92 25.52 9.86 12.03 3.23 3.94 
1965 100.9 29.88 29.62 29.18 28.92 24.61 24.39 12.94 12.83 4.28 4.24 
1966 163.6 40.67 24.87 52.47 32.08 41.34 25.28 18.97 11.60 10.10 6.18 
1967 214.3 50.00 23.33 65.46 30.55 53.72 25.09 24.50 11.43 20.55 9.59 
1968 305.5 65.38 21.40 90.38 29.59 88.72 29.05 33.20 10.87 27.77 9.09 
1969 433.2 84.86 19.59 117.76 27.18 141.69 32.71 48.53 11.20 40.38 9.32 
1970 496.1 101.29 20.42 133.66 26.94 148.88 30.01 54.57 11.00 57.70 11.63 
1971 614.0 129.39 21.07 170.81 17.81 173.71 28.29 66.40 10.81 73.74 12.01 
1972 790.9 172.06 21.76 229.17 28.98 222.71 28.16 92.30 11.67 74.63 9.44 
1973 812.3 199.60 24.57 249.40 30.70 266.00 32.75 72.60 8.94 24.70 3.04 
1974 1257.7 319.50 25.40 463.50 36.85 334.00 26.56 107.30 8.53 33.40 2.66 
1975 1716.7 465.30 27.10 654.00 38.10 465.40 27.11 89.30 5.30 42.70 2.49 
1976 2428.0 762.8 31.42 863.1 35.48 655.9 27.01 92.5 3.81 53.7 2.21 
1977 3232.7 1023.3 31.66 885.8 27.40 667.9 20.66 523.7 16.20 131.9 4.08 
1978 4408.0 1438.1 32.62 1154.9 26.20 954.5 21.65 419.1 9.51 441.4 10.01 
 
As of 1962, when South Korea’s five-year economic development plan was first 
launched, the budget for national defense had decreased and the budget for economic 
development had increased. The defense budget, which used to be above 30 percent, had 
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been on the decline until 1969, except for 1964 and 1965. On the other hand, the budget 
for economic development had not shown a steady increase from the previous figure, but 
it can be seen that it had increased and maintained at a level equivalent to about 30 percent. 
This fact illustrates the policy direction of the time: economic growth and social stability 
based on deterrence against North Korea first, and the construction of defense forces later. 
The defense budget can be seen to rise little by little again from 1970. This was due 
to South Korea’s push for self-defense in line with the situation of the times and changes 
in U.S. foreign policy. The security relationship between South Korea and the U.S. eroded 
when South Korea failed to carry out U.S. demands in dealing with the Blue House raid 
and the abduction of the USS Pueblo in 1968, and the U.S. pursued unilateral resolution. 
Also, in 1969, when the Nixon Doctrine called for Asian countries to take more 
responsibility for their defense, South Korea began to feel a fear of abandonment. In this 
context, South Korea had begun to realize the need for self-defense and to implement it, 
and the defense budget increases after 1970 can be understood from this extension. 
As a result, from the end of the Korean War to 1978, the UNC contributed direct 
U.N. economic aid to South Korea for economic recovery, reconstruction and revival. The 
fact that the U.N. and the UNC were under U.S.-led influence at the time makes U.S. 
economic aid to South Korea relevant as well. In other words, the UNC could be judged to 
have had an impact on South Korea’s economic development by guaranteeing foreign 
capital’s economic assistance. In addition, the UNC guaranteed South Korean security with 
the commitment to U.S. security assistance as well as deterrence against North Korea in 
the 1960s when North Korea’s real threats emerged, allowing the South Korean 
government to divert state resources to its economic development. This policy priority led 
to remarkable growth in the South Korean economy, which can by far be seen as the 
indirect impact of the UNC on South Korea’s economic development. In turn, South 
Korea’s growing economic advantage over North Korea contributed directly to increases 
of South Korea’s military capacity in later years. 
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D. ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE UNC ON POLITICAL AND 
DIPLOMATIC SECURITY IN SOUTH KOREA 
This section analyzes the impact of the UNC on South Korea’s political and 
diplomatic security before the establishment of the CFC. Military security is closely 
aligned with political and diplomatic elements. Basically, military security presupposes 
protection against internal and external threats to ensure the physical survival of the nation. 
The state can use both diplomatic and security policies against foreign threats, and may 
mobilize military elements to stabilize national order against domestic threats. In this 
regard, the fact that the UNC was in charge of part of South Korea’s military security with 
OPCON of the South Korean military before the CFC was established indicates that the 
UNC could not be completely free from South Korea’s political and diplomatic security at 
the time. 
Based on this logic, this section examines the impact of the UNC on Korea’s 
political and diplomatic security. First, it looks at the impact of the UNC on South Korea’s 
political change in political security. At this time, military and political elements are 
connected through military mobilization. Next, the impact of the UNC on diplomatic 
security is analyzed by looking at whether diplomatic autonomy of South Korea had been 
limited in exchange for security assurances. 
1. Assumption of Analysis 
a. Political Democratization 
This section examines whether the UNC influenced political changes in South 
Korea during the period between 1953 and 1978. Political change comprehensively means 
a change in the political system or the emergence of a new political situation. Political 
change includes system-level changes, such as military coups, the emergence and downfall 
of authoritarian regimes, and democratic governance processes, as well as political 
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structure changes, such as shifts in power relations, changes in governance relations and 
changes in policies that cause changes in people’s political behavior.83 
It could be said that democratization falls within a range of these political changes. 
Democratization refers to the transition from a non-democratic political system to a 
democratic political system. This democratization involves fundamental changes, such as 
changes in the governance structure in a non-democratic political system, and also the 
expansion of political subjects and their actions. On the one hand, the process of democracy 
becoming more solid within a basic democratic political system can also be seen as 
democratization. The fact that research on democratization is concentrated on the transition 
to democracy and the solidification of democracy supports this.84 
Democracy is a political system that broadens the scope of political participation, 
and this characteristic can be seen from the fact that the etymology of democracy is rule by 
the people combining with the ancient Greek words “demos” and “kratos.”85 In more 
modern use, democracy also means a system of substantive rights.86 Definitions of the 
concept of democracy vary from scholar to scholar, but the convergence points are as 
follows: Democracy is a political system that continuously reflects the preferences of all 
citizens while ensuring free and fair political competition, comprehensive political 
participation, and political and civil liberties.87 
As can be seen from the conceptual definition of democracy, democracy entails 
some essential conditions. First, in terms of institutions and procedures, democracy 
requires protections of political rights, such as fair and regular electoral systems, electoral 
 
83 Seong-ho Jang, “An Analysis on the Effect of the Socioeconomic Crisis on the Political 
Fluctuations of Korea,” The Journal of Political Science and Communication 11, no. 2 (December 2008): 
190–191. 
84 Yong Cheol Kim, “Democratization Movements and Democratization in South Korea: Success and 
Failure,” Journal of Democracy and Human Rights 15, no. 3 (December 2015): 275. 
85 Hyung Chul Kim, “A Task and Constructing Strategy for the Quality of Asian Democracy Index,” 
Comparative Democratic Studies 8, no. 2 (December 2012): 102. 
86 Hyung Chul Kim, “The Effects of Socioeconomic Factors and Political Institutions on the Level of 
Democracy,” Korean Political Science Review 41, no. 1 (March 2007): 126. 
87 Hyung Chul Kim, “A Task and Constructing Strategy for the Quality of Asian Democracy Index,” 
Comparative Democratic Studies 8, no. 2 (December 2012): 103. 
52 
rights, and multi-party systems. In addition, democracy requires freedom and 
accountability of citizens in socio-economic aspects.88 That is, democracy requires that the 
value of competition, participation and freedom be guaranteed on a formal and practical 
level. 
Here, the analysis of the UNC’s role in South Korea’s political changes focuses on 
analysis of the UNC’s role in South Korea’s political democratization. This is because the 
South Korea’s political changes have been undergoing a transition to a democratic political 
order, accompanied by advance and retreat, since its founding. South Korea’s political 
order began with the first parliamentary democracy, but was replaced by an authoritarian 
political order in the midst of an emergency. However, after the authoritarian political order 
failed to institutionalize, one form of authoritarian rule was transformed into another form 
of authoritarian rule amid the subsequent replacement of constitutional and military 
governments. Then, in 1987, the people’s uprising on June 10 led to the launch of the 
civilian government, which transformed the country into a democratic political order.89 
This section analyzes the role of the UNC in this period of conflict that had been marked 
by the pain of democratization. 
If the military were involved in the process of political change in Korea, the UNC 
would not be free from its responsibility for its role, and the connotation of the UNC’s role 
would be determined by the outcome of the corresponding political change. The fact that 
military security ensures the physical survival of the nation from internal and external 
threats leaves room for the possibility of use of military elements domestically. In a 
properly settled political system, democracy can avoid the negative aspects of this 
possibility, but otherwise it cannot completely ignore the mobilization of troops and the 
possibility of political intervention. The UNC, which held OPCON over South Korean 
troops at the time, cannot be free from its responsibility if the South Korean troops were 
involved in its politics. 
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The UNC may take direct or indirect responsibility for the South Korean military’s 
political intervention. If the UNC took the initiative to intervene in South Korean politics 
by utilizing the South Korean military, it would demand direct responsibility from the 
UNC. On the other hand, if the UNC did not take the initiative in intervening, but the South 
Korean government itself led the political intervention and the UNC gave passive approval, 
such as acquiescence or abetting it, the UNC still had indirect responsibility. In other 
words, in the case of military mobilization across certain forms, the UNC assumes 
responsibility, and the soundness of this responsibility ultimately follows the outcome of 
South Korea’s political democratization. 
Examples of military mobilization in South Korean politics from 1953 to 1978 
include the suppression of the April 19 Revolution in 1960, the May 16 military coup in 
1961, and the declaration of the Yushin regime in 1972. Therefore, this section analyzes 
the political impact of the UNC on those historical cases. 
b. Diplomatic Autonomy 
This section analyzes how the UNC influenced South Korea’s diplomatic autonomy 
during the 1953–1978 period. Diplomatic autonomy is a concept belonging to a category 
of diplomatic power, a dependent variable that can be derived from the complex correlation 
of international politics. The UNC is not an organization of sovereign state units, but an 
arm of a common organization that reflects the agreed values of various countries. This 
fact indicates that the UNC reflects the nature of international politics, while at the same 
time linking the two variables, South Korea and the UNC, on the stage of international 
relations. Moreover, the fact that the UNC had OPCON over the South Korean military at 
the time further strengthens the link between both of them from a diplomatic standpoint, 
naturally raising as an issue the diplomatic autonomy variable between the other two 
variables. 
First of all, diplomatic power means a country’s ability to express its national power 
externally, meaning the power and influence it can exert in international relations. 90 
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Diplomatic power can often be perceived as a concept commensurate with national power, 
or as a complement to national power. The former explains that diplomacy is a function of 
hard power, such as military and economic power.91 Conversely, the latter explains that a 
country with a low national power can broaden the scope of its interests with high 
diplomatic power.92 But it can be seen that diplomatic power itself is closely related, not a 
concept far from the national power of a nation. This can be seen from scholars who discuss 
the diplomatic strategies of small countries under the assumption that national power limits 
some of their diplomatic power.93 
The international political science community generally defines national power as 
a comprehensive force of such components as population, natural resources, national 
defense, economic power, people’s morale, government leadership, and diplomatic 
technology. 94  That is, it presents tangible and intangible elements as components of 
national power. However, detailed standards vary from scholar to scholar in distinguishing 
national power, particularly regarding smaller powers. First, Robert O. Keohane 
distinguishes national power by focusing on physical standards. According to Keohane, 
countries in the international system are divided into system determining states, system 
infusing states, system affecting states, and system influential states.95 On the other hand, 
Robert L. Rothstein distinguishes national power on a psychological basis. In particular, 
Rothstein defines weaker countries through standards that distinguish national power. 
Rothstein’s proposed weak country is a country that recognizes that it cannot secure 
national security in its own capacity and has to rely on other countries or international 
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organizations, while at the same time being recognized by other countries.96 Although 
there are some differences in the criteria for distinguishing national power, such as the 
recognition of its influence and ability on the international system, it could be seen that 
there is a presence or absence of physical capability at its core, even for smaller countries. 
Basically, a small country uses foreign policy to solve the primary goal of physical 
survival. Small countries want to separate domestic environment and ability for demands 
and challenges from external environment, and consider the minimization of risk first in 
policy decision making.97 From a realistic perspective, a small country can consider two 
strategies, balance and bandwagon, as its foreign policy. Small countries can maintain a 
balance of power in alliance with other forces resisting external pressures and threats, or 
they can adapt to external pressures and threats and take advantage of them meeting the 
conditions they require.98 South Korea, born as a newly independent nation after liberation 
from Japan’s colonial rule and the Korean War, was clearly a small country in terms of 
physical ability. At that time, South Korea adopted a strategy of balance of power against 
the primary threat of North Korea, which led to its alliance with the United States. 
The alliance between South Korea and the United States began as an asymmetric 
alliance. First, to discuss the symmetry of the alliance, James D. Morrow divides countries 
into Superpower, Major and Minor, and describes the relationship between countries in 
different forms as asymmetrical.99 Robert L. Rothstein argues that a small country cannot 
protect itself and naturally forms an alliance with a great power for security, and explains 
that these alliances are asymmetrical, which implies a difference in national power.100 That 
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is, it could be seen that asymmetric alliances result from a power imbalance. This 
asymmetry limits the equal relationship between the two allied countries. A good theory to 
describe this is the Autonomy Security Trade-off Model, an interchange model of security 
and independence.101 This model explains that small countries can increase security by 
forming alliances with great powers, but at the expense of autonomy in return. In other 
words, small countries recognize that the great powers have freedom of action on them for 
the sake of their own vital interests and the right to survive, in the process, the great powers 
want to expand their influence.102 The alliance between South Korea and the United States 
since the Korean War reflects this characteristic. 
For the present analysis, the South Korea-U.S. asymmetric alliance could be 
replaced by the relationship between South Korea and the UNC in terms of Korea’s 
diplomacy and security. The practical fact that the UNC operates under the initiative of the 
U.S. reduces the gap between South Korea-U.S. relations and South Korea-U.N. relations. 
Also, officially, the UNC held OPCON over South Korean military, which was responsible 
for protecting South Korea’s safety from external threats. In the process, there remains 
room for the UNC’s influence over South Korea’s foreign affairs and security. Therefore, 
the UNC can impose certain restrictions on South Korea’s foreign affairs and security 
instead of nominally guaranteeing South Korea’s security. 
In this context, this section selects an analysis assumption that the UNC might have 
imposed unilateral restrictions on Seoul’s foreign policy drive in exchange for taking 
charge of the country’s security. In particular, it looks at the limitations of South Korea’s 
diplomatic and security autonomy arising from South Korea-U.S. relations, considering the 
aforementioned possible replacement of the Korea-U.S. relationship by the Korea-U.N. 
relationship. It analyzes whether the U.S. or UNC had one-way restrictions on the foreign 
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policy that Seoul wanted to pursue, or whether the U.S. or UNC made Seoul pursue certain 
foreign policies. 
2. Reference Point of Analysis 
a. The Level of Political Democratization in South Korea. 
Objective reference points are important to assess the impact of the UNC on South 
Korea’s political democratization. However, dealing with objective indicators of an 
intangible political system can have logical limitations not only in accessing data but also 
in the process of deriving indicators. In this regard, this section utilizes the democratic 
indicators that have attempted to catalog the level of democracy as objectively as possible 
as the basis for the evaluation of democratization. 
The level of democracy can be seen as a political performance, meaning how well 
the basic attributes of democracy are being realized in each democratic system. 103 
Attempts to provide objective indicators for these levels of democracy have been made in 
a variety of ways. This section utilizes the Polity IV Project among various studies. Since 
the Polity IV Project has examined the characteristics and transitions of the political system 
in all independent countries since 1800, data on the period from 1953 to 1978 can be found 
in this section. The Polity IV Project focuses on the extent to which democratic and 
authoritarian characteristics are included at the same time in a particular political system 
and gives measurement scores for democratic levels. The measurement score is calculated 
on a 21-point scale through the executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, 
and political competition. This score ranges from the lowest score of -10 points, hereditary 
monarchy, to the highest score of +10 points, consolidated democracy, where -6 points or 
less means autocracy and +6 points or higher means democracy.104 
From 1948 to 2013, South Korea’s democratic indicators are noted in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. South Korea’s Democratic Indicators (1948-2013).105 
In this graph, the line colors have different meanings. The blue line is what is 
generally plotted over time. The red line specifies a period of factionalism, and the green 
line specifies a period of transition for the political system. The letter X indicates autocratic 
backsliding, and A indicates executive auto coups or autogolpe.106 
This graph shows that the democratic indicators change drastically based on the 
suppression of the April 19 Revolution of 1960, the military coup on May 16, 1961, and 
the declaration of Yushin constitution in 1972, which were inflection points of political 
change in South Korea. As the graph shows, South Korea’s democracy index, which had 
been low by -4 points until 1959, had risen sharply to 8 points by 1961, reflecting the April 
19 Revolution in this period. The democracy index, which stood at eight in 1961, had fallen 
sharply by -7 points until 1963, due to the May 16 military coup that took place at this time. 
The democracy index, which showed relatively stable figures at three points in the late 
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1960s, fell sharply again to -9 points as of 1973, following President Park Chung-hee’s 
declaration of the Yushin constitution. In sum, South Korea’s democratic indicators rose 
following the April 19 revolution, but after the May 16 military coup and the declaration 
of the Yushin constitution, the democratic indicators fell sharply. In other words, the 
political democratization of South Korea progressed through the April 19 Revolution, but 
it was reversed through the May 16 military coup, and some later progress was reversed 
again by the proclamation of the Yushin constitution. This chapter discusses these 
developments in more detail in the following section. 
b. Military Security Cooperation between South Korea and the United States 
In analyzing the impact of the UNC on Korea’s diplomatic autonomy, the special 
nature of the relationship between the U.S. and the UNC means that the South Korea-U.S. 
relationship itself is an important independent variable and parameter. The UNC, which 
had OPCON over the South Korean military, was under the command of the U.S. Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, so the scope of the UNC’s role was bound to overlap with the strategic 
interests of the United States. In this context, military security cooperation between South 
Korea and the U.S. could be an important basis in order to judge South Korea’s diplomatic 
autonomy based on the security-autonomous exchange model. 
Relations between Korea and the United States began on May 22, 1882, when the 
two countries signed the Treaty of Friendship Between Joseon Dynasty and the U.S., Trade 
and Navigation, a treaty of diplomatic relations. However, the relationship between Korea 
and the U.S. was severed in 1905 when Japan colonized the Korean Empire, but was 
restored at the point of liberation in 1945 and the establishment of the Korean government 
in 1948.107 Full-fledged military security cooperation between both of them began in 
October 1953 with the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the ROK and the 
United States. When a cease-fire became a fait accompli during the Korean War, South 
Korea wanted to sign a mutual defense treaty with the United States to prepare for the 
existential threat from North Korea. However, there was no easy compromise between 
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South Korea and the United States over the signing of the mutual defense treaty. In 
particular, the issues between the two countries were the timing of the signing of the mutual 
defense treaty, the size of the South Korean troops, the continuation of Operational 
Command over the Korean troops held by the U.N. forces, and the deadline for political 
talks to discuss the unification of the Korean Peninsula after the armistice.108 There had 
been several rounds of talks between the two countries to narrow these differences, and as 
a result, the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty was officially signed in October 1953.109 
The ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty officially took effect only a year later, on 
November 17, 1954, when notifications of ratification were exchanged. Although the 
Mutual Defense Treaty had been formally signed, differences between the two countries 
had not been completely resolved, and therefore the exchange of the treaty’s ratification 
notices was delayed. 110  South Korea and the U.S. found a compromise to resolve 
differences in Agreed Minute Relating to Continuous Cooperation in Economic and 
Military Matters. The memorandum of agreement consisted of Appendix A, which deals 
with the text and the implementation details of economic issues, and Appendix B, which 
specified the scale of the South Korean military buildup. This memorandum particularly 
included clauses that allowed the commander of the UNC to retain OPCON of South 
Korean troops even after the armistice, and that the U.S. guarantees economic and military 
assistance to South Korea in return.111 When the memorandum of agreement was formally 
signed on November 17, 1954, the ratification notices of the Mutual Defense Treaty were 
exchanged on the same day, marking the official beginning of the South Korea-U.S. 
military security cooperation relationship. 
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South Korea-U.S. military security cooperation became more institutionalized 
when the two countries began their annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in 1968. 
The first Security Consultative Meeting was held in Washington on May 27, 1968. It was 
the highest-level security policy consultative body, with the defense ministers of the two 
countries as the chief delegates and involving senior foreign and defense officials.112 At 
the meeting, the defense ministers of South Korea and the U.S. discussed the security of 
the Korean Peninsula and together decided on the direction of policies. Behind the 
background of SCM was North Korea’s offensive provocations, including the Blue House 
raid and abduction of the USS Pueblo in 1968. In detail, differences between South Korea 
and the U.S. in responding to North Korea’s provocations had heightened security threats 
felt by South Korea, which was tentatively resolved by the SCM.113 The SCM itself meant 
the expansion of South Korea’s participation conditions and capabilities in the defense of 
South Korea. As such, the ROK-U.S. military security cooperation became a more mutual 
alliance and underwent further gradual changes, resulting in the institutional development 
of the establishment of the CFC in 1978. 
3. Analysis for Political and Diplomatic Factors 
a. UNC and Political Democracy in South Korea 
On April 19, 1960, students and citizens across the country staged massive protests 
against the Rhee Syngman regime. Student protesters marched through the streets shouting 
anti-dictatorship and democracy. As protesters headed from the National Assembly 
building to the Blue House, police fired indiscriminately at the protesters, causing many 
casualties. Victims occurred across the country in the process of suppressing the protest. 
Later in the day, the Rhee administration declared emergency martial law to try to settle 
the situation, but citizens did not stop protesting, demanding fundamental reform. In the 
end, due to continued resistance from citizens, President Rhee issued a presidential 
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resignation statement on April 26, ending the first administration, which had continued 
since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948.114 
The April 19 Revolution was fundamentally led by students and citizens under the 
wish of overthrowing the dictatorship. At that time, the logic of the Cold War was rooted 
in public consciousness due to the Korean War, and the division of the two Koreas. 
President Rhee Syngman and the ruling party were using the political symbol of anti-
Communism as an important weapon in the power movement under these circumstances 
to continue their long-term rule.115 In particular, President Rhee, the government and the 
ruling party had revised the Constitution twice for long-term rule and caused various 
manipulated elections. As the suppression of the basic values of democracy intensified, 
complaints from citizens were raised and eventually expressed in the form of protests.116 
On March 15, 1960, a nationwide protest against the manipulated election took place, but 
in the process of suppressing it, the police caused many casualties and buried the body of 
one of the casualties in the sea. After this revelation, citizens’ complaints intensified, 
leading to the April 19 Revolution. 
As President Rhee Syngman stepped down following the April 19 Revolution, the 
political space, which had been suppressed by authoritarian dictatorships, was opened up. 
The law on assembly and demonstration was changed from a permit system to a reporting 
and notification system, and the establishment of newspapers and political parties was also 
changed from a permit system to a registration system. As a result, citizens’ political 
participation and freedom of the press were greatly increased. 117  South Korea’s 
democracy, which had not been able to break away from the nature of authoritarian 
regimes, was able to set a turning point for development based on the April 19 Revolution. 
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There was a role of the military in the course of the suppression of the April 19 
Revolution. In response to the mass protests, the government declared emergency martial 
law and tried to suppress it by force. An exchange of opinions between the South Korean 
government and UNC was essential for that because the UNC had OPCON of the Korean 
military at the time. In fact, U.S. approval existed for the movement of South Korean troops 
to quell the unrest. According to a telegram sent by U.S. Ambassador to Korea Walter P. 
McConaughy to the U.S. Secretary of State on April 20, 1960, President Rhee Syngman, 
Interior Minister Hong Jin-ki and Defense Minister Kim Jung-yeol, who were at the Blue 
House on the day of the April 19 Revolution, declared the martial law at 1 p.m. and agreed 
to deploy the 15th Division of the Korean Army to suppress the riot. Also, according to a 
telegram on April 25, the acting commander of the UNC, E. I. Cummings, agreed to the 
South Korean request for the mobilization of the 15th Division for the suppression of unrest 
and the enforcement of martial law. It states that the acting commander of the UNC and 
the U.S. Embassy in Seoul agreed that there were not any other alternatives to restoring 
domestic order, which could be achieved only by the use of military at this stage, and that 
the UNC had no tactical need for the 15th Division under the current circumstances. Even 
though the telegram was asking the South Korean defense minister to avoid firing at 
civilians and to use minimal force in responding to the situation, it is clear that there had 
been U.S. approval for the deployment of South Korean troops.118 
South Korea’s democracy experienced a developmental stage with the April 19 
Revolution and the launch of the second administration, but it was disrupted by the May 
16 military coup in 1961.119 Some military forces led by then General Park Chung-hee 
entered Seoul on May 16 and took power, forming a supreme council for national 
reconstruction and implementing military rule. 
There are many discussions on the background of the May 16 military coup, but 
political instability and interests within the military at that time are discussed as examples. 
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Unlike the Rhee Syngman administration, the second administration adopted a 
parliamentary cabinet system. However, the majority party, the political ruling group, was 
divided by political interests, and corruption was rampant in the political circle. In addition, 
the second administration at that time expressed its incompetence by not having the ability 
to carry out the five-year economic development plan, and the low economic development 
heightened discontent within South Korean society. Factional relations prevailed in the 
military as well. In addition, unlike the Korean War in which military officers were able to 
get high-speed promotions, the promotion period at that time increased, resulting in a 
naturally delayed promotion. Problems such as structural corruption and promotion 
congestion in the military led to formation of a group of reform-minded officers. In this 
context, military forces led by General Park Chung-hee staged a coup to clean up the 
political and military circles that were incompetent and mired in corruption.120 
After the May 16 military coup, Chairman Park Chung-hee, who chaired the 
Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, attempted to lay the foundation for 
modernization and industrialization by reorganizing the national administrative body into 
an efficient organization. However, these military regimes generally attempted to 
strengthen their dictatorial powers, running counter to democratization. The military 
government took control of the intelligence and police forces, followed by the judiciary 
and legislation. The fact that 2,036 pieces of legislation were processed in a year 
immediately after the coup suggests this. The military government also controlled the 
media at that time. The military government maintained its policy to abolish the resisting 
press and to form a cooperative relationship with the remaining press. The military 
government also established the National Intelligence Service (NIS) on June 10, 1961, 
which mimicked the CIA in the United States. The NIS had considerable power to 
supervise information and the investigation activities of various government departments, 
including the military, which symbolized the military government’s strong suppression of 
the state.121 
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The May 16 military coup was more closely connected with the military than the 
April 19 Revolution. This is because the state’s power had been under the control of the 
military from the coup until the transfer of power to civilian governments. Shortly after the 
May 16 coup, the commander of the UNC, Carter B. Magruder, issued a statement 
supporting the legally established South Korean government led by Prime Minister Chang 
Myeon. In the statement, the commander of the UNC said he expects the three military 
chiefs of staff to use their influence to restore civilian control to government and restore 
domestic order. 122  Deputy U.S. Ambassador Marshall Green also supported the 
constitutional government. 123  But then the U.S. government took the attitude of 
acknowledging the coup in a statement issued by the State Department on May 19. And 
the commander of the UNC took the same stance.124 But it was a serious problem for the 
commander of the UNC that OPCON of South Korean military was still under the coup 
forces after the military coup. In response, the UNC’s commander moved to restore 
OPCON under the command of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and on May 26, coup forces 
decided to return OPCON after reaching an agreement with the commander of the UNC. 
The agreement included the UNC’s agreement to use the OPCON of South Korean troops 
only to defend South Korea from communist aggression.125 This decision left room for 
future intervention by Korean military forces in domestic politics. 
South Korean democracy entered a dark age as the Park Chung-hee administration 
ended up becoming Yushin regime system advocating one-man dictatorship. President 
Park Chung-hee declared emergency martial law across the country on October 17, 1972, 
and put forward a new constitutional amendment that would allow him to remain in power 
for life. After a referendum on November 21 of that year, he promulgated the Yushin 
Constitution on December 27. The contents of the Yushin Constitution were filled with 
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institutional mechanisms to support Park Chung-hee’s one-man dictatorship. Under the 
Yushin regime, the National Assembly could not exercise its right to impeach or inspect 
state affairs, and civil society, including the media, was placed under strong control of the 
state body, causing the role of political and civil society to be extremely diminished.126 
President Park Chung-hee insisted on the logic that unexpected threats could occur 
in the changing international environment, including the U.S.-China detente and the Nixon 
Doctrine before and after the proclamation of the Yushin regime, and declared emergency 
martial law nationwide under these circumstances. 127  However, unlike the April 19 
Revolution and the May 16 Military Coup, there was no direct use of the military in 
domestic politics. In addition, the commander of the UNC, who agreed on the scope of the 
use of OPCON of South Korean military after the May 16 military coup, had less room to 
restrain the direct use of the military in domestic politics. 
To summarize the influence of the UNC in the case of political change in Koreac, 
it can be seen that the UNC played a certain role in intervening in politics and later 
politicizing the Korean military in the course of the suppression of the April 19 Revolution 
and the May 16 military coup. The UNC approved the use of the military by the Korean 
government in the process of suppressing the April 19 Revolution, which promoted the 
implementation of democracy in Korea, while not actively stopping the use of the military 
in the May 16 military coup that led to the authoritarian regime. Through this, the UNC 
played a rather negative role in the democratization of South Korean politics in that period 
of time. 
b. UNC and South Korea’s Diplomatic Autonomy 
Before the establishment of the CFC, South Korea’s defense system was centered 
on the UNC. The UNC was in charge of removing the threat in case of an emergency with 
OPCON. The UNC obviously was responsible for South Korean security. However, in fact, 
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the U.S. presence was actually responsible for South Korea’s security because of the 
UNC’s chain of command leading to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
South Korea was in a structure where its diplomatic autonomy could be restricted 
by the UNC and the United States. This could happen in several ways. First of all, one can 
think of a case in which the UNC or the U.S. had restricted Seoul’s diplomatic autonomy 
by unilaterally pursuing foreign policy. Or, one can consider a case in which South Korea 
had been restricted by the UNC or the United States in pursuing certain foreign policies. 
Finally, considering that the UNC was a reflection of the ideal value of the UN, one can 
think of a case in which a change in the UNC’s diplomatic position could affect South 
Korea’s diplomatic position. 
In the late 1960s, South Korea’s diplomatic autonomy was restricted by the 
unilateral nature of the UNC or the United States. Friction occurred between South Korea 
and the U.S. in the process of resolving a series of North Korean provocations in 1968. 
South Korea wanted to take tough military action against North Korea after the Blue House 
raid on January 21, 1968. However, the UNC and the U.S. response fell short of South 
Korea’s expectations. Rather, the UNC and the U.S. kept South Korea in check out of 
concern for South Korea’s independent military action.128 Two days later, on January 23 
the USS Pueblo was seized by North Korea in open waters off the east coast. In response, 
the UNC issued Defcon 2 and prepared for military action in response to the incident, 
unlike the Blue House raid. Due to the discriminatory response, the South Korean 
government expressed strong dissatisfaction with the U.S. side. This complaint can be 
confirmed in the speech of President Park Chung-hee at the groundbreaking ceremony of 
the Gyeongbu Expressway on February 1, 1968.129 
The United States then shifted from military to diplomatic means in resolving the 
USS Pueblo incident. The United States tried to resolve the issue through direct 
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negotiations with North Korea. However, South Korea was even more opposed to the 
negotiations because they were a big boost to the North’s diplomatic status.130 Under these 
circumstances, the United States could not completely ignore South Korea’s position, and 
on February 12, 1968, it dispatched a special envoy Cyrus Roberts Vance to South Korea. 
The talks between the South Korean government and special envoy led to a joint statement 
aimed at reaffirming U.S. defense commitment to South Korea, including increased U.S. 
military aid to South Korea, which later led to a summit between President Park Chung-
hee and President Lyndon B. Johnson on April 18, 1968 and the hosting of the annual 
Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting.131 This series of measures ended the dispute 
between South Korea and the United States over the issue, but it was an agreement and a 
second best option at a time when Seoul’s diplomatic autonomy was limited. 
The Nixon Doctrine, released in 1969, was another case in which the UNC and U.S. 
unilateral foreign policy imposed restrictions on South Korea. On July 25, 1969, President 
Richard Nixon announced a new Asian policy, the Nixon Doctrine, in Guam. The Nixon 
Doctrine said the United States could provide its allies with weapons and economic aid, 
but not necessarily with its troops, and in particular urged Asian countries to reduce their 
dependence on the United States and resolve their security issues independently. The Nixon 
Doctrine led to the reduction of U.S. troops in South Korea. On March 27, 1970, U.S. 
Ambassador to South Korea William J. Porter notified President Park Chung-hee of the 
unilateral plan to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea. The South Korean government 
and politicians expressed strong discontent over the unilateral action by the United States. 
Nevertheless, the 7th Division in South Korea was withdrawn on November 15, 1970, and 
the 2nd Division in Korea was relocated to fill the void.132 The UNC, which had OPCON 
over the South Korean military at the time, simply complied with the flow in the process. 
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Clearly, the UNC was representing the U.S. strategic coordination in its unilateral foreign 
policy. This indicates that South Korea’s autonomy in Korea-U.S. diplomatic relations was 
limited. It can be understood in this context that the self-defense policy that the Park 
Chung-hee administration wanted to pursue was limited by Washington’s unilateral 
diplomatic moves.133 
President Richard Nixon had also begun seeking to improve relations with China 
as part of his international policy of easing tensions. At that time, the U.S. judged that 
attracting China as a member of the international community would ease tensions in Asia 
and have a positive effect on the rational resolution of the Indochina conflict.134 Therefore, 
the U.S. government also asked the South Korean government to be more active in 
improving relations with North Korea. This could be attributed to the U.S. judgment that 
the stabilization of the Korean Peninsula would help to improve relations with China. For 
South Korea, however, it was not an acceptable situation that China, one of the leading 
adversaries during the Korean War, and its ally, the U.S., were trying to improve relations. 
The South Korean government analyzed that China would intervene in the Korean 
Peninsula issues in a way that would be disadvantageous to the South Korean 
government.135 
Nevertheless, the U.S.-China detente led to inter-Korean talks between South 
Korea and North Korea. Talks began between South Korea and North Korea in August 
1971, starting with Red Cross talks. But Seoul and Pyongyang had fundamentally different 
goals, so dialogue between Seoul and Pyongyang was suspended by Pyongyang, only 
confirming differences in their perceptions, and the relationship between Seoul and 
Pyongyang soon returned to its pre-existing hostile condition. 136 This U.S. policy of 
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seeking to improve relations with China forced Seoul to make a passive change in its 
foreign policy, showing its one-sided nature. 
In some cases, the foreign policies that Korea wanted to pursue were restricted by 
the UNC or the United States. A good example is that, before and after the armistice of the 
Korean War, President Rhee Syngman embraced a foreign policy to bring down North 
Korea by force and achieve reunification. As North Korea’s military threats, which had 
been heightened even before the Korean War, changed from image to reality through the 
Korean War, President Rhee’s perception that South Korea’s security can be guaranteed 
only by removing North Korean communism was strengthened.137 This foreign policy 
began even before the armistice of the Korean War was signed, and the U.S. government 
at that time took a stand against it. As of May 17, 1951, the United States adopted NSC 48/
5, deciding to end the war in Korea with negotiations and leading the discussion of a 
ceasefire.138 South Korea opposed the truce as an extension of its preferred foreign policy, 
and in the process, insisted on allowing the South Korean military to conduct a solo attack. 
These different opinions converged to the agreement on a mutual defense treaty 
after the armistice. However, even after the armistice, President Rhee continued to express 
his intention to bring down North Korea. In response, the U.S. government set a course of 
action to prevent Rhee’s resumption of armed actions. The United States adopted NSC 
167/1, which said the United States would not intervene at all if South Korea launched an 
independent military action, would stop providing military and logistics support to South 
Korean troops, and would take steps to protect only the U.N. forces. This was a clear 
opposition to President Rhee’s foreign policy. Ultimately, the U.S. had signed the Agreed 
Minute Relating to Continued Cooperation in Economic and Military Matters with South 
Korea, which stipulates that the commander of the UNC would keep retaining OPCON of 
the South Korean military, practically limiting Seoul’s foreign policy. Under these 
circumstances, the foreign policy gradually lost momentum after the mid-1950s due to 
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domestic opposition, which was raised in South Korea, and consequently was 
withdrawn.139 
South Korea also experienced foreign policy restrictions in the Park Chung-hee 
administration. In the late 1960s, North Korea’s provocations became aggressive, along 
with the escalation of the Vietnam War. Under these circumstances, South Korea’s 
awareness of security threats had increased, which had been more intensified with the 
announcement of the Nixon Doctrine. The Nixon Doctrine itself was a call for initiatives 
and self-help efforts by Asian countries, so South Korea envisioned the Asia-Pacific Treaty 
Organization (APATO), a collective security system in the Asia-Pacific region, centered 
around Vietnam’s warring nations in the name of deterring communist aggression. This 
APATO proposal exposed that the existing UNC-centered defense system did not reflect 
the value of a collective security system led by the United States. However, the South 
Korean government’s APATO initiative was met with opposition from the U.S. 
government. On March 19, 1969, Secretary of State William Rogers told South Korean 
Ambassador to the United States Kim Dong-jo that President Richard Nixon was primarily 
concerned about regional cooperation in Asia in terms of economy and culture, not about 
security cooperation, which means additional security commitments. Behind this position 
was a fierce anti-war movement against the Vietnam War in the United States at the time. 
As a result, Seoul’s APATO diplomatic initiative to draw security ties in Asia fell through 
due to opposition from Washington, again showing the deep U.S. shadow over Seoul’s 
security policy.140 
In some cases, a change in the UNC’s diplomatic position had affected South 
Korea’s diplomatic position. By the 1970s, the status of the United States within the United 
Nations had been somewhat weakened due to the newly emerging non-aligned 
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movement.141 Meanwhile, the UNC’s status had been weakened as most of the remaining 
troops contributing to the UNC returned to their homelands in the 1970s.142 At the UN, 
initiatives emerged to dismantle the UNC.143 As discussed in the following chapter, South 
Korea and the United States reacted by planning the creation of a new joint command.144 
But the important fact here is that, in the time since the establishment of the Republic of 
Korea government was legally recognized by the United Nations and the UNC in the 
Korean War prevented South Korea from communizing, the international community’s 
diplomatic support for South Korea through the United Nations had weakened. This can 
be seen as limiting the scope of Seoul’s diplomatic autonomy, including putting Seoul in a 
defensive position on the diplomatic stage. 
In sum, during this period, the UNC had a role in the U.S. global strategy under its 
command structure. This means that certain restrictions on Seoul’s foreign policy in the 
asymmetric alliance between Seoul and Washington were represented through restrictions 
by the UNC. In particular, restrictions on South Korea’s diplomatic autonomy may stand 
out in diplomatic issues related to security. The UNC and the U.S. imposed restrictions on 
the foreign policy of reunification pursued by President Rhee Syngman. Later, the APATO 
initiative that President Park Chung-hee pushed ahead was also restricted by the UNC and 
the United States. At the same time, they pushed for a unilateral solution in dealing with 
the North’s provocations in 1968. Later still, the U.S. pursued unilateral policies such as 
Nixon Doctrine, the subsequent withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, and the U.S.-
China detente, forcing Seoul to follow passively. As such, it could be seen that the UNC 
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and the U.S. had certain restrictions on South Korea’s diplomatic autonomy in return for 
providing security. 
However, the negative assessment of the restriction on diplomatic autonomy can 
be said to have been partially closed in return for negotiations between Seoul and 
Washington. The U.S. signed a mutual defense treaty with South Korea in the process of 
realistically curbing President Rhee’s foreign policy for reunification, which resulted in the 
U.S. being directly bound to security on the Korean Peninsula. Also, South Korea’s fear of 
abandonment and complaints in the process of dealing with North Korea’s provocations in 
1968 had been able to lure more U.S. military aid to South Korea and the hosting of the 
annual South Korea-U.S. SCM. As a result, the UNC imposed some restrictions on South 
Korea’s diplomatic autonomy in return for taking responsibility for South Korea’s security, 
but the UNC also paid the price of a conciliatory gesture toward Seoul. 
E. CONCLUSION: ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE UNC ON 
SECURITY IN SOUTH KOREA BEFORE THE CREATION OF THE CFC 
This chapter has analyzed the impact of the UNC on South Korean security during 
the period from the signing of the Korean War Armistice Agreement in 1953 to the 
establishment of the CFC in 1978. The chapter analysis has examined the UNC impact on 
military and economic aspects, and then political and diplomatic aspects. 
In this period, the UNC had a limited but positive impact on South Korea’s military 
security. The UNC held OPCON over the South Korean military and was primarily 
responsible for the defense of South Korea. The UNC’s security responsibility for South 
Korea was expressed through deterrence against North Korea and served to ensure the 
South Korea’s physical survival from North Korea’s threats. The UNC was able to restrain 
North Korea from carrying out massive military attacks. Through this, South Korea’s 
military security was able to avoid the serious threat of war. However, North Korea’s 
provocative space was still open. North Korea continued to express its threat to South 
Korea in the form of indirect infiltration and local armed conflict, and kept South Korea’s 
military tensions high. In this regard, the UNC’s role in South Korea’s military security 
was limited but positive. 
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The UNC had a positive impact on South Korea’s economic security. The UNC’s 
role in South Korea’s economic development had emerged through direct economic aid 
and indirect economic development guarantees. The UNC provided direct economic aid to 
help and develop the impoverished South Korean economy after the Korean War. Also, the 
UNC itself was an institutional way of ensuring U.S. aid. This enabled the South Korean 
economy to gain a foothold for future growth. In addition, the UNC played an indirect role 
in South Korea’s economic development through the derivative effects of deterrence 
against North Korea. Based on UNC deterrence and security assistance, South Korea was 
able to divert its limited state resources to economic development, which was a driving 
force behind the rapid growth of the South Korean economy. In this regard, the UNC’s role 
in South Korea’s economic security was positive. 
On the other hand, the UNC’s role in South Korea’s political and diplomatic 
security was somewhat negative. First of all, the political system of South Korea saw 
retrogression of democracy during that period, and the military was involved as part of the 
means of force. The UNC, which had OPCON over the South Korean military, could have 
served as a restrictor to the military’s involvement in South Korean politics. However, the 
UNC took a stand as a passive bystander in this series of circumstances. During the April 
19 Revolution, the South Korean government decided to deploy military units to suppress 
the revolutionary forces, and the UNC allowed it. In addition, the coup forces of the May 
16th military coup committed illegal acts outside the OPCON of the UNC, but the UNC 
did not actively curb them and later took steps to recognize the coup forces. In other words, 
the UNC was not completely independent from South Korea’s political and security 
regression at the time. 
Because South Korea’s defense system was centered on the UNC, and the UNC 
exercised full-fledged authority over South Korea’s security, the leading U.S. role behind 
the UNC suggests that the full-scale authority over South Korea’s security came from the 
U.S. In this context, the UNC could be seen as a channel for U.S. restrictions on South 
Korean autonomy, instead of being responsible only for South Korea’s military security. 
Before and after the Korean War Armistice Agreement, President Rhee Syngman pushed 
for a strong diplomatic unification policy, but this was limited by the United States due to 
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the issue of opportunity cost. In the late 1960s, President Park Chung-hee conceived the 
APATO, a collective security system in the Asia-Pacific region, but this was also limited 
by the burden of security costs and indifference of the U.S. At the same time, the U.S. 
pushed for a unilateral solution in 1968 in the course of dealing with a series of North 
Korean provocations, and later pushed ahead with unilateral policies such as Nixon 
Doctrine, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and the U.S.-China detente, 
prompting Seoul to establish a foreign policy imposed by Washington’s choice. In the 
process, South Korea did conduct negotiations with the United States, but ultimately its 
active diplomacy and autonomy were limited. As a result, while the UNC played a positive 
role in South Korea’s physical survival since the Korean War Armistice Agreement until 
the establishment of the CFC, in the process it played a rather negative role in South Korea 
realizing its ideal values as a nation. 
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III. THE IMPACT OF THE UNC AFTER THE CREATION OF 
THE CFC 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyzes the impact of the UNC on South Korea’s security from the 
establishment of the CFC in 1978 to the start of a unilateral attempt by North Korea to 
neutralize the UNC in 1991. With the establishment of the CFC in 1978, OPCON of South 
Korean troops was transferred from the UNC to the CFC. This was a turning point in the 
role of the UNC, which had been directly responsible for Korean security, and the role of 
the UNC was reduced to the management of the Armistice Agreement and guarantee of the 
provision of forces. In 1991, the communist bloc collapsed and a South Korean general 
was appointed as the chief delegate to the UNCMAC. Under these circumstances, North 
Korea tried to neutralize the UNC in earnest, insisting on the uselessness of the NNSC. 
This chapter analyzes the role of the UNC in the period from the creation of the CFC to 
1991. First, this chapter looks at the background of the CFC, the change of the UNC’s role, 
and the characteristics of the ROK-U.S. combined defense system. Subsequently, the 
impact of the UNC on South Korean security is comprehensively analyzed. 
B. THE UNC AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CFC 
1. The Historical Background of the CFC 
a. The Weakening of the Status of the UN and Efforts to Dismantle the UNC 
The CFC was created in the 1970s as an active response between South Korea and 
the U.S. amid the changing security environment and the changing international situation 
surrounding the UNC. In the 1960s, the United States was the leading influence within the 
UN, but the emerging Third World countries forming the non-aligned movement at that 
time began to rebel against the United States at the U.N.145 As a result, the status of the 
UNC was also weakening. As most of the remaining UNC troops returned to their 
homeland in the 1970s, the UNC remained only a nominal symbol of the UN and was 
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mostly operated by the U.S. military.146 Under these circumstances, the USFK withdrawal 
in 1971 ultimately weakened the UNC’s function on the defense of South Korea.147 
At a time when the status of the UN and UNC was declining, the issue of 
dismantling the UNC was officially raised at the UN on July 17, 1972. Algeria and other 
communist countries sent a letter to the U.N. secretary-general asking for discussions on 
the subject of reviewing the existence of the UNC. On September 21, 1973, communist-
led Liberia and Tunisia also submitted a resolution to the U.N. General Assembly 
requesting to remove U.N. authority from foreign troops in South Korea and dismantle the 
UNC.148 
South Korea and the United States, which are directly related to the UNC, had to 
come up with countermeasures against initiatives. The answer was a new joint command. 
On December 31, 1973, the Nixon administration through National Security Study 
Memorandum (NSSM) 190 directed policy research for the transition to a new security 
system on the Korean Peninsula. The key point was to present the details of the negotiations 
with China and North Korea and their strategies for negotiations regarding the 
dismantlement of the UNC.149 In response, the NSC submitted a NSSM 190 research 
report providing basic requirements to ensure that the dismantling of the UNC would not 
undermine South Korea’s security. NSC staffs focused on the issue of OPCON over the 
South Korean military among the issues that should not be negotiated with the communist 
side so as not to weaken South Korean security.150 NSC staffs suggested that the ROK-
US CFC, under the command of the U.S. military, exercise OPCON over all Korean 
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troops.151 Details of the CFC were not specified at that time, but the CFC began to emerge 
as an alternative to the UNC at this point. State Secretary Henry A. Kissinger reported the 
results of the study on the NSSM 190 to President Richard Nixon on March 25, 1974, and 
on March 29, President delivered a negotiating strategy for this through National Security 
Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 251.152  
But the United States had failed to agree with China and North Korea on the issue. 
In addition, the fact that the communist resolution was voted down by a tie at the 29th U.N. 
General Assembly in 1974 meant not only weakening the status of the United Nations but 
also increasing international calls for ending direct U.N. involvement on the Korean 
Peninsula.153 Against this backdrop, Seoul and Washington could not be sure that the 30th 
U.N. General Assembly in 1975 would flow in a favorable direction. Therefore, South 
Korea and the U.S. agreed to prepare for any situation in which the resolution to dismantle 
the UNC is passed or rejected. In other words, their reaction was to push for diplomatic 
efforts to reject the communist claim at the U.N. General Assembly by publicly 
reorganizing the functions of the UNC, and to clarify preparations for the creation of a new 
CFC that can represent the functions of the UNC and the national interests of the two 
countries in case the dismantlement of the UNC was approved internally.154 The content 
of the establishment of the CFC emerged and materialized in this period of time. 
b. South Korea’s Perception of Security Threats and Dissatisfaction with the 
UNC-Centered Security System 
Since the Korean War, North Korea has continued to infiltrate and provoke South 
Korea as well as build up its military capabilities to communize the Korean Peninsula. In 
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particular, the emergence of a strong anti-communist regime in South Korea in the early 
1960s further increased the level of North Korea’s provocations. 155  Under these 
circumstances, South Korea at the time relied heavily on the alliance with the U.S. as an 
integral part of its national security.156 Even though the commander of the UNC held 
OPCON over South Korean troops, South Korea was practically relying on the presence of 
the U.S. in that the command structure of the UNC led to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
But the Nixon Doctrine was a big shock to South Korea. The Nixon Doctrine called 
for initiatives from Asian countries, stating that the primary responsibility for security in 
Asia belonged to the countries concerned. Naturally, the aftermath of the Nixon Doctrine 
made South Korea, which relied on the U.S. for security, feel threatened with 
abandonment, a perception that increased due to the actual reduction of U.S. troops in 
South Korea. In 1971, Nixon reduced the number of the USFK by 18,000.157 At that time, 
the South Korean government was unable to stop the unilateral decision by the United 
States despite its extreme opposition to it, which naturally increased the fear of 
abandonment felt by South Korea. 
The fear of abandonment felt by South Korea was greater facing President Jimmy 
Carter’s policy of withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea in 1977. The communization 
of Indochina in 1975 divided U.S. domestic opinion over Washington’s excessive security 
commitment to the Asian region. Under these circumstances, President Carter as a 
candidate had made a campaign pledge to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea, and he 
had carried it out in earnest upon taking office.158 In response, President Park Chung-hee 
stubbornly opposed the plan, calling for the transfer of OPCON to South Korea after the 
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withdrawal of the USFK and compensation for the withdrawal.159 In addition, President 
Carter ordered a review of action guidelines linking human rights issues in South Korea to 
preliminary plan for the withdrawal of the USFK.160 Here, the President Park Chung-hee 
clashed with President Carter’s leadership prioritizing human rights. At that time, President 
Park ruled the nation with strong state-led leadership, and held that in Korean-style 
democracy, the universal freedom and values such as human rights of Western-style 
democracy could be partially restricted or withheld. However this thought was different 
from President Carter’s idea.161 As such, President Carter’s troop withdrawal policy had 
raised fears of less deterrence for South Korea. 
At the same time, South Korea was unhappy with the UNC-centered security 
system. There was little room for South Korea to participate in operational plans and 
matters related to maintaining the country’s security under the circumstances when the 
commander of the UNC held OPCON of the South Korean military. At that time, all of the 
UNC’s operations were unilaterally led by the U.S. military.162 The complaints were more 
pronounced in friction between Seoul and Washington over a series of North Korea’s 
provocations in 1968. The commander of the UNC, who held OPCON, did not respond 
much to the Blue House raid, but issued a Defcon 2 for the abduction of the USS Pueblo 
and prepared for military action. The South Korean government expressed strong 
dissatisfaction with the discriminatory response, protesting it to the United States.163 
After the U.S. withdrew from the Vietnam War in 1975, Indochina was 
communized. The fall of democracy in Indochina had been linked to North Korea’s 
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continued provocations and claims to dismantle the UNC, causing South Korea to be 
gripped by serious security concerns. At that time, South Korea needed, among other 
things, a continued guarantee of deterrence against North Korea provided by the UNC. 
However, the U.S. policy to withdraw USFK and the UNC-centered security system had 
increased the fear and dissatisfaction of South Korea. In this context, South Korea needed 
institutional changes and devices to fundamentally guarantee U.S. security commitments 
to South Korea. 
c. U.S. Security Costs and Continued Strategic Interest on the Korean 
Peninsula 
The United States, which had emerged as a great power after World War I and II, 
formed an international political and economic order based on its overwhelming ability. 
Although the U.S. was fighting against Soviet-centered communist forces in the Cold War, 
it was playing the role of a guardian of the free democratic world and gaining hegemony 
outside the communist sphere. However, in the 1970s, American hegemony began to be 
threatened, and the American-centered international political and economic order began to 
falter.164 In particular, the U.S. suffered a total economic crisis at the time, with the 
outflow of gold increasing and the U.S. dollar depreciating.165 
Under these circumstances, the strengthening of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam 
War further deepened the economic crisis in the U.S. In particular, unlike the Korean War, 
the United States had to cover all the war expenses on its own in the Vietnam War. During 
the Korean War, the U.S. was able to cover some of the costs through various civil society 
organizations and even religious organizations. But in the case of the Vietnam War, U.S. 
allies were reluctant to provide war support as well as participation in the war, and even 
the countries that sent troops were relying on the U.S. for all material assistance resulting 
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from the dispatch.166 The United States had spent more than $240 billion on the Vietnam 
War, including indirect expenses.167 As such, the Vietnam War further increased the 
burden of security costs for the U.S. which was facing an economic crisis. 
The U.S. needed measures to address it. The unilateral policy of providing security 
to allies was forced to change in the face of the negative situation of the Vietnam War and 
the consequent anti-war sentiment. The United States wanted its allies to share some of the 
costs in security matters related to their countries. This U.S. interest was especially high 
regarding South Korea. Moreover, because the legitimacy of the UNC was being 
questioned in the international community, the United States needed an alternative not only 
to be able to share the burden of security costs with South Korea but also to retain the 
legitimation of the UNC. Nevertheless, the United States still considered the Korean 
Peninsula an important base for Northeast Asia.168 In the Cold War confrontation, the 
Korean Peninsula had strategic importance as an outpost. In other words, the United States 
needed alternatives that would still be able to represent its strategic interests within the 
Korean Peninsula. In this context, the U.S. began to consider adaptations to the UNC.169 
2. Change in the Role of the UNC after Establishment of the CFC 
On November 7, 1978, the ROK-U.S. CFC was established based on the ROK-U.S. 
Terms of Reference (TOR) in terms of the MAC and the CFC. This was the result of long 
consultations between South Korea and the United States in a series of meetings, and the 
institutionalization of the existing South Korea-U.S. alliance and military cooperation. 
Following the establishment of the CFC, the UNC handed over OPCON of South Korean 
troops to the CFC. This also transferred South Korea’s primary defense duty from the UNC 
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to the CFC.170 In the event of North Korea’s violation of the Armistice Agreement, the 
UNC could order the CFC to deal with the violation, but the actual defense duty over South 
Korea was to be taken over by the CFC with OPCON.171 As a result, the UNC has only 
taken on the role of ensuring the implementation and compliance of Armistice Agreements 
and the provision of troops by U.N. member states in case of emergency. 
3. South Korea-U.S. Combined Defense System 
With the creation of the CFC, South Korea’s defense system has changed from a 
UNC-centered defense system to a South Korea-U.S. combined defense system. The ROK-
US combined defense system was organized as a NATO-type defense system.172 The 
NATO-type defense system takes the form of a combined command consisting of the top 
leaders of the participating countries. That is, the leaders of all countries participating in 
the organization, regardless of the differences in national power, operate the Allied Forces 
with equal qualifications. In addition, the NATO-type defense system has separate boards 
of directors which has a way of handing down operational guidelines to the combined 
command.173 The CFC, which institutionalized the South Korea-U.S. combined defense 
system, has had a chain of command like this NATO-type defense system. 
The two countries agreed to appoint a senior U.S. military officer to the post of 
commander of the CFC. The four-star U.S. general, a senior U.S. military officer and 
commander of the CFC, came to exercise OPCON over the U.S. and South Korean troops 
entrusted to defend the country. However, Seoul and Washington have set up a Military 
Committee (MC) at the top of the CFC, composed of the chairmen of the two countries’ 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, to ensure combined command. As a result, the commander of the 
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CFC came to perform its duties in accordance with the strategic instructions and guidelines 
given by the ROK-U.S. MC. The SCM exists again at the top of the ROK-US MC, and this 
SCM hands down strategic instructions and guidelines from the two Presidents, who 
complete the combined command structure. Thus, the CFC was an organization in which 
a four-star U.S. general served as commander, but guaranteed the command of the leaders 
of the two countries, and the commander of the CFC was assigned roles and missions in 
accordance with the strategic guidelines and instructions based on such command.174 The 
Strategic Command No. 1, which was given to the CFC by the MC on August 28, 1978, 
emphasized the responsibility of the ROK defense and the importance of Seoul defense 
and ordered the mission to the commander of the CFC.175 
Such a combined defense system between South Korea and the U.S. meant an 
easing of existing asymmetric Seoul-Washington relations. Under the existing UNC-
centered defense system, South Korea had little to do with its own security-related 
operational plans and other matters.176 South Korea had to accept the UNC’s guidelines 
unilaterally in its security policy, and the UNC moved under the direction of the U.S. Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. In other words, under the UNC South Korea had to carry out operations 
only in accordance with an operational plan established by the United States.177 However, 
the new combined defense system had a MC as an upper body of the CFC, which included 
the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and senior military officials of South Korea, to 
draw up strategic guidelines and instructions with the U.S. side. In other words, a 
fundamental institutional mechanism had been put in place to more actively reflect the 
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situation and position of the South Korean military in its security policy.178 Although the 
combined defense system did not completely resolve the asymmetry of South Korea-U.S. 
relations, it ensured South Korea’s status as a relatively equal strategic partner. 
C. THE ROLE OF THE UNC ON MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SECURITY 
This section analyzes the impact of the UNC on South Korea’s military and 
economic security after establishment of the CFC. Since handing over OPCON of South 
Korean troops to the CFC in 1978, the UNC has only taken on the role of managing 
compliance and implementation of the Armistice Agreement and providing armed forces 
of UN member states to the Korean Peninsula in case of emergency. This meant a step back 
from direct responsibility for South Korea’s defense, and also meant that the UNC no 
longer had a direct connection to the country’s economic development initiative. Therefore, 
the analysis here focuses on how the UN’s role in implementing and complying with the 
Armistice Agreement contributes to deterrence against North Korea. Taking into account 
the fact that this reduced UNC role cannot be directly converted into economic value, the 
analysis here focuses on the strategic value provided by the provision of armed forces of 
UN member states in case of emergency, which is guaranteed by the UNC. 
1. Assumption of Analysis 
a. Armistice Agreement and Deterrence Against North Korea 
This section analyzes whether the UNC had exercised deterrence against North 
Korea in implementing and complying with the Armistice Agreement. In fact, the 
Armistice Agreement itself is a secondary factor in deterrence against North Korea, rather 
than a military response based on existing OPCON. The military response is to prevent 
North Korea from carrying out military attacks by recognizing the potential damage to 
itself that might result. The armistice, however, forces the North to comply legally, 
prompting Pyongyang to abandon its threatening behavior. It is necessary to find out how 
these secondary elements can be linked to inhibitors. 
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Such influence depends on the conditions of deterrence. The deterrent force that 
forces the other party to abandon its own action through the value judgment between the 
damage and the profit that accompanies any action requires some conditions for its 
functioning. The first condition is capability. Basically, deterrence is the result of 
psychological struggle that takes advantage of making threats, not execution of threats. 
Without the capability to implement real threats in this process, the other party can never 
experience anxiety, and ultimately no deterrence is established. In other words, having the 
capability to recognize threats basically guarantees deterrence.179 
The second condition of deterrence is communication. Deterrence manifested in 
psychological struggle presupposes interrelationships. In these interrelationships there is a 
cycle in which intentions and threats are conveyed, and the profit and loss calculations are 
made, and the reprocessed intentions and threats are re-delivered. If facts about threats 
against each other are not communicated or are distorted, the effect of deterrence would 
disappear. This is because the cycle of intent and threat itself is not established. Thus, in 
deterrence, the process of accurately conveying the inhibitor’s intention of what action to 
take is important.180 
The last condition of deterrence is credibility. In deterrence, it is important to ensure 
clearly that the other party has the intention and ability to inflict costs and damage as 
delivered in advance if the one undertakes the acts forbidden. If one doesn’t trust and 
underestimates the other’s possible threats, it naturally lowers the cost of conducting the 
threatening behavior. Thus, deterrence requires essentially the capability and intention to 
support a threat, but above all, a process to get the other party to accept the content and 
possibilities of the threat.181 
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Given these conditions, the question becomes whether the Armistice Agreement 
had any actual capability to deter North Korea’s military threats, and whether the intent to 
respond to those threats was effectively communicated. 
The Armistice Agreement was an agreement between the two sides of the Korean 
War that promised to stop military threats and ban future military provocations. In fact, 
this agreement institutionally ensured the capability, communication, and mutual 
credibility by having the MAC and the NNSC as the main agents. This observations 
establishes an analysis assumption that the Armistice Agreement was able to curb North 
Korea’s military provocations at a time when the possibility of military threats from the 
North was high. 
Questions could be raised about whether the Armistice Agreement could be the 
only independent variable for deterrence against North Korea. Indeed, deterrence against 
North Korea might be derived more directly from U.S. forces based in the combined 
defense system at that time. Therefore, the variable of the United States is considered 
together in this analysis. This section looks at the variables of the U.S. and UNC in the case 
of North Korea’s provocations and determines the influence of UNC through the Armistice 
Agreement. 
b. UNC Assurance of Armed Forces of the UN Member States in the Event 
of an Emergency 
This section analyzes the strategic value of the role of the UNC as a guarantee of 
armed forces supply in case of an emergency. This begins with the fact that there was no 
primary correlation between the UNC and South Korea’s economic development at the 
time. As discussed in the prior chapter, the UNC provided direct economic aid to South 
Korea until 1960 for the country’s post-war economic recovery and revival, but suspended 
aid after that.182 This vacuum in UN economic aid was filled with U.S. aid, and it also 
gradually changed to the form of a loan. Also, it is less important to examine the indirect 
impact of the UNC on South Korea’s economic development. Since 1978, South Korea’s 
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economic power had already far outstripped that of North Korea. At that time, North 
Korea’s GNI grew steadily from $10.2 billion in 1978 to $15.5 billion in 1991, but its level 
was limited to that range. Korea’s GNI, on the other hand, has continued to grow from 
$53.1 billion in 1978 to $333.7 billion in 1991.183 As such, South Korea’s economy was 
far superior to North Korea’s. 
In this sense, to analyze the economic value of the role of the UNC and its impact 
on the South Korean economy at that time, it is necessary to analyze the economic value 
of the UNC’s role in the event of an emergency. However, there are limitations to this 
process. First of all, it is difficult to convert the exact economic value of human and 
intangible resources among the forces that could be deployed to the Korean Peninsula in 
case of an emergency. As discussed earlier, disputes persist over accuracy in assessing and 
comparing military forces. There is also a limit to the access to data that can translate actual 
military power into economic value. Translating the economic value of the UNC’s capacity 
to supply armed forces in the event of emergencies that never took place is even harder to 
gauge with objectivity. In other words, the calculation of economic value to the UNC role 
of providing armed forces in case of an emergency would be highly subjective. 
Therefore, this section looks at strategic value rather than objective economic value 
for the role of UNC. The UNC’s role in providing armed forces would apply in the 
condition that war on the Korean Peninsula recur. However, since there has been no major 
military attack on the Korean Peninsula since the Korean War, there can be no calculation 
of the actual role, unlike the Armistice Agreement. In this regard, this section wants to 
examine what strategic value the role had, although it was not realized. Based on this, the 
present analysis assumes the UNC’s guarantee of armed forces of UN member states in 
case of emergency had useful strategic value for South Korea at that time. 
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2. Reference Point of Analysis 
a. The Possibility of Military Threats From North Korea 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the possibility of North Korea’s military threats 
reflects its threat capabilities and will, which is a probable factor in North Korea’s 
provocations. The possibility remains a reference point in determining whether the Armistice 
Agreement would exercise deterrence against North Korea. Table 8 utilizes the same 
methodology from the previous chapter to measure North Korea’s threat (again using 1968 as 
the baseline year), continuing the annual measures from Table 1 into the period since the 
establishment of the CFC in 1978. Figure 3 then displays the prospect of military threats from 
North Korea across both periods (before and after formation of the CFC), from 1961–1991. 

































1968 2.65 0.48 24.40% 1.28 31.1 100.0 
1979 0.91 0.20 23.55% 0.18 4.3 36.5 
1980 0.85 0.22 24.00% 0.19 4.6 38.0 
1981 0.85 0.20 23.82% 0.17 4.1 35.9 
1982 0.76 0.19 23.82% 0.14 3.5 32.9 
1983 0.81 0.18 23.45% 0.15 3.4 32.5 
1984 0.81 0.17 23.42% 0.13 3.1 31.1 
1985 0.80 0.17 23.05% 0.13 3.0 30.4 
1986 0.79 0.17 22.59% 0.13 3.0 29.6 
1987 0.75 0.15 21.75% 0.11 2.4 26.1 
1988 0.61 0.11 21.46% 0.07 1.5 20.6 
1989 0.51 0.10 21.28% 0.05 1.0 17.0 
1990 0.51 0.09 21.56% 0.05 1.0 17.0 
1991 0.47 0.08 22.49% 0.04 0.8 15.7 
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Figure 3. Military Threats from North Korea (1961-1991).185 
Based on these measures, military threats from North Korea steadily decreased after 
1978. There is a relatively sharp decline between 1985 and 1988, but no particular 
difference appears during the overall period. This is significantly lower than the probability 
in the late 1960s. Nevertheless, this section looks at the cases of North Korea’s actual 
provocations, and analyzes the effectiveness of the deterrence against the North based in 
these instances. 
b. The UNC Forces stationed in South Korea in 1980, and to Be Provided to 
South Korea in Case of Emergency 
This section considers the UNC’s role in providing armed forces in case of an 
emergency. It analyzes how much power could be provided by the UN member states in 
the event of a recurrence of war on the Korean Peninsula. First of all, the type of military 
strength of the UNC, which had been deployed on the Korean Peninsula at that time, could 
be the basis for determining the difference between the potential power supply figures 
before and after an emergency. 
 
185 Source: Jeongwoo Lee, “The Assessment of North Korea`s Conventional Military Power and the 
Change of Its Military Threat to South Korea,” Review of North Korean Studies 17, no. 2 (August 2014): 
318. 
92 
In this period, the UNC’s forces deployed on the Korean Peninsula consisted mostly 
of USFK and South Korean troops. In particular, in 1980, the USFK maintained 39,000 
troops, led by the 2nd Infantry Division under the Eighth Army. During the Korean War, 
the number of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea reached 314,000, but most of them 
withdrew after the Korean War armistice, leaving only the 2nd and 7th divisions under the 
Eighth Army’s command on the peninsula. Since then, the reduction of U.S. troops in 
South Korea had continued as the U.S. global strategy was readjusted. In 1970, the 7th 
Division was withdrawn under the Nixon Doctrine, and in 1977, 3,000 more troops were 
withdrawn under President Jimmy Carter’s policy, leaving the level of 39,000 in 1980.186 
In 1980, South Korea’s military strength remained at the level of 600,000 troops. At that 
time, South Korea’s military strength consisted of Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine, led 
by 20 army infantry divisions, which were slightly less numerous than North Korea’s 
680,000 troops at the time.187 Overall, combined USFK and South Korean troop levels on 
the Korean Peninsula in 1980 totaled 640,000. 
Next, it is necessary to look at the overall military power of countries that promised 
to provide their armed forces in case of emergency. The external situation since 1978 is 
quite different from the external situation at the time of the Korean War armistice, and the 
internal opportunity cost of fulfilling the promise had also increased. Therefore, it was a 
situation in which the power supply itself was not guaranteed. In addition, even if the power 
supply was implemented in case of an emergency, the level was not certain. The present 
analysis uses the tangible maximum of military power that could be provided at that time. 
This was clearly a level that could not be realized in practice because it is the total military 
strength of the countries that might support South Korea. However, this calculation enables 
a rough estimate because it establishes the upper boundary of the range. The tangible 
military level in 1980 of the countries that previously supported South Korea through the 
UNC is as follows in Table 9. 
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Table 9. Total Armed Forces of the Korean War-Participating Countries.188 
Australia Belgium Britain Canada Colombia Ethiopia France Greece 
71,011 87,900 329,204 78,646 65,800 229,500 494,730 181,500 
Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Philippines 
South 
Africa Thailand Turkey 
 
660 114,980 12,640 112,800 86050 230,800 567,000  
 
Obviously, these figures in the table represent troop levels far beyond what could 
be deployed to the Korean Peninsula in case of an emergency. Nevertheless, the military 
strength of a country that promised to provide armed forces is useful in gauging the 
approximate figure of such a provision. For example, as a very crude approximation, if 
each country above would provide 5% of its military force to support South Korea in case 
of an emergency, this would be over 130,000 additional troops—over three times as many 
troops as stationed in South Korea by the USFK at that time. 
3. Analysis for Military and Economic Factors 
a. The Effectiveness of the UNC’s Deterrence Against North Korea through 
the Armistice Agreement 
Before analyzing the deterrence of the Armistice Agreement, this section examines 
whether the UNC’s role in managing the Armistice Agreement itself met the conditions of 
deterrence. It checks whether the Armistice Agreement had the capability to guarantee 
deterrence against North Korea. It also checks whether North Korea had recognized 
sanctions and threats against violations of the Armistice Agreement and considered them 
in deciding its policy and provocation. In other words, it analyzes whether the deterrence 
against North Korea had been well exercised by first looking into the level of deterrence 
and then examining the cases of North Korea’s provocations, and how the elements of the 
Armistice Agreement affected the process. 
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On July 27, 1953, the Armistice Agreement was signed between Mark W. Clark, 
commander of the United Nations Command, Kim Il-sung, commander of the Korean 
People’s Army, and Péng Déhuái, commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army. It 
was an agreement that legally suspended mutual military activities on the Korean Peninsula 
that had lasted for three years. The Armistice Agreement consists of a total of 5 articles 
and 63 clauses, which guarantees a ban on future military provocative acts and the 
maintenance of dialogue channels between the two sides in addition to the suspension of 
military hostilities.189 
The Armistice Agreement has a MAC and a NNSC to ensure its implementation. 
The MAC is a joint organization of a total of ten representatives, consisting of five 
representatives from the UNC and five representatives from communist countries, and 
serves as a communication body that discusses and resolves the issues of implementation 
and compliance with the Armistice Agreement.190 The NNSC is an organization composed 
of representatives from four countries that did not participate in the Korean War and serves 
to maintain the Armistice Agreement along with the MAC. The initial NNSC had 
Czechoslovakia and Poland as communist-side delegations, and Switzerland and Sweden 
as the UNC-side delegations. Unlike the MAC, the NNSC is a separate independent 
organization, not an organization under the UNC, and is in a cooperative relationship with 
the MAC. When the commander of the UNC requests the NNSC to do the tasks necessary 
to maintain the armistice, the NNSC decides and carries out the tasks after independent 
judgment. That is, the Armistice Agreement had an institutional mechanism to ensure the 
capability, communications, and credibility to implement the Armistice Agreement by 
keeping the MAC and the NNSC as implementation entities. In fact, the MAC held up to 
hundreds of talks with the North Korean side every month from 1953 to 1991, and the 
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NNSC has also held weekly neutral meetings once a week since the signing of the 
Armistice Agreement.191 
However, these institutional mechanisms disappeared in the 1990s. When the UNC 
appointed a South Korean general as its chief delegate of the UNCMAC in 1991, North 
Korea objected that South Korea was not a party to the Armistice Agreement. Later, on 
December 15, 1994, North Korea completely withdrew its MAC. In addition, North Korea 
insisted on the uselessness of the NNSC, forcibly withdrawing the Czechoslovakian 
delegation on April 3, 1993, and the Polish delegation on February 28, 1995. As a result, 
the NNSC was halved, and all activities of the NNSC in North Korea were virtually 
suspended.192 As such, institutional guarantees for the implementation of the Armistice 
Agreement have been lost as of 1993. 
The practical capability of the Armistice Agreement was not guaranteed from the 
beginning. This is because there was no real response or threat to the other party if it 
violated the Armistice Agreement. Article 2 Clause 12 of the Armistice Agreement states 
that “The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation 
of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and 
personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this 
armistice agreement is signed.”193 That is, the MAC and the NNSC have the authority to 
investigate any violation of the Armistice Agreement and consult with each other for a 
solution, but the handling of the case is left to the side which violates. This means that 
sanctions and threats from violations of the Armistice Agreement are nominal, which 
means that the Armistice Agreement lacks practical capability to contain North Korea. 
Since the 1970s, North Korea has insisted on replacing the armistice with a peace 
treaty, and has insisted on direct negotiations with the United States on the replacement of 
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the Armistice Agreement.194 At that time, North Korea advocated the replacement of the 
Armistice Agreement in connection with dismantling the UNC and completely 
withdrawing foreign troops from South Korea, thereby fulfilling the preconditions for 
communization of the Korean Peninsula. Here, the fact that North Korea attempted to 
replace the armistice with a peace treaty even though the Armistice Agreement lacked 
practical capability for deterrence suggests that Pyongyang did recognize effects of the 
existence of the minimum Armistice Agreement itself. In other words, North Korea was 
aware of the meaning of the Armistice Agreement itself and the ripple effect of violating 
it, so it wanted to fundamentally change it. As a result, it can be seen that the Armistice 
Agreement was limited in meaningfully deterring North Korea due to the lack of practical 
capability, although the mutual recognition of the armistice did constrain North Korea’s 
diplomatic aims. 
Since the establishment of the CFC, North Korea’s provocations have been 
different in many ways. First of all, after the establishment of the CFC, the number of the 
provocation fell to about 30 by 1991.195 This is a significantly small number and even 
smaller than the 49 provocations in 1971. However, North Korea’s provocations had 
changed considerably in terms of the intensity and location. Previously, the intensity of 
provocation was relatively low, including infiltration, espionage, assassination of key 
figures, and armed conflict at DMZ, and the location was limited to the Korean Peninsula. 
The intensity became stronger in the 1980s, including the Rangoon Bombing and the KAL 
bombing, and the location was also expanded to the international stage.196 This could be 
seen as a change in North Korea’s policy related to provocation. As a result, the actual 
number of provocations decreased as the possibility of North Korea’s threat decreased, but 
on the contrary, the intensity of provocations increased. Considering this point, even after 
1978 to the first half of 1980, the deterrence was still ineffective. 
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The following review takes a look at some of the major examples of North Korean 
provocations from the 1980s. Through this, the review evaluates the effectiveness of 
deterrence against North Korea in detail by understanding what North Korea’s strategic 
intentions were behind the provocation cases. In addition, the review can also determine 
what the effects of the Armistice Agreement were in the process. The major examples of 
North Korea’s provocations in 1980s include the Rangoon Bombing and the Korean Air 
Flight Bombing. 
On October 9, 1983, North Korea’s secret agents set up high-performance 
explosives at Aung San Cemetery in Myanmar and detonated them to carry out mass 
assassinations. Their aim was to kill South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan, who was 
visiting Myanmar at the time. However, a bomb exploded before President Chun arrived 
at the venue, saving the president’s life. But the bombing killed 17 high-ranking officials, 
including South Korea’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister, and 15 others were 
seriously injured. Also, four Myanmarese were killed and 32 injured. North Korea acted 
with the intention of confusing the South Korean government by killing the South Korean 
president, taking advantage of mounting democratic movements and political unrest in 
South Korea.197 Myanmar severed diplomatic ties with North Korea after the provocation. 
Costa Rica, Comoros, and Western Samoa also severed diplomatic ties with North Korea 
in succession, and 10 other countries including Australia, New Zealand, Brunei, the 
Philippines, the Dominican Republic, France, the Netherlands, West Germany, Oman and 
the United Arab Emirates announced the principle of non-establishment of diplomatic ties 
with North Korea. In addition, 25 capitalist countries, including the United States, 
Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Canada, issued an official condemnation.198 In other 
words, North Korea had become a target of criticism not only from members of the UNC 
but also from Third World countries. As a result, the provocation was a tragedy in which 
North Korea’s will to provoke was not deterred in advance. Nevertheless, the armistice 
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later collected the international community’s stern condemnation of the provocations, 
which contributed to the North’s diplomatic isolation. 
On November 29, 1987, Korean Air Flight 858, which departed from Baghdad to 
Seoul, was blown up in midair in waters off Myanmar, killing all 115 people, including 80 
Korean workers returning from Iraq. Kim Seung-il and Kim Hyun-hee, North Korean 
agents disguised as Japanese named Shinichi Hachiya and Mayumi Hachiya, committed 
the attack. They left the liquid explosive PLX disguised as alcohol on the plane and blew 
up the fuselage. Their aim was to create social and political instability and confusion in 
South Korea, which had begun to outpace North Korea in all areas of politics, economy 
and diplomacy, and especially to prevent the 1988 Seoul Olympics from being held. After 
the truth of the incident was officially announced, the U.S. immediately imposed various 
sanctions on North Korea by labeling it a terrorist state, while Japan also banned North 
Korean officials from entering the country. On February 10, 1988, an emergency meeting 
of the U.N. Security Council was convened to denounce North Korea’s terrorist acts.199 
As in the Rangoon Bombing, the South Korean government also failed to deter North 
Korea’s willingness to provoke, but later led North Korea to a diplomatic disadvantage in 
the international arena. 
To sum this up, it could be seen that deterrence against North Korea was limited in 
itself because of the lack of the actual capability to pose retaliatory threat. This lack had 
many sources, but clearly the Armistice Agreement was insufficient to restrain North Korea 
in these cases. Therefore, it is somewhat difficult to say that the Armistice Agreement acted 
as a deterrent against North Korea in terms of decreasing the number of North Korea’s 
provocation since 1978. In fact, because intensity of provocations had increased although 
its frequency had decreased, deterrence itself during the period was still not as effective as 
before. In other words, since the establishment of the CFC, the UNC had been less 
influential in exercising deterrence against North Korea. However, the Armistice 
Agreement helped isolate North Korea’s diplomacy after a series of provocations. This 
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suggests that the UNC’s role in the armistice could be linked to positive contributions to 
the diplomatic security of South Korea. 
b. Strategic Value of Providing Armed Forces of the UN Member States in 
Case of Emergency 
This section examines if the role of the UNC served as a strategic value for South 
Korea, focusing on the role of the UNC in providing armed forces to the Korean Peninsula 
in case of an emergency. This role is significant by itself, but above all, the performance 
of its role had to be guaranteed in order to have practical value. In other words, the role of 
the UNC required institutional mechanisms to support it as well as a symbolic agreement. 
Therefore, this section examines if the role of the UNC had strategic value for South Korea 
by considering the convention of the participating countries and the institutional 
mechanisms supporting it. 
This UNC’s role is based on the Washington Declaration. The Washington 
Declaration was a joint policy declaration issued by representatives of 16 countries 
participating in the Korean War in Washington, D.C., at a time when the armistice was 
signed on the Korean Peninsula on July 27, 1953. At that time, representatives from 16 
countries shared the view that the Armistice Agreement did not include provisions in case 
of a recurrence of armed aggression and adopted such a joint policy declaration.200 The 
key to the Washington Declaration is that in the event of a recurrence of war on the Korean 
Peninsula, the 16 countries would immediately unite again to counter the aggression and 
restore world peace. As such, the Washington Declaration symbolically guarantees the 
UNC’s role in providing armed forces by declaring that parties to it would re-engage in the 
name of the UNC at any time in the event of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula.201 
Normally, in order for a nation to use force against another country in the 
international community, the legitimacy of the war must be recognized internationally. 
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Basically, this requires the adoption of a resolution by the U.N. Security Council. But the 
case of the Washington Declaration was different. The UNC, which would respond to the 
recurrence of war on the Korean Peninsula, was already guaranteed international legal 
status by the United Nations, and the Washington Declaration, which promises to provide 
armed forces to the UNC, was still valid. Therefore, in the event of another war on the 
Korean Peninsula, the supporting powers could guarantee the deployment of their forces 
on the Korean Peninsula in the shortest period without separate approval from the U.N. 
Security Council. 202  The characteristic of this Washington Declaration was one 
institutional procedure that practically guaranteed the role of the UNC in providing armed 
forces. 
The institutional mechanism that substantially guarantees the role of the UNC could 
be seen in the organization of the UNC, illustrated in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. The Organization of the UNC.203 
First, the UNC maintains a group of liaison officers from UN member states. The 
Liaison Officer Group contributes to the smooth role of providing armed forces in case of 
emergency, as it exists to share awareness of the situation on the Korean Peninsula 
strengthen ties from peacetime. In particular, the Liaison Officer Group was more 
meaningful when all the U.N. forces that participated in the Korean War withdrew from 
South Korea. For background information, the status of the deployment and withdrawal of 
the U.N. forces that participated in the Korean War is provided in Table 10. 
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Table 10. The Status of the UN Forces in the Korean War.204 
Country Date of Deployment Date of Withdrawal Scale of Deployment 
Australia Sep 28, 1950 Mar, 1956 1 Infantry Battalion, 1 Squadron 
Belgium Jan 31, 1951 Dec, 1954 1 Infantry Battalion 
Britain Aug 29, 1950 July, 1957 1 Infantry Brigade, Navy 
Canada Dec, 1950 Apr, 1956 1 Infantry Battalion, Navy, Air Force 
Colombia May 21, 1951 Oct, 1954 1 Infantry Battalion 
Ethiopia May 5, 1951 Oct, 1956 1 Infantry Battalion 
France Nov 29, 1950 Oct, 1953 1 Infantry Battalion 
Greece Dec 9, 1950 Aug, 1956 1 Infantry Battalion, 1 Squadron 
Luxembourg Jan 31, 1951 Dec, 1954 1 Infantry Platoon 
Netherlands Nov 23, 1950 May, 1956 1 Infantry Battalion 
New Zealand Dec 31, 1950 May, 1956 1 Infantry Battalion 
Philippine Sep 19, 1950 May, 1955 1 Infantry Battalion 
South Africa Nov 7, 1950 June, 1972 1 Infantry Battalion 
Thailand Oct, 1950 July, 1966 1 Infantry Brigade 
Turkey Nov, 1950 Dec, 1953 1 Squadron 
 
The UNC also has a Multi-National Coordination Center (MNCC) under the wing 
of the Operations Staff. The MNCC provides advice and cooperation on the deployment of 
the forces of the UNC member countries, and updates the military force levels of the UNC 
member states and reports them to the UNC periodically. In case of emergency, this 
department cooperates with the liaison teams of each member state in the scale, capability 
and operational standards of the units to be provided. Through this, the MNCC effectively 
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guarantees the role of providing U.N. forces. As such, the UNC had an institutional 
mechanism that guaranteed its own role in providing armed forces. 
The UNC also guaranteed the provision of armed forces in case of emergency by 
maintaining the UNC’s rear base in Japan. First, the UNC’s rear base was established in 
Jama, Japan to maintain the SOFA between the UNC and Japan when the UN Command 
moved from Tokyo to Seoul on July 1, 1957. The SOFA was signed between the UNC and 
the Japanese government on February 19, 1954, ensuring that the troops of the UNC 
member states could use the UNC base in Japan at will without prior permission from 
Japan.205 In other words, the rear base was created because the SOFA continued as long 
as the rear base of the UNC in Japan was maintained. Based on this, the forces provided 
by all UN member states to be deployed to the Korean Peninsula would be temporarily 
accommodated and waiting at the UNC’s rear base before the deployment. The UNC’s rear 
base carries out the military support missions necessary for the UNC’s forces, and also 
supports the deployment to the Korean Peninsula. In other words, the UNC’s rear base 
itself has served as an important institutional mechanism to substantially guarantee the 
UNC’s military force supply. 
In sum, the UNC’s role in providing armed forces had provided important strategic 
value for South Korea. Since the establishment of the CFC in 1978 and the transfer of 
OPCON to the CFC, the UNC had stepped down from its direct responsibility for the 
defense of South Korea, but it had still held part of that responsibility through its role of 
providing armed forces of the UN member states in case of emergency. The impact and 
usefulness of this role on South Korea’s economic development is very indirect and 
therefore difficult to weigh. In addition, it was difficult to assign an objective economic 
value equivalent to this. Therefore, this section tried to find out what the strategic value of 
the role of providing armed forces of the UN member states to South Korea in case of 
emergency was. As a result, this UNC’s role was guaranteed by having institutional 
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procedures and apparatus, which provided considerable strategic value to the Republic of 
Korea. 
D. ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE UNC ON POLITICAL AND 
DIPLOMATIC SECURITY IN SOUTH KOREA AFTER THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CFC 
This section analyzes the impact of the UNC on South Korea’s political and 
diplomatic security since the establishment of the CFC. It analyzes the stated role of the 
UNC and value that the symbolic meaning of the UNC in the international community had 
in South Korea’s internal and external environment. However, it is not easy to find a 
connection between the UNC and political security. First of all, the stated role of the UNC 
was to block the external variables of North Korea, leaving little room for intervention in 
the inherent political situation in South Korea. Also, the symbolic meaning of the UNC at 
the time was clearly divided from the symbolic meaning of the United States following the 
transfer of OPCON, further distancing itself from the domestic situation in South Korea. 
As a result, the UNC at this time had nothing to do with South Korea’s domestic political 
security. In fact, the domestic political changes in South Korea in the 1980s were 
significant. This is because the authoritarian political system, which lasted about 30 years 
after the Korean War armistice, had been replaced by a democratic political system. The 
new government, which had emerged since the transition to democracy, further cemented 
the value of democracy that had spread among the public, although it was a branch of 
existing ruling forces. Judging that the UNC’s influence on this political situation was 
minimal, this section focuses on the UNC’s impact on South Korea’s diplomatic security. 
1. Assumption of Analysis: Changes in the Diplomatic Horizons of South 
Korea and North Korea 
This section analyzes the impact of the UNC on South Korea’s diplomatic security 
during the period from the establishment of the CFC in 1978 to when North Korea began 
to neutralize the UNC in 1991. The UNC, created by the United Nations resolution during 
the Korean War, had carried out the functions of maintaining peace and resolving disputes 
as stipulated in the U.N. Charter. But the UNC also did more than that. The UNC performed 
a function of providing international support and collective justification on the one hand 
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and confirming wrongdoing on the other. 206  In other words, the UN and the UNC 
functioned as a diplomatic venue and means for South and North Korea to justify their 
regime. In this regard, the UNC could be seen as highly related to South Korea’s diplomatic 
posture. 
Unlike the period before the CFC was established, the UNC no longer held OPCON 
over South Korean troops. This means there is less probability that the UNC can intervene 
in South Korea’s diplomatic autonomy based on the existing security-autonomous 
exchange model (discussed in the prior chapter). However, given that the UNC was the 
venue and means of diplomatic confrontation, it is possible to assess the UNC’s impact on 
the expansion of South Korea’s diplomatic horizons, to confirm whether solidarity of the 
international community’s support through the ideal value of the UNC had affected the 
expansion of South Korea’s diplomatic scope. On the other hand, it is noted that the role 
that the UNC had played since the Korean War presupposes external variables such as 
North Korea. This suggests that an analysis of North Korea’s diplomacy could also be used 
to assess the relative growth level of South Korea’s diplomacy. In other words, it is possible 
to analyze the relative level of diplomatic development in South Korea by comparing how 
the UNC had affected changes in North Korean diplomacy as well. 
Since 1978, diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula had shown a different aspect. 
South Korea had achieved a de-ideologicalization of diplomacy by expanding diplomacy 
with communist countries. South Korea had also diversified its diplomacy by making 
steady progress with Third World countries. Most strikingly, South Korea increased its 
diplomatic presence in the international community by hosting the 1986 Asian Games and 
the 1988 Seoul Olympics. On the other hand, North Korea had been relatively isolated. 
North Korea had not completely deviated from the framework of ideological and camp 
diplomacy, and had faced some restrictions on its diplomatic relations with existing Third 
World countries and non-aligned countries. North Korea, which suffered a relative 
diplomatic inferiority compared to South Korea, further deepened its diplomatic isolation 
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following disintegration of communist rule in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Taking this context into account, the analysis 
examines how the UNC itself had affected the expansion of South Korean diplomacy and 
the isolation of North Korean diplomacy. 
2. Reference Point of Analysis: The Diplomatic Status of South Korea and 
North Korea before 1978 
In comparing and analyzing the diplomatic horizons of South Korea and North 
Korea since 1978, it is necessary to confirm the international situation at the time and the 
level of diplomacy between Seoul and Pyongyang before then. First, the representative 
feature of the international situation at that time was world detente. The Cold War 
confrontation, which had lasted until the 1960s, had begun to warm by early 1970. First, 
President Richard Nixon began to seek to improve relations with China after he took office 
in 1969. At that time, the United States sought to achieve a new balance of power in its 
favor, taking advantage of some fragmentation of the communist camp in Asia after the 
Sino-Soviet border dispute. By recognizing China as a member of the international 
community and improving relations, the U.S. sought to ease tensions in Asia and gain 
favorable help in resolving the Indochina conflict at that time.207 These attempts led to 
China’s replacement of Taiwan in the status of a permanent member of the United Nations 
in October 1971 and President Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972. The U.S. then 
pushed for better relations with the Soviet Union. The U.S. sought to change its arms race 
and its consumptive competition with the Soviet Union, to ease the resulting international 
tension. This change resulted in the summit between the U.S. and Soviet Union in Moscow 
in May 1972 and the signing of the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in 
November 1969, which later led to various agreements aimed at preventing potential armed 
conflicts between the two countries.208 As such, the early 1970s was a time when the Cold 
War between the camps entered a mood of reconciliation. 
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In this atmosphere of the times, the scope of diplomacy of South Korea and North 
Korea was also expanding. First, to assess the visible level of diplomacy between South 
Korea and North Korea, the status of diplomatic ties and membership in international 
organizations under the United Nations as of 1978 is provided in Table 11 and Figure 5. 
Table 11. The Status of Diplomatic Ties of South and North Korea in 
1978.209 
 Diplomatic Ties with South Korea 
Diplomatic Ties with 
North Korea 
Diplomatic Ties with 
South and North 
Korea 
Total 104 93 53 
Asia 21 21 15 
America 27 6 5 
Europe 20 18 9 
Middle East 11 11 4 
Africa 25 37 20 
 
Figure 5. The Status of Diplomatic Ties of South and North Korea in 1978. 
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Table 12. The Status of Membership in International Organizations.210 
The Name of Organization South Korea 
North 
Korea 
World Health Organization (WHO) 1949 1973 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO) 1949 1977 
Universal Postal Union (UPU) 1949 1974 
UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) 
1950 1974 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 1952 1975 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 1952 1977 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 1955 - 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) 
1955 - 
International Development Association (IDA) 1961 - 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) 1964 - 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) 
1967 - 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO) 1956 1975 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) 1962 1986 
UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) 1967 1980 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 1979 1974 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 1978 1986 
UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) 1957 1987 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 1957 1974 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(ESCAP) 
1954 1992 
UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 1965 1973 
 
These various data show that South Korea’s diplomatic activity has been ahead of 
North Korea’s diplomatic activity since even before the Korean War. 
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However, a microanalysis of the diplomatic situation on the Korean Peninsula is 
needed to more accurately determine the level of diplomacy of South Korea and North 
Korea at the time in question. In the early 1970s, South Korea and North Korea were 
influenced by the global trend of detente, and made changes in their relations through the 
first inter-Korean talks and the 7∙4 joint statement, a milestone since the establishment of 
the divided regime. Ironically, however, South Korea and North Korea were keen on 
diplomatic competition with each other at the time.211 In the 1960s, North Korea began to 
promote friendly relations through diversification diplomacy based on the principle of 
peaceful coexistence with countries with different social systems as well as the communist 
camp.212 North Korea began to pursue the globalization of its foreign policy in the 1970s 
to develop friendly and cooperative relations with all countries around the world. 
North Korea also changed its existing anti-U.N. policy.213 Previously, North Korea 
had been hostile toward the United Nations. Not only did the United Nations play a decisive 
role in the birth of the South Korean government, North Korea and the United Nations 
fought each other during the Korean War, and South Korea maintained its lead at the United 
Nations until the 1960s due to the leading U.S. position. However, since the 1960s, a large 
number of newly independent and non-aligned countries joined the UN, causing the U.S. 
its diplomatic status in the UN to weaken.214 In 1971, when China won a permanent seat 
at the UN, North Korea gradually began to actively participate in the UN.215 North Korea’s 
active stance toward the United Nations was accompanied by expanding international 
organizations’ participation as of 1973, and consequently strengthening its position. 
Nevertheless, North Korea’s diplomacy was practically limited to diplomacy with the 
communist camp and non-aligned countries. 
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At that time, South Korea had maintained its foreign policy stance to deter North 
Korea from entering international organizations and to isolate the North from the 
international community. However, under the international situation of the 1970s, South 
Korea could no longer block North Korea from entering the international community, and 
could not continue to gain an edge over North Korea at the United Nations and other 
international organizations. 216  On June 23, 1973, President Park Chung-hee issued a 
special declaration on foreign policy for peaceful unification, bringing about a shift in 
foreign policy. The core content of the declaration, called the 6∙23 Declaration, was to 
recognize North Korea’s true identity, advocating North Korea’s participation in 
international organizations, simultaneous entry of the two Koreas to the U.N., and 
diplomacy on reciprocal equality with the communist regime in order to ease tensions on 
the Korean Peninsula and promote peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas.217 Since 
the 6∙23 Declaration, South Korea enjoyed certain achievements in establishing diplomatic 
ties with non-aligned countries such as India, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Nepal and Burma, 
and had also established diplomatic ties with Finland and Indonesia, which were on a pro-
communist diplomatic line. However, relations had not improved significantly except for 
indirect trade, and while North Korea officially joined the non-aligned movement at a 
meeting in Peru in August 1975, South Korea was denied membership and suffered a 
diplomatic setback.218 In sum, by the late 1970s, South Korea was numerically ahead of 
North Korea in diplomatic activity, but was relatively behind in practical diplomatic 
competition. 
3. Analysis for Diplomatic Factors 
This section analyzes how the UNC is linked to the expansion of South Korea’s 
diplomatic horizon. South Korea expanded its diplomatic reach during the 1980s. South 
Korea practically achieved the de-ideologicalization of diplomacy based on the 6∙23 
Declaration through improved relations with China in the 1980s. Also, South Korea had 
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expanded its diplomacy with Third World countries. Meanwhile, South Korea successfully 
hosted the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympics, which meant an 
unprecedented diplomatic golden age. This section looks at how the UNC had affected this 
series of changes. 
Until the 1960s, South Korea’s diplomacy was dependent on the United States, and 
reflected anti-communist ideology.219 At a time when the Cold War confrontation was 
solid, such ideological diplomacy exerted its influence. However, South Korea’s 
ideological diplomacy gradually began to be on the defensive as the entry of third world 
countries and North Korea’s entry into the international community became more active. 
To overcome this situation, South Korea announced its de-ideologicalization of diplomacy 
through the 6∙23 Declaration in 1973. Nevertheless, the 6∙23 declaration did not bring 
tangible results to South Korea soon. 
The de-ideologicalization of South Korean diplomacy began in earnest through 
improved relations with China. South Korea had attempted to improve relations with China 
in earnest since the late 1970s. In December 1978, when China adopted a policy centered 
on economic development through the 11th Conference of the Communist Party of China, 
the possibility in economic trade with South Korea was opened.220 Based on this, South 
Korea had gained momentum to improve relations with China. However, South Korea tried 
to achieve results in non-political areas such as economics, humanities and sports first, 
judging that it could not improve political relations from the beginning due to different 
ideological lines.221 Such efforts also resulted in the establishment of a task force for 
Chinese affairs in the South Korean government to collect information related to China at 
the time. China had also shown desire for improving relations with South Korea. Since 
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1981, China had allowed Chinese diplomats to contact South Korean diplomats at 
diplomatic gatherings hosted by third countries.222 
North Korea’s opposition to the diplomatic change between South Korea and China 
was severe. When Kim Il-sung visited Beijing in September 1982, North Korea strongly 
protested trade between South Korea and China, prompting China to take formal regulatory 
measures. On September 25, 1982, China, along with Israel and South Africa, imposed a 
ban on indirect trade with South Korea.223 But this diplomatic disconnect was mitigated 
in the process of resolving the incident in which a Chinese civil aircraft was hijacked and 
made an emergency landing in South Korea in May 1983. In the course of dealing with the 
case, consultations between the two governments were inevitable, the first official 
diplomatic contact since the Korean War. As such, the incident served as an opportunity 
for direct negotiations and dialogue between South Korea and China, and to begin a process 
to improve bilateral relations that has continued since then. 
In the 1980s, Korea achieved not only diplomatic de-ideologicalization but also 
diplomatic diversification. South Korea had newly established diplomatic ties with 
countries in Central and South America and Africa, and sought to further strengthen its 
diplomacy with Arab countries. The efforts were prompted by the diplomatic rivalry with 
North Korea, which at the time had been keen on improving its diplomacy with third-world 
and non-aligned nations. In fact, in the 1980s, South Korea made diplomatic relations with 
32 Latin American countries, excluding Cuba, and signed science and technology 
agreements with many of them.224 Also, President Chun Doo-hwan made his first trip to 
Kenya, Nigeria, Gabon and Senegal, and expanded diplomatic ties in Africa, with nine 
African leaders visiting South Korea. Moreover, at a time when the status of Arab countries 
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was strengthened by the booming crude oil exports, South Korea promoted more active 
pro-Arab policies to promote exchanges with various Arab countries.225 
At that time, the peak of South Korean diplomacy was achieved through the hosting 
of the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympics. The 1986 Asian Games was the 
largest ever, with 4,839 athletes from 27 countries participating, an opportunity that 
brought countries around the world, including those in both the West and the Communist 
camps, have a strong affinity for South Korea.226 The 1988 Seoul Olympics also marked 
the largest-ever Olympics in history at the time of the event, while the 1980 Moscow 
Olympics and 1984 Los Angeles Olympics were half-Olympics in a standoff between the 
communist camp and the free camp, and this was also an opportunity to further improve 
South Korea’s international status and image.227 
Above all, the process of hosting these international events required considerable 
diplomatic power. The renewed Cold War atmosphere following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979 was projected into the competition to host the Olympics, and there 
was an official and unofficial obstruction of the communist camp led by the Soviet Union 
to prevent South Korea from hosting the Olympics. In particular, South Korea, located on 
the Cold War front, was not attractive for hosting the Olympics amid heightened 
international tensions. However, South Korea was eventually able to win the bid based on 
solid U.S. security commitments with the support of IOC members from Latin America, 
Africa and the Middle East who insisted on hosting in developing countries. 228 The 
decision to host the Asian Games came two months after the decision to host the 
Olympics.229 In the process of hosting the Asian Games, renewed international tensions 
 
225 Ibid., 483. 
226 Joonseok Yang, “Examining How Seoul Won the 1986 Asian Games Bid in 1981: Focusing on 
Bidding Competition with Pyongyang and Baghdad,” Culture and Politics 7, no. 3 (September 2020): 176. 
227 Myongsob Kim and Joonseok Yang, “The Political and Diplomatic History of the Seoul Olympic 
Bid: How Did Seoul Win the Bid in 1981?,” The Korean Journal of International Studies 54, no. 4 
(December 2014): 272. 
228 Ibid., 296–297. 
229 Joonseok Yang, “Examining How Seoul Won the 1986 Asian Games Bid in 1981: Focusing on 
Bidding Competition with Pyongyang and Baghdad,” Culture and Politics 7, no. 3 (September 2020): 177. 
114 
were also negatively affecting the atmosphere. Moreover, the Cold War confrontation was 
stronger as South Korea was competing with North Korea for hosting the Asian Games. 
However, South Korea was able to take advantage of its successful bid to host the Seoul 
Olympics. In addition, South Korea was able to confirm its bid for the Asian Games with 
the support of members of the AGF in the Middle East, just like the process of hosting the 
Olympics.230 
As such, since 1978, South Korea’s diplomacy had shown a different development 
from the previous period. Behind this diplomatic development was the changing 
international environment at the time. Above all, however, the limitations of existing 
ideological diplomacy and South Korea’s leading efforts to overcome it were the main 
sources of change. South Korea’s position at the UN gradually decreased in the 1970s due 
to North Korea’s diplomatic progress with a non-aligned countries, and calls to dismantle 
the UNC raised doubts about the legality of the UNC itself. This also meant that the role 
of the UN and UNC, which had been rallying collective legitimacy and support from the 
international community, was further restricted. Against this backdrop, diplomatic 
competition with North Korea had raised the need for South Korea to break away from the 
existing ideological diplomatic framework. Therefore, South Korea attempted to de-
idealize its diplomacy by improving its relations with China, and to gain a diplomatic 
advantage by expanding its diplomacy with the Third World and non-aligned countries. 
Such efforts also led to the hosting of the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympics. 
As a result, these advances resulted from a Korean-led effort, and the impact of the UN 
and UNC was limited. 
On the contrary, there is a different correlation between the UNC and North Korea’s 
diplomatic isolation. Since 1978, North Korea’s diplomacy had been defensive. North 
Korea’s diplomatic influence had narrowed as non-aligned state diplomacy had lost its 
momentum and communist countries had taken revisionist steps. Under these 
circumstances, North Korea’s bold provocations to South Korea generated international 
criticism that isolated North Korea diplomatically, and its diplomatic isolation crucially 
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intensified when the communist political system collapsed in the late 1980s. The UNC 
existed in the background of these series of events. 
At first, North Korea stuck to its anti-U.N. foreign policy. This is because North 
Korea was a party to the conflict with the UNC during the Korean War, and after the 
Korean War, the united support of the United Nations was directed only toward South 
Korea. Therefore, North Korea had rejected the existence of the United Nations and UNC, 
turning to a communist foreign policy dependent on China and the Soviet Union. However, 
as the conflict between China and the Soviet Union led to division on the communist camp 
in the 1960s, North Korea tried to improve relations with the Third World countries while 
using Juche foreign policies. In the meantime, in the 1970s, North Korea expanded its 
diplomatic horizons by promoting the globalization of foreign policy and taking an active 
stance toward the United Nations, riding on the changes in the international community. 
Nevertheless, North Korea’s diplomacy remained largely in the middle of communist and 
non-aligned policies.231 
In the 1980s, North Korea became defensive throughout its diplomacy when its 
non-aligned diplomacy lost momentum. North Korea’s diplomatic support base began to 
falter as the non-aligned countries, which North Korea had placed importance on in terms 
of diplomacy, became divided. In fact, the non-aligned movement wanted to resist both 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization, but many of its members had virtually allied 
relations with powerful countries. Under these circumstances, serious conflicts occurred 
between India and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, and a full-fledged internal division occurred in 
the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Member countries had been 
divided over the legality and support of Soviet actions. In response, North Korea appealed 
for unity in the non-aligned movement to protect its diplomatic support base, and made 
efforts to invite its members and to host international conferences.232 Nevertheless, North 
Korea’s efforts could not fundamentally address the limitations of the non-aligned 
 
231 Kyu Sup Chung, “Studies of North Koreas Foreign Policy including South Korea: 
Accomplishments and Implications,” Review of North Korean Studies 13, no. 1 (April 2010): 7. 
232 Kyu Sup Chung, “Foreign and Unification Policy of North Korea in the 1980s,” Review of North 
Korean Studies 7, no. 1 (May 2004): 18–19. 
116 
movement, and North Korea suffered serious losses in its overall diplomacy as the non-
aligned movement lost its effectiveness. 
Intensifying the North’s diplomatic isolation was its bold provocation, including 
the Rangoon Bombing in 1983 and the Korean Air Flight Bombing in 1987. The 
international community’s criticism was directed to North Korea after Myanmar’s 
investigative authorities revealed that the North Korean government was directly involved 
in the terrorist attack on Aung San in Myanmar. Ten countries, including France and 
Australia, as well as Myanmar, had expressed the principle of non-establishment of 
diplomatic ties with North Korea, while 25 capitalist countries, including the United States 
and Japan, had issued official statements of condemnation. 233  The South Korean 
government had also appealed for international support by calling for punitive action 
against North Korea on the agenda of the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General 
Assembly.234 A negative image of North Korea in the international community was further 
deepened by the Korean Air Flight Bombing in 1987. In the wake of the incident, the U.S. 
has designated North Korea as a terrorist state every year since January 1988, and the 
international community, which shared strategic values with the U.S., had increasingly 
ruled out relations with North Korea. In other words, North Korea had to bear several 
disadvantages, including increased diplomatic isolation.235 
The collapse of the communist bloc in the late 1980s had a decisive impact on North 
Korea’s diplomatic isolation. After the split between China and the Soviet Union in the 
1960s, North Korea pursued Juche foreign policy. Nevertheless, North Korea’s diplomacy 
in general was based on support from the communist camp, such as the Soviet Union and 
China. North Korea is geographically bordering China and the Soviet Union, and the 
absolute influence of China and the Soviet Union in establishing a regime in North Korea 
and historical experience such as the Korean War had tied its diplomacy to the variables of 
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China-Soviet relations. 236  However, the revisionist trend was strengthened in the 
communist camp as China pushed for reform and opening policies in the late 1970s and 
Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union also pushed for reform and opening policies in the 
mid-1980s, which led to changes in the political systems of Eastern European communist 
countries in the late 1980s.237 In response, North Korea still emphasized the superiority of 
its socialist system, and North Korea vowed to stick to communism, trying to counter this 
trend of change.238 But North Korea’s position did not prevent the collapse of communism 
and the end of the Cold War, after which North Korea completely lost its international 
support base. 
Since 1978, North Korea had been on the defensive diplomatically, unlike South 
Korea. The second Cold War and the division of the non-aligned movement caused 
considerable losses in North Korea’s diplomacy, and North Korea’s bold provocations 
caused its diplomatic isolation. Crucially, the collapse of the communist bloc further 
deepened North Korea’s diplomatic isolation. Considering how the changes of the 
international situation had forced North Korea to alter its diplomatic tactics, there were 
fundamental limitations of North Korea’s communist and non-aligned diplomacy. 
In this process, the UN played a role in rallying international condemnation and 
criticism against North Korea’s provocations; the Armistice Agreement, and the role of the 
UNC, also added to North Korea’s barbaric image. North Korea’s diplomatic starting point 
stemmed from the inertial role and presence of the UN and the UNC. The position and 
historical experience of the UN and the UNC on Korean Peninsula limited North Korea’s 
diplomacy to the scope of communist and non-aligned diplomacy. In this respect, the UN 
and the UNC had had an indirect impact on North Korea’s diplomatic inferiority. 
In sum, the UNC had an indirect impact on promoting South Korea’s diplomatic 
security. The impact was made by relatively creating a diplomatic dominance in South 
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Korea through its influence on North Korea’s diplomatic isolation rather than its impact on 
Seoul’s expanding diplomatic horizons. At that time, South Korea’s expansion of its 
diplomatic horizon was based on a foreign policy shift and state-led efforts stemming from 
diplomatic competition with North Korea. On the other hand, North Korea’s diplomatic 
isolation was the result of the vicious circle between the limits of the communist and non-
aligned diplomacy and North Korea’s provocations. 
The UN and the UNC influenced North Korea to establish the starting point for 
diplomacy. Also, the UN and UNC played a role in gathering international condemnation 
of North Korea since provocations. As a result, the UN and the UNC had made indirect 
contributions to North Korea’s diplomatic isolation since 1978, which could be said to have 
tilted the diplomatic balance of the Korean Peninsula in favor of South Korea. 
E. CONCLUSION: ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE UNC ON 
SECURITY IN SOUTH KOREA AFTER THE CREATION OF THE CFC 
After the establishment of the CFC in 1978, the UNC had a limited impact on South 
Korea’s military security. The creation of the CFC reduced the role of the UNC to the 
management of the Armistice Agreement and the role of forces provider in case of 
emergency. Given the UNC’s role in managing compliance with the Armistice Agreement, 
the UNC was involved in the defense of South Korea in the form of forcing North Korea 
to abide by the bilateral agreement. However, North Korea continued to make provocations 
against South Korea, ignoring the Armistice Agreement, and the intensity of the 
provocations became even stronger. This limitation was due to the fact that the Armistice 
Agreement itself was a pure formal agreement that did not have the practical threat 
capability to cause any of its parties to suppress their actions. The Armistice Agreement 
failed to show any practical deterrence against North Korea, enabling only a follow-up 
response, such as condemning North Korea’s provocations. 
On the other hand, the UNC’s role as forces provider in case of an emergency was 
of strategic value. Assuming the economic damage that South Korea could suffer in case 
of emergency, such as the second Korean War, the UNC’s role in ensuring the provision 
of forces could have considerable economic value. However, the objective evaluation of 
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these roles is limited, and in addition, the role of providing forces could not be accurately 
evaluated because there has been no recurrence of war on the Korean Peninsula. So this 
analysis judged the value of the UNC roughly by whether it could guarantee the 
performance of its role. The UNC ordinarily had been organizing relevant departments 
within the organization to ensure the role of providing multinational forces, and had 
maintained a rear base in Japan. This was a significant strategic value for South Korea as 
it guaranteed the role of providing forces to the Korean Peninsula in case of an emergency. 
The UNC’s impact on South Korea’s political security had been limited in its 
analysis. The UNC’s changed role after the creation of the CFC was based on the premise 
of external threats, as it was not directly linked to South Korea’s domestic variables. Also, 
the transfer of OPCON held by the UNC to the CFC had disconnected the possibility of 
UNC involvement in domestic affairs in South Korea. 
The UNC had some positive effects on South Korea’s diplomatic security. The 
UNC had a relatively indirect impact on isolating North Korea’s diplomacy, rather than 
directly affecting Seoul’s diplomatic promotion. The historical experience and role of the 
UN history since the Korean War had been inertial, prompting North Korea’s diplomacy 
to focus on the communist camp and non-aligned countries. North Korea had made 
diplomatic initiatives since the 1970s, pushing for the globalization of diplomacy, but it 
had been unable to completely break away from its existing communist camp and non-
aligned diplomatic lines. North Korea’s diplomacy had been put on the defensive as 
international changes had turned against the communist and non-aligned camps. In the 
process, North Korea continued to make provocations, and the UN and the UNC further 
obstructed its diplomatic offensive by rallying international condemnation of the North’s 
provocations. Then, the collapse of the socialist bloc in the late 1980s decisively isolated 
North Korea’s diplomacy. In this regard, the UNC played an indirect positive role in South 
Korea’s diplomatic security. 
Altogether, the UNC did not have a direct impact on South Korea’s military 
security after the creation of the CFC, but had guaranteed potential strategic value and 
contributed to the formation of a relative diplomatic dominance for South Korea. 
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This thesis examined the impact of the UNC on South Korea’s comprehensive 
security from the Korean War armistice in 1953 to the time when North Korea began to 
neutralize the UNC in earnest in 1991. The analysis was conducted by dividing this time 
frame into two period, before and after the creation of the CFC in 1978. After the creation 
of the CFC, the UNC handed over OPCON of South Korean troops to the CFC, meaning 
the UNC’s role was reduced from South Korea’s direct defense to managing the Armistice 
Agreement and to ensuring the provision of armed forces to the Korean Peninsula in case 
of emergency. 
This study extended the scope of South Korea’s security to include not only military 
security but also physical economic security and non-physical political and diplomatic 
security areas. This enabled the thesis to go beyond the limits of existing research focused 
solely on military security. 
The thesis analysis was organized according to the two periods before and after the 
establishment of the CFC in 1978 and the physical and non-physical security standards. 
The following sections summarize the conclusions in each of these categories. 
1. The UNC’s Impact on South Korean Military and Economic Security 
before the Establishment of the CFC 
At a time when the UNC had OPCON over the South Korean military, this thesis 
has found that the UNC had a limited positive impact on the South Korean defense. During 
the period, the UNC prevented the recurrence of war on the Korean Peninsula by curbing 
North Korea’s massive military attacks, but failed to completely curb North Korea’s 
indirect infiltration and the outbreak of armed conflict. After the Korean War armistice, 
North Korea provoked in earnest in the 1960s and 1970s, peaking in the late 1960s. If one 
looks at North Korea’s intentions behind the provocations, it was the communization of 
the Korean Peninsula. The plan was to use violent mechanisms to confuse South Korean 
society, and to communize South Korea. 
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Nevertheless, unlike the Korean War, North Korea’s provocations could only 
include indirect infiltration and local armed conflict. Also, deterrence against North Korea 
was based on a changing balance of national power between South Korea and North Korea. 
When North Korea had its own competitive edge by maintaining a relatively equal balance 
of national power with South Korea, the North intended to penetrate deeper into South 
Korean society and prepare for an all-round communization, but this boldness had 
diminished once the national power gap began to widen. As a result, the UNC had 
suppressed the recurrence of war on the Korean Peninsula, but had not been able to 
completely curb North Korea’s provocations. Also, the UNC’s deterrence had been linked 
to South Korea’s growing national power, affecting North Korea’s provocations. 
The thesis has found that the UNC had a positive impact on South Korea’s 
economic security during the period. From the end of the Korean War until 1960, the UNC 
provided direct economic aid to restore and revive the South Korean economy devastated 
by the Korean War, and guaranteed foreign capital assistance. Most of the foreign capital 
was equivalent to U.S. capital and the U.S. initiative in the UNC guaranteed the U.S. aid. 
This aid was mainly in the form of military aid, which also meant a commitment to South 
Korea to deter North Korea. With such economic aid from the United Nations and the 
United States, South Korea was able to achieve economic recovery, and based on security 
support it was able to divert limited national resources to economic development. This 
became the important basis of the rapid growth of the South Korean economy, which led 
to the nation’s growing national power. The positive impact of the UNC on South Korea’s 
economic security is of high importance, given that South Korea’s growing national power 
had served as a stepping stone to complement deterrence against North Korea and expand 
Seoul’s diplomacy in the future. 
2. The UNC’s Impact on South Korean Political and Diplomatic Security 
before the Establishment of the CFC 
On the other hand, this thesis has found that the UNC’s influence on South Korea’s 
political and security during the period was negative. At that time, the UNC failed to 
guarantee South Korea’s political democratization and political stability as a passive 
bystander. The April 19 Revolution in South Korea occurred when the first administration, 
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which emerged as a symbol of democracy, was virtually consolidated into an authoritarian 
regime. This was a self-sustaining move that required the implementation of democracy. 
But at the time, the South Korean government planned to mobilize military force to 
suppress it, and the UNC approved it. This was the result of turning a blind eye to domestic 
demands for the implementation of democracy. The April 19 Revolution opened a gap in 
democratization in South Korean society, but soon led to the May 16 military coup, and 
the new authoritarian regime replaced the prior authoritarian regime. In a military coup in 
which some of South Korea’s military power was mobilized, the UNC did not play an 
active role in curbing it, which can be seen as the UNC’s passive sympathy for the reversal 
of democracy. As a result, the UNC was not completely free from the political instability 
of South Korea, where democratic reversals continued at the time. 
This thesis has found that there had also been some negative results in the 
correlation between South Korea’s diplomatic security and the UNC. First of all, the UNC 
held OPCON over South Korean troops and the UNC was primarily responsible for the 
defense of South Korea. However, there was a leading U.S. role behind the UNC, which 
meant that the UNC-centered defense system was actually a U.S.-led security system. In 
this regard, the UNC could be seen as a channel for U.S. restrictions on South Korea’s 
autonomy in return for being responsible for the country’s security. Before and after the 
Korean War Armistice Agreement, President Rhee Syngman refused to coexist with North 
Korea and pursued a strong diplomatic policy toward the reunification by forces. However, 
the United States limited that policy due to the opportunity costs that such a foreign policy 
could cause. In the late 1960s, President Park Chung-hee conceived the APATO, a 
collective security system in the Asia-Pacific region, but this was also constrained by the 
U.S. due to the burden of security costs and indifference. Meanwhile, the U.S. pushed for 
a unilateral solution in the process of dealing with a series of North Korean provocations 
in 1968, and later pushed ahead with unilateral policies such as Nixon Doctrine, the 
withdrawal of USFK and the U.S.-China detente, prompting Seoul to passively adjust its 
foreign policy. South Korea’s active diplomacy and autonomy could not play an 
independent role, although it was also provided with benefits in return for negotiations with 
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the United States. Therefore, this thesis has found that the UNC was a facet of the security 
structure that imposed restrictions on South Korea’s diplomatic autonomy. 
3. The UNC’s Impact on South Korean Military and Economic Security 
after the Establishment of the CFC 
Since the establishment of the CFC in 1978, the UNC had sought to maintain 
stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula in the role of managing the Armistice 
Agreement and maintaining the capacity for providing armed forces of the UN member 
states in case of emergency. This was not an actual military force, but a mutual agreement 
between adversaries and a potential guarantee of military power to take responsibility for 
the defense of South Korea. However, it shows that the level of deterrence against North 
Korea had been limited. Most of all, North Korea’s provocations continued even after 
1978. Although the number of provocations had decreased, the intensity had increased. 
Basically, the effectiveness of deterrence through military response was suspect. 
In addition, if the role of the UNC is taken into account, the deterrence of the 
Armistice Agreement itself was also not effective. In particular, this result can be attributed 
to the fact that the Armistice Agreement itself is a pure form of agreement that does not 
have the capability to pose a physical sanction to the other party’s behavior. The Armistice 
Agreement could be a means to criticize North Korea in a follow-up way, but there was a 
limit to preventing violations preemptively. In other words, the relationship between the 
UNC’s role in the Armistice Agreement and its deterrence was not close. 
On the other hand, this thesis has found that the role of the UNC to provide armed 
forces of the UN member states in case of an emergency was of strategic value. First of all, 
strategic value was the alternative influence emerging insofar as the objective 
correspondence and evaluation of economic value for the role was limited. The thesis 
evaluated the UNC role through the guarantee of implementation, as the effectiveness 
could not be fully assessed because the war did not recur on the Korean Peninsula. The 
UNC was equipped with institutional procedures and apparatus, such as organizations 
within the UNC and maintaining rear bases, to ensure the implementation of its role. In 
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other words, the role in providing armed forces of the UN member states in case of an 
emergency was a significant strategic value for Korea. 
4. The UNC’s Impact on South Korean Political and Diplomatic Security 
after the Establishment of the CFC 
The UNC’s impact on South Korea’s political security was limited in its analysis. 
Since the establishment of the CFC, there had been little connection between the UNC and 
South Korea’s domestic variables as the reduced role of the UNC had been limited only to 
external threats. Furthermore, the transfer of OPCON also replaced the symbolic meaning 
of the U.S. initiative within the UNC in domestic affairs with the CFC. In this context, the 
analysis of the role of the UNC on South Korea’s political security was omitted. 
This thesis found that the UNC had some positive influence on Korea’s diplomatic 
security. The impact was more on North Korea’s diplomatic isolation than on South 
Korea’s diplomatic expansion. The UNC’s partial contribution to deepening North Korea’s 
diplomatic isolation had ensured South Korea’s diplomatic dominance. After the Korean 
War, North Korea chose a diplomatic direction emphasizing communist and non-aligned 
countries. Later, North Korea made diplomatic efforts in the 1970s pushing for the 
globalization of its diplomacy, but from the late 1970s North Korea’s diplomacy was on 
the defensive as changes in the international community had revealed the limitations of 
such communist and non-aligned diplomacy. In the process, North Korea’s provocations 
further aggravated the situation, and the subsequent collapse of the communist bloc in the 
late 1980s dealt a decisive blow to Pyongyang’s diplomacy. The historical experience and 
inertia of the UN and the UNC played a role in North Korea’s diplomatic starting point, 
and the UN and the UNC played a role in collecting international condemnation of North 
Korea’s provocations. Taking this into consideration, it could be judged that the UNC had 
an indirect and positive impact on South Korea’s diplomatic security. 
5. Conclusion 
In sum, the UNC had a positive and negative impact on South Korea’s 
comprehensive security since its foundation until 1991. At a time when the UNC had 
OPCON, the UNC had more impact on South Korea’s physical survival. The UNC helped 
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curb the recurrence of a second Korean War and supported South Korea’s economic 
development based on that primary role. In the process, however, it either condoned South 
Korea’s domestic problems or restricted South Korea’s foreign policy drive. After the UNC 
handed over OPCON, South Korea’s physical survival was potentially guaranteed in case 
of emergency by the UNC. In addition, the UNC put the North on the defensive 
diplomatically even though the UNC could not force the North to make rational and 
reasonable judgments and actions. As such, the UNC was deeply involved in South Korea’s 
security and affected it in various ways. 
B. IMPLICATIONS 
The UNC has had a significant impact on the overall security of South Korea, but 
its role and influence has changed over time. Above all, there was the concept of OPCON 
at its core. With the transfer of OPCON, the actual tangible influence of the UNC was 
transformed into a symbolic intangible influence. Today the UNC is again facing a new 
wave of change. While the UNC is no longer directly related to South Korea’s OPCON, 
ongoing discussions between Seoul and Washington on the transfer of wartime OPCON 
from the CFC to South Korea would cause new changes in the defense system on the 
Korean Peninsula. 
Furthermore, voices for establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula that 
moves beyond existing conflicts and confrontations are advocating an end-of-war 
declaration between South Korea and North Korea. The declaration of the end of the war 
means the end of the Korean War armistice, which would call for the dismantlement or 
change of the role of the UNC. In fact, debate is underway on whether to dismantle the 
UNC and whether the UNC is legal or not. This means that the UNC can no longer be seen 
as a fixed constant in the security system on the Korean Peninsula. 
1. The Pursuit of North Korea’s Complete Denuclearization 
In this situation, the policy implications of this thesis are as follows: First, in 
implementing the establishment of a peace regime with North Korea, it is necessary to 
achieve complete denuclearization that can eliminate with certainty North Korea’s 
offensive threats against South Korea. In the past, the UNC-centered defense system and 
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the CFC combined defense system failed to completely deter North Korea’s military 
threats, even though they had the capacity to take military action. Although the form of 
North Korea’s provocations was not a at the level of direct all-out war, Pyongyang’s 
military threat intention continued to be expressed. 
In this regard, there should be no room for tolerance against North Korea’s military 
threats, and measures are needed to fundamentally eliminate its capabilities. In fact, on 
September 19, 2018, the 9∙19 Military Agreement was signed between South Korea and 
North Korea to ban hostile acts against each other in the spirit of a peaceful atmosphere. 
But this agreement is now losing its meaning due to the North’s volatile policy toward 
South Korea. 
2. Securing South Korea’s Diplomatic Initiative 
Second, in order to establish a peace regime, South Korea needs international 
cooperation and must take diplomatic initiative as a middle power. The Korean Peninsula 
issue has drawn attention from the international community beyond South Korea and North 
Korea. At a time when the balance of national power between South Korea and North 
Korea was relatively symmetrical, diplomatic competition was in full swing between the 
two sides, which meant that both of them needed collective support from the international 
community in moving the Korean Peninsula situation in its own favor. Despite the 
considerable gap in national power between South Korea and North Korea today, South 
Korea needs international cooperation to further push its opinion as North Korea seeks 
leverage in the international community through asymmetric weapons. 
In the past, issues on the Korean Peninsula also were heavily influenced by the 
actions of neighboring powers. The foreign policies of South Korea and North Korea had 
shifted in line with the positions of the powerful neighboring countries, the United States, 
China, and the Soviet Union. Therefore, above all, this calls for South Korea to take a more 
initiative and be an active player in resolving the Korean Peninsula issue today. 
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3. Maintaining the Prototype and Role of the UNC As a Complement to 
the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces 
Third, even after the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, the 
UNC should remain in some form to support the ROK-U.S. combined forces. The UNC 
has served more than just a specified role in ROK-U.S. relations as well as the international 
community. In particular, the UNC has been a supplementary system that acts as the 
vehicle of the international community and ensures close ties between ROK and the U.S. 
Considering this, if the UNC continues to play such a role even after the establishment of 
a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, the strategic value for South Korea would be 
significant. 
But the most important consideration in this policy implication is that South 
Korea’s autonomy should not be compromised by major changes in Seoul-Washington 
relations, which would follow the establishment of a peace regime and the transfer of 
wartime OPCON. In particular, the core logic of the opinion that calls for the dissolution 
of the UNC began with concerns about the violation of South Korea’s autonomy. This 
viewpoint insists that the U.S. is trying to achieve institutional guarantees through the UNC 
in order to project its global strategy in South Korea despite a series of changes in Korean 
security conditions. The final implication of this thesis is that, in any future peace regime, 
the original and positive role of the UNC should be maintained to the extent that South 
Korea’s autonomy is guaranteed, by reinforcing the positive roles and reducing the 
negative roles that the UNC has played in the past. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study has analyzed the UNC’s role in South Korea’s comprehensive security. 
However, there was a conceptual element that created challenges in the course of the 
analysis. And this study focused on analysis at specified periods in the past and did not 
undertake research that could suggest the future direction of the UNC. 
1. A Clear Correlation Between the UNC and the United States 
This study reveals that the relationship between the United States and the UNC is 
intertwined. In the analysis, the UNC reflected objectives of the U.S. based on the fact that 
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the U.S. had a leading influence on UNC actions from the establishment of the UNC to its 
subsequent role, and that most of the U.N. forces stationed on the Korean Peninsula after 
the Korean War armistice were U.S. soldiers. Even though there are widespread opinions 
that the UNC was an organization that reflected the U.S. global strategy at the time, this 
thesis did not study its correlation in detail. Therefore, a detailed study is needed on how 
much the UNC was a means of U.S. strategy. 
2. The Role of the UNC Since 1990S 
This study is limited in that it did not undertake an analysis of when North Korea 
in earnest posed a significant threat to the international community through its nuclear 
weapons development. In fact, North Korea’s nuclear weapons development has been a 
very important variable in security issues on the Korean Peninsula in recent decades. In 
this period, international condemnation of North Korea has intensified. Nevertheless, this 
study focused on earlier times. This is because the initial intent of this study was to focus 
on differences of the UNC role before and after the transition of OPCON. Thus, this thesis 
leaves room for further analysis of the role of the UNC in the period since the 1990s, in 
which North Korea’s nuclear weapons development plays a large role. 
3. The Change of the UNC 
This study began with an attempt to assess the value effectiveness of the UNC, and 
how that varied with the role change of the UNC. Through this research, this thesis looked 
at how the UNC had historically influenced South Korean security. However, this thesis 
did not provide direction in predicting how the role of the UNC would change in the future. 
In particular, it is necessary to study the possibility that the role of the UNC in providing 
armed forces to the Korean Peninsula in case of an emergency could in the future develop 
into providing a multinational force that could expand to respond to a source of threat 
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